On the agenda: Tampa meeting — surveillance camera (Feb 15)

Hillsborough County Canvassing Board Meeting
February 15, 2024
11:00 AM
1.

Public Comment – 5 minutes
Please Note: Public comment is limited to matters or issues within the authority of the Canvassing Board

2.

Welcome and Introductions
a. Administrative Order A-2023-054

3.

Meeting Guidelines
a. Review and adopt

4.

Meeting and Activities Schedule
a. Review DE Reference Guide 0020: Canvassing Board Membership and Activities
b. Adopt meeting schedule and public notice

5.

Public Logic & Accuracy Test
a. Begin testing of Tabulation System and Audit System
b. ExpressVote Ballot Marking Device demonstration

6.

Testing of Voting Systems
a. Review DE Reference Guide 0019: Guidelines for Logic and Accuracy (L&A) Testing
b. Adopt public L&A Testing equipment allocation

7.

Canvassing of Vote By Mail (VBM) Ballots
a. VBM Ballot Types and Timelines
b. Review and adopt signature verification training and certification requirement
c. Review and adopt Canvassing Board VBM Ballot Criteria Chart

8.

Canvassing Provisional Ballots
a. Review and adopt Canvassing Board Provisional Ballot Criteria Chart

9.

Signature Cure Affidavits for VBM and Provisional Ballots
a. Review and Adopt Guidelines for Accepting or Rejecting Signature Cure Affidavits

10. Inspection, Examination, Review and Observation Guidelines and Protocols
a. Public inspection or examination of ballots and certificates, FS 101.572(1)
b. Review or inspection of certain materials by authorized persons, FS 101.572(2)
c. Observation of tabulation, FS 101.5612(2)
d. Observation of duplication, FS 101.5614(4)(a)
e. Observation of opening
f.
Filing a Protest to a VBM Ballot, FS101.68(2)(c)(4)
11. Voter Intent
a. Review rule 1S-2.027 and adopt criteria
12. Duplication
a. Review and adopt Duplication Policy and Guidelines
13. Recount
a. Review DE Reference Guidelines 0010: Recount Procedure Summary
14. Post-election Audit
a. Review DE Reference Guidelines 0011: Post-Election Voting System Audit Procedures Summary
b. Authorize use of Automated Independent Audit system
15. Security Procedures
16. Verify Logic & Accuracy Results
a. Tabulation System
b. Audit System
17. Adjourn

Hillsborough County
Canvassing Board

2024

2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) definition of canvass: Compilation of election returns
and validation of the outcome that forms the basis of the official results by political subdivision (VVSG
Volume 1, Version 1.0, A-6). These guidelines are available at www.eac.gov.

The purpose of the canvass is to account for every ballot cast and to ensure that each valid vote is
included in the official results. For an election official, the canvass means aggregating or confirming
every valid ballot cast and counted—absentee, early voting, Election Day, provisional, challenged, and
uniformed and overseas citizen. The canvass enables an election official to resolve discrepancies, correct
errors, and take any remedial actions necessary to ensure completeness and accuracy before certifying
the election.

Administrative Order; BOCC Recap

Meeting Guidelines

Canvassing Board Membership and Activities (DE Reference Guide 0020)

Logic and Accuracy Test (DE Reference Guide 0019)
Vote By Mail Ballot Types and Timelines; Federal and State Write In Ballots (DE Reference Guide
0002*); Signature Verification Training; Canvassing Board VBM Ballot Criteria Chart
Provisional Ballot Canvassing Criteria Chart; Voter Challenges (DE Reference Guide 0009*)

Guidelines for Accepting or Rejecting Signature Cure Affidavits

Observation and Inspection

Standards for Determining Voter Intent (Rule 1S-2.027)

Duplication Policy and Guidelines
Recount Procedure Summary (DE Reference Guideline 0010); Recount Procedures Manual (DS-DE
405)
Post-Election Audit Procedure Summary (DE Reference Guidelines 0011)

Security Procedures (Redacted)

*Update in progress as per Division of Elections

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2024 Hillsborough County Canvassing Board
Meeting Guidelines
1. Members will be identified with name tags and their names will be posted on the website and in
legal notices.
2. Attendees will sign in upon arrival and may sign up for public comment up until the time the
meeting is scheduled to begin.
3. At the start of each meeting, the Canvassing Board will allow for a total of 5 minutes for public
comment for Canvassing Board meetings. Public comment is limited to matters or issues within the
authority of the Canvassing Board.
4. Images of ballots and signatures will be projected for the public to see when reviewing voter intent
and signature matches.
5. No photos or videos may be taken when confidential information is being displayed, or as
prohibited by law.
6. Agendas will be posted on the Supervisor of Elections website by 6 PM the day before the meeting.
7. Minutes will be posted on the Supervisor of Elections website immediately following the next
meeting at which they will be adopted.

Canvassing Board Membership and Activities
DE Reference Guide 0020 (Updated 01-23-2024)(supersedes all prior versions)

These guidelines are for reference only. They are not to be construed as legal advice or representation. For any particular set of facts or
circumstances, refer to the applicable state, federal law, and case law, and/or consult a private attorney before drawing any legal
conclusions or relying upon this information.

Membership1
o

The Board is composed of three members: the supervisor of elections, a county court judge who acts as the
chair, and the chair of the board of county commissioners.

o

The names of canvassing board members must be published on the supervisor of elections’ website when
logic and accuracy testing is completed.

o

At least 48 hours published notice on the county’s website as provided in s. 50.0311, on the supervisor’s
website, or in one or more newspapers of general circulation in the county. If the applicable website
becomes unavailable or there is no newspaper of general circulation in the county, the notice must be
posted in at least four conspicuous places in the county.

Substitute
o

Substitutes must be appointed whenever a member is disqualified 2 or unable to serve in accordance with
section 102.141(1), Fla. Stat.

o

A substitute cannot be a candidate with opposition in the election being canvassed and cannot be an active
participant in the campaign or candidacy of any candidate with opposition in the election being canvassed.
For what constitutes active participation in the campaign or candidacy of a candidate, see Division of
Elections Advisory Opinion DE 09-07.

Alternate
o

The board must have at least two alternates designated.

o

The alternates should be appointed when the canvassing board membership is designated. An alternate may
serv3 in any seat.

o

If not otherwise serving as one of the three canvassing board members, the alternate can be present,
observe and communicate with the other board members but cannot vote in the board’s decisions or
determinations. The process for appointing alternates is set out in section 102.141(1), Fla. Stat.

Duties
o

Duties include, but are not, limited to:
 Undergoing mandatory signature matching training
 Canvassing of vote-by-mail ballots which can start as soon after the pre-election (public logic and
accuracy) testing of voting equipment is completed which can be scheduled within the 25 days before
early voting starts in the respective county 3 (conceivably as soon as 40 days before election day).
 Canvassing and counting of provisional ballots in consideration of evidence available.

1

§ 102.141, Fla. Stat

2 Disqualification and/or removal of members.

o

Authority to remove a canvassing board member. See Division of Elections’ Advisory Opinion DE 15-03

o

‘Active participation’ by a canvassing board member. See Division of Elections’ Advisory Opinion DE 08-10.

3 § 101.657, Fla. Stat. – The minimum mandatory EV period is 8 days beginning 10 days before election day with no less than 8 hours and no more

than 12 hours per day. Counties can offer additional days of EV up to the 15th day before Election Day and/or the 2nd day before Election Day.
Florida Department of State

Page 1 of 3

 Election night reporting, 1st unofficial, 2nd unofficial (if recount), and official certification of results
 Conducting recounts if triggered and post-election certification voting system audit which must be
completed no later than the 7th day following the board’s certification of the election.
 Submitting conduct of election reports, no later than 20 business days after the Election Canvassing
Commission certifies the election.
This reference guide focuses specifically on the membership requirement for those activities.

Requisite membership for canvassing board activities
•

Unless otherwise specified in law or rule, the canvassing board may act when two members are present, thereby
constituting a majority. The majority must agree on action to take. See also DE Advisory Opinion 05-08. The chart
below details required membership for each category of activity.
Activity
Public logic & accuracy
testing

Duplication of ballot

Canvassing vote-bymail ballots
Determination to count
or reject vote-by-mail
ballots
Signature matching provisional ballot
certificates, vote-bymail ballot certificates,
cure affidavits
Canvassing of
provisional ballots

Recount

Florida Department of State

Number of Board Members to be Present

Citation: law(s) and/or
rule(s)

•

At least one member present for test

•

All members to certify the accuracy of test

•

Majority to approve ballots to be duplicated

•

At least one member to be present during duplication of
ballots

•

Majority to approve and order the opening of the ballots

•

At least one member must be present at all times during
opening and running of the ballots through tabulation
system

•

Majority present to determine whether to count or reject
a ballot

Sections 101.68, 101.6925,
and 102.141(2), Fla. Stat.

•

Majority to determine whether signature matches

•

Determination beyond reasonable doubt

Sections 101.048 and 101.68,
Fla. Stat.

•

Majority to determine whether to count or reject

•

Determination by preponderance of the evidence

•

Majority present at all times during recount process

•

All members for determination or decision to resolve a
discrepancy during a recount

•

At least one board member present at all times during
tabulation if a paper-based or digital-based automatic
independent recount tabulation system is used during the

Section 101.5612(2), Fla. Stat.

Sections 101.5614(5), 101.68,
and 102.141(8), Fla. Stat.
Sections 101.68, 101.6925,
and 102.141(2) & (8), Fla.
Stat.

Sections 101.048, 101.049,
101.657, 101.6925, and
102.141(2), Fla. Stat.; Rule 1S2.037, Fla. Admin. Code
Sections 102.141 and
102.166, Fla. Stat.; Rules 1S2.027, and 1S-2.031, Fla.
Admin. Code, DS-DE 405

Page 2 of 3

Activity

Number of Board Members to be Present

Citation: law(s) and/or
rule(s)

recount and ballots are being tabulated on the system
prior to the order of a recount 4

Certification of election
results
Post-election
certification audit of
voting system

•

Majority to certify results

Section 102.141, Fla. Stat.

•

Majority at all times during audit process except that at
least one board member need only be present during the
processing of ballots into the automated independent
audit system

Section 101.591, Fla. Stat.;
Rule 1S-5.026, Fla. Admin.
Code; DS-DE 410

Currently no such system is tested or certified for use in the state.

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Florida Department of State

Page 3 of 3

Guidelines for Logic and Accuracy (L&A) Testing
DE Reference Guide 0019 (Updated 05/2022)

These guidelines are for reference only. They are not to be construed as legal advice or representation. For any particular set of facts
or circumstances, refer to the applicable state, federal law, and case law, and/or consult a private attorney before drawing any legal
conclusions or relying upon this information.

OVERVIEW
100% Logic and Accuracy (L&A) Testing. After completing maintenance and programming of voting equipment,
the law requires a logic and accuracy (L&A) testing to be conducted on all of the voting equipment to be used in an
election (100% L&A). This test:
o Is done to ensure that the system is properly programmed, the election is accurately defined on the voting
system, and the input, output, and communication devices are working correctly. 1
o May be conducted before or after the public L&A test (details below). Best practice is before public L&A.
o Involves testing:

All programmed precinct voting devices

All programmed voter interface devices

All tabulators that will be used for vote-by-mail ballots

•

•

Public L&A Testing. A sample of the automatic tabulation equipment 2 to be used in an election must be publicly
tested to ensure equipment will correctly count the votes cast for all candidates, in all offices, and on all measures.
o

o
o

o
o

Publish public notice at least 48 hours in advance of the event.3 See more details in the “NOTICE REQUIREMENTS”
section.
Complete on any day within the 25-day period 4 before early voting (EV) 5 is scheduled to begin in the county.
Requires canvassing board to convene for public L&A testing, certify to the accuracy of the test, and witness
resetting and sealing of each device that passed to a pre-election state of readiness in such a manner as to
secure its state of readiness until the opening of the polls (Canvassing board may designate one member to be
its representative.
Test within presence of attending political party representatives and candidates or their representatives.
Upon completion of the logic and accuracy test, the names of the canvassing board members must be published
on the supervisor’s website.

NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
•

The public L&A date, time, and place must be posted at least 48-hours in advance on the supervisor of elections
website and once in the newspaper. If no newspaper is available, then notice may be posted in four conspicuous
locations in the county.

•

The applicable qualifying officer (supervisor of elections or the municipal elections official) may, at the time of
qualifying, give written notice of the public L&A test’s date, time, and location to each candidate and obtain a signed
receipt that the notice has been given.

§ 101.5612(1), Fla. Stat.
“Automatic tabulation equipment” is defined as the apparatus necessary to automatically examine, count, and record votes.
3
§ 101.5612(2), Fla. Stat.
4
Id.
5
§ 101.657, Fla. Stat. – The minimum mandatory EV period is 8 days beginning 10 days before election day with no less than 8 hours
and no more than 12 hours per day. Counties can offer additional days of EV up to the 15th day before Election Day and/or the 2nd
day before Election day.
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Florida Department of State

DOS DE Reference Guide 0019 (05/2022)

Page 1 of 4

•

At least 30 days before early voting is scheduled to begin in the county, the applicable qualifying officer must send
via certified mail written notice of the test date, time, and location to the county party chair of each political party
and to all candidates other than those for statewide office whose names appear on the ballot in the county and who
did not receive written notification from the applicable qualifying officer at the time of qualifying. 6

TESTING REQUIREMENTS
•

Public L&A testing may include all or a sample of the tabulation equipment. If the county chooses to publicly test
only a sample, the requirements 7 are:
o A random selection of at least 5% or 10 precinct optical scan devices, whichever is greater
o Ballot marking devices, the overall number of which is at the discretion of the supervisor, to ensure that
they satisfy accessibility requirements as described in subsections 101.56062(1)(n) and (2), Fla. Stat.
o Early voting device(s), the overall number of which is at the discretion of the supervisor
o All central count (vote-by-mail) tabulators

•

Testing requires producing/processing a set of pre-determined valid votes for each candidate and for each measure,
as well as one or more overvoted ballots for each contest. This is commonly called a test deck. See additional test
deck details in the “TEST DECK REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS” section.

•

After the test deck has been processed through the tabulation equipment, a comparison is made between the predetermined test deck results and a printout of tabulator results to ensure that the “expected” vote counts matched
the actual vote counts.

•

If a tested tabulation device is found to have an error in tabulation, it is deemed unsatisfactory and the canvassing
board must take, at least, the following steps 8:
o
o
o

Determine the cause of the error
Identify and test other devices that could reasonably be assumed to have the same error
Test a sufficient number of devices to determine that all other devices are satisfactory

•

If the canvassing board deems any device to be unsatisfactory, it may require all devices to be tested or may declare
that all devices are unsatisfactory.

•

If an error is found in the operation or output of a particular device, such as with spelling or the order of candidates
on a report, the canvassing board must determine whether this is cause to deem a device to be unsatisfactory. 9

•

Mandatory additional step for public testing of equipment used to tabulate vote-by-mail ballots - If any error is
detected on electronic or electromechanical voting systems configured to tabulate vote-by-mail ballots at a central
or regional site, the statutes call for the error to be corrected, and for testing to be repeated until an errorless count
is achieved immediately before the start of the official count of the ballots and again after the completion of the
official count.10

•

When the public L&A testing has been satisfactorily completed, the canvassing board or its representative, the
representatives of the political parties, and the candidates or their representatives who attended the test shall be
allowed to witness the resetting to a pre-election state of readiness of each device that passed and the sealing of
each device that passed to secure its state until the opening of the polls. 11

§ 101.5612(2), Fla. Stat.
§ 101.5612(4)(a)1., Fla. Stat.
8
§ 101.5612(4)(a)2., Fla. Stat.
9
§ 101.5612(4)(a)3., Fla. Stat.
10
§ 101.5612(3), Fla. Stat.
11
§101.5612(4)(b), Fla. Stat.
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7

Florida Department of State

DOS DE Reference Guide 0019 (05/2022)

Page 2 of 4

•

The canvassing board or its representative shall execute a written statement identifying the tabulation devices that
were tested, the results of the testing, the device’s protective counter numbers (if applicable) the number of the
seal securing each tabulation device at the conclusion of testing, any problems reported to the board as a result of
the testing, and whether each device tested was deemed to be satisfactory or unsatisfactory. 12

•

If any tabulating device is deemed to be unsatisfactory, it must be recoded, repaired, or replaced and must then be
made available for retesting. Such device must be determined by the canvassing board or its representative to be
satisfactory before it may be used in any election. The canvassing board or its representative shall announce at the
close of the first testing the date, place, and time that any unsatisfactory device will be retested or may, at the
option of the board, notify by telephone each person who was present at the first testing as to the date, place, and
time that the retesting will occur. 13

•

Records must be kept of all pre-election testing of electronic or electromechanical tabulation devices used in any
election. These records must be available for inspection and/or reference during public L&A testing. Records must
include the name of the person who tested each device, along with the date, place, time, and results of each test. 14

•

Test records must be retained as part of the official records of the election. 15

•

Once the logic and accuracy test is completed, canvassing boards may begin to canvass returned vote-by-mail
ballots. 16.

TEST DECK REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
•

A test deck is a set of ballots with pre-audited results, meaning that they have a pre-determined number of valid
votes for each candidate on each measure, with at least one or more overvoted ballots for each contest (to ensure
that voting device will alert voter that overvoted races will not be counted) 17.

•

Pre-audited results are used to verify the accuracy of the public L&A test by comparing the pre-audited results to the
public test results. The pre-audited results may be manually determined, electronically generated (i.e. using a
spreadsheet), or produced during pre-public L&A testing.

•

L&A tests must include actual ballots that will be used in the election; and if the county uses ballot-on-demand,
these ballots, using the same paper stock as will be used for the election, must be included. 18

•

The test deck should include at least one blank ballot (to ensure that voting device will accept a blank ballot), hand
marked ballots, and ballot marking device ballots. The test deck may also include electronically marked ballots.

•

The creation of an “enhanced” test desk with non-traditional vote patterns and/or the addition of more test ballots
to make up a unique number of votes for each candidate is strongly recommended. While a county may have used a
1-2-3 test deck pattern, it is not the most precise way to verify that votes are being tabulated correctly.

[Checklist for Public Logic and Accuracy Testing on next page]

§ 101.5612(4)(c), Fla. Stat.
§ 101.5612(4)(d), Fla. Stat.
14
§ 101.5612(4)(e), Fla. Stat.
15
§ 101.5612(4)(e), Fla. Stat.
16
§ 101.68(2)(a), Fla. Stat.
17
§ 101.5612(3), Fla. Stat.
18
§ 101.5612(5), Fla. Stat.
12
13

Florida Department of State

DOS DE Reference Guide 0019 (05/2022)

Page 3 of 4

CHECKLIST FOR PUBLIC LOGIC AND ACCURACY TESTING
The L&A test ideally serves as a dress rehearsal for the actual election and should include the following key elements:


A sample of available voting devices or 100%



One or more early voting devices



All vote-by-mail tabulators



Examination of ballot marking devices, along with the audio ballot and ADA accessories that are paired with the
device (e.g. tactile device, visual display ballot, display contrast, ballot magnification)



A pre-audited group of ballots, with a predetermined number of valid votes for each candidate, on each
measure, to include one or more ballots with an overvote



The test deck should include as many ballots as needed to accommodate a unique number of marks for each of
the candidates and yes/no votes to ensure that the correct number of votes are counted for each candidate and
each issue. The supervisor of elections has discretion whether or not to examine every ballot style.



Upload of the results into the election management system



Modem upload, if applicable



Creation of the election night reporting in the XML file format 19



Submission of the election night reporting in the XML file format to the Division, if a test file has not been
previously submitted



Submission (via certified mail) of a copy of the election database (preferably with uploaded L&A results) to BVSC
within 24 hours 20

19

§ 102.141(4), Fla. Stat.; Rule 1S-2.053, Fla. Admin. Code

20

§101.5607(1)(b), Fla. Stat.
Florida Department of State

DOS DE Reference Guide 0019 (05/2022)

Page 4 of 4

VBM BALLOT TYPES AND TIMELINES
A returned official VBM ballot always takes precedence over the voter’s returned state write-in ballot (SWAB) or
federal write-in ballot (FWAB).
UOCAVA (Uniformed Overseas and Civilian Absentee Voting Act) Voter: Any member of a uniformed service on
active duty who, by reason of such duty, is absent stateside or overseas from the place of residence where
otherwise qualified to vote; any member of the merchant marine, who by reason of such service is absent stateside
or overseas from the place of residence where otherwise qualified to vote; and any spouse or dependent of
uniformed service member of merchant marine.
Overseas means outside of the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin
Islands, and American Samoa

•
•

•

VBM Ballot Type

Return
Method

Deadline for Receipt

Authority

7 PM Election Day

101.62
101.67

7PM Election Day

101.62
Rule 1S-2.030

Faxed

7 PM Election Day

101.62
Rule 1S-2.030

If mailed

Up to 10 days after PPP or General
Election. Must be postmarked or dated no
later than Election Day

101.62, Rule 1S2.030

Regular Official VBM (upon request of voter)
Any voter
Any absent stateside uniformed service
member or merchant marine member,
or spouse or dependent
Any overseas voter (uniformed service
member or merchant marine member,
or spouse or dependent; or US civilian
citizen)

Mail or
Drop Off

State Write-In Ballot [SWAB] (upon request of voter between 180 and 90 before the General Election)
101.6951
Any overseas voter (due to military or
Mailed
7 PM Election Day
101.6952
other contingency that will preclude the
Faxed
Rule 1S-2.028
normal delivery of a regular VBM ballot,
and to vote all offices –federal, state
Up to 10 days after PPP or General
101.6951
and local – to which the voter is entitled If mailed Election. Must be postmarked or dated no
101.6952
to vote)
later than Election Day
Rule 1S-2.028
Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot [FWAB] (Emergency/back up ballot if regular VBM ballot requested but not yet
received by UOCAVA voter for use in any federal, state or local election)
Any absent stateside uniformed services
7 PM Election Day
UOCAVA 52
member or merchant marine member,
Mailed
(If postmarked by Election Day, the date on U.S.C. 20303
or spouse or dependent
envelope will be deemed return date)
101.6952
Mailed
101.62
7 PM Election Day
Faxed
Rule 1S-2.030
Any overseas voter (uniformed services
member or merchant marine member,
Up to 10 days after PPP or General
101.6951
or spouse or dependent, or US civilian)
If mailed Election. Must be postmarked or dated no
101.6952
later than Election Day
•
•

•

FWAB is not canvassed until 7 PM Election Day. If regular VBM ballot not received by 7 PM Election Day, the FWAB is
canvassed.
If FWAB received from overseas voter for the PPP or General, it is not canvassed until 10 days after Election Day to allow for
receipt of the regular VBM ballot. If regular VBM ballot is not received by the 10 day deadline, the FWAB is canvassed.
Date signed is presumed to be the date mailed regardless of postmark date or absence of postmark.

Guidelines for VBM Ballot Types and Timelines, Hillsborough County Canvassing Board,
From FSE Canvassing Board Workshop

Page 1 of 1

From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:

Matthews, Maria I. <[email protected]>
Wednesday, January 17, 2024 5:00 PM
SOEList; SOEStaffContacts
Marconnet, Amber
Signature Verification 2024 Election Cycle

EXTERNAL EMAIL: Exercise Caution with links or
attachments.
Dear Supervisors of Elections,
As you and/or your staff take the Signature Verification 2024 Election Cycle online program
offered through the Florida Institute of Government on behalf of the Department of
State/Division of Elections, please note that this program and content format was designed to
be taken individually at the convenience of the participant with focus on individual learning
and testing. This follows the format similar to other program offerings through FIOG such as
the Florida Ethics, Public Records and Sunshine Law program.
Our current arrangement with the Florida Institute of Government did not contemplate nor
incorporate functionality for group training or creating certificates for a group of participants.
The program taken individually generates one certificate specific to the participant.
We understand the convenience that may come from such group training, particularly if you
are already gathered together for some other separate online training program such as the
canvassing board workshop. I recall that a link to the course program was provided within the
canvassing board workshop but the signature verification program is not a part of the
workshop but a separate program.
That being said, we will certainly consider this functionality as part of any future signature
program redevelopment which would allow for group training but test individual knowledge
and issue individual certificates for proof of participation and as needed, for continuing
education credit. Until then, please encourage participants to take the course individually.
Again, the direct link to the Signature Verification 2024 Election Cycle online program is
https://elearning.iog.fsu.edu/enroll/2710579?th__ug=05390922
Respec ully,
1

Maria Ma hews, Esq.
Division of Elec ons, Director
850-245-6520 | Office Line
DEPARTMENT OF STATE | DIVISION OF ELECTIONS
R. A. Gray Building, Room 316
500 S. Bronough Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
850-245-6200 | Main Line
850-245-6217 | Fax
866-308-6739 | Voter Assistance Hotline
877-868-3737 | Voter Fraud Hotline
Email:
DivElec [email protected]florida.com
Website: h ps://dos.myflorida.com/elec ons
Important notices:
This response is provided for reference only and does not constitute legal advice or representation. As applied to a particular set of facts or
circumstances, interested parties should refer to the Florida Statutes and applicable case law, and/or consult a private attorney before drawing any
legal conclusions or relying upon the information provided. (Esta respuesta se proporciona solo como referencia y no constituye consejo ni
representación legal. Las personas interesadas deben consultar los Estatutos de la Florida y la jurisprudencia aplicable, y / o consultar a un abogado
privado para saber como el leye se aplique a sus hechos or circustancias particulares antes de sacar conclusiones legales o confiar en la información
proporcionada.)
Written communications including email addresses to governmental agencies constitute public records and are available to the public including
media upon request unless the information is subject to a specific statutory exemption. See e.g., F.S. 668.6076 (Las comunicaciones escritas, incluso
las direcciones de correo electrónico, a agencias de gobierno, constituyen registros públicos y están disponibles, a pedido, para el público, incluso la
prenjsa, a menos que la información esté sujeta a una exención legal específica. Véase por ejemplo, F.S. 668.6076)

2

Hillsborough County Canvassing Board VBM Ballot Criteria Chart
Statute/ Rule

Vote By Mail

Accept

101.68(2)(c)1
101.68(4)(b)

No signature, if left uncured
No signature, with cure affifavit

101.68(2)(c)1,
98.077(4)(a), 101.65

Signature does not match, received completed cure affidavit

101.68(2)(c)1,
98.077(4)(a), 101.65

*X

*X
X

Signature printed and does not match the signature on file, if left uncured or incomplete cure

101.68(4)(b)

101.68(1)(c)
101.64(2)
101.045
101.68(2)(c)2
101.67(2)
101.69
Statute/ Rule

*X

Signature printed does not match, with completed cure affidavit
Voter signed envelope for someone else and both voters had a request on file

X
X

Two or more ballots for the same election returned in one mailing envelope

X

Voter sends ballot in blank envelope that does not have the oath
Voted wrong ballot (voter has moved/party change)
Voter deceased after ballot was postmarked or voter removed after ballot returned
Late return of VBM ballot (except UOCAVA voters)
Voted early or at the polls
Vote By Mail Cure Affidavit

X
X
X
X
Accept

Cure Affidavit received with Tier 1 identification

X

101.68(3)(b)

Cure Affidavit received with Tier 2 identification and the cure signature matches a signature on record

X

Canvassing Board VBM Ballot Criteria Chart

From FSE Canvassing Board Workshop

X
X

101.68(3)(a)

Cure Affidavit received with Tier 2 identification and the signature on the cure does not match** a signature on
record
Cure not received prior to 5 PM on the 2nd day after the election

Case by Case

X

Signature does not match**, if left uncured or incomplete cure

101.68(2)(c)1

Reject

Reject

Case by Case

*X
X

Page 1 of 2

Statute/ Rule

Absent from Overseas Voters (10 Days After the Election)

Accept

101.6952, 1S-2.030

No postmark or date

101.6952, 1S-2.030

Date of postmark on or before election day

X

Dated on or before election day but postmarked later or no postmark
Dated and postmarked after election day or dated after election day with no postmark

X

Statute/ Rule

State Write-In Ballot

101.6951

Reject
X

X
Accept

Reject

State write-in ballot will be considered on a case by case basis

Statute/ Rule

Special Instances
Voter submitted a voted sample ballot with clear voter intent, inside their Certificate Envelope that has a valid
signature
Voter changed address, sent two ballots; both ballots received, first correct ballot accepted
[PPP or Primary] Voter changed political affiliation, sent two ballots; both ballots received, first correct ballot
accepted

Statute/ Rule

Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot
Not a registered voter in the county
Signed the FWAB and the signature verified, no other issues
No date and no postmark -- received after election day
Dated or postmarked on election day or earlier
No request received but dated on or before election day and oath is signed
Challenge of overseas voter based on not meeting definition of 97.021(25)
Not registered by deadline

Case by Case

Case by Case
X

Accept

Reject

Case by Case

Reject

Case by Case

X
X
X
Accept

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

*Opportunity to Cure: Per FS 101.68(4) until 5 PM on the 2nd day after the election, the supervisor shall allow an elector who has returned a VBM ballot that does not include
the elector's signature or whose signature does not match to submit an affidavit with a copy of identification to cure.
**Beyond reasonable doubt: Per FS 101.68(2)(c), a finding by the Canvassing Board that an elector's signature does not match must be by majority vote and beyond a reasonable
doubt.
10 Day Extension for Overseas Voters: A federal write-in absentee ballot may not be canvassed until 7 PM on the day of the election A federal write-in absentee ballot from an
overseas voter in a presidential preference primary or general election may not be canvassed until the conclusion of the 10 day period specified in subsection (5). Each federal
write-in absentee ballot received by 7 PM on the day of the election shall be canvassed pursuant to 101.5614(5) and 101.68, unless the elector's official absentee ballot is
received by 7 PM on election day 101.6952(2)(a). An absent uniformed services voter or an overseas voter who makes timely application for but does not receive an official
absentee ballot may use the federal write-in absentee ballot to vote in any federal, state or local election.

Canvassing Board VBM Ballot Criteria Chart

From FSE Canvassing Board Workshop

Page 2 of 2

Hillsborough County Canvassing Board Provisional Ballot Criteria Chart
Statute/ Rule
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.045
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.048
101.049
101.049

Provisional Ballots

Accept

Voter is eligible, signature matches, correct precinct
Voter is eligible but did not have proper ID -- Signature matches that on file
Voter given the provisional in error -- should have voted a regular ballot
Voter application was not verified by the state, voter furnished additional information prior to 5 PM of the 2nd
day. Voter deemed eligible.
Election Day ballot cast in wrong precinct
Voter name not found -- not registered to vote
Voter moved into county -- Eligible, signature matches, correct precinct
Voter moved out of county
Voter had been removed as ineligible
Voter registered after the books closed
Voter's application was not verified by the state, voter did not furnish additional identification by 5 PM of the 2nd
day.
Voters application was incomplete so not eligible to vote
Voter's signature did not match** and voter did not sign "Signature Differs" Affidavit, but signature on provisional
matches that on file with SOE
Voter's signature did not match** and voter did not sign "Signature Differs" Affidavit, but voter completes the
cure affidavit

X
X
X

Canvassing Board Provisional Ballot Criteria Chart

From FSE Canvassing Board Workshop

Case by Case

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Voter's signature did not match, voter did not sign "Signature Differs" Affidavit, and left uncured or incomplete
Voter's right to vote has been challenged, or the voter has been sent a notice of potential ineligibility under s.
98.075(7)
[PPP or Primary] Voter has disputed party affiliation; provisional ballot is the wrong party according to SOE
research
Voter has already voted by mail or at an early vote ocation
Voting hours extended -- voter is eligible and in the correct precinct
Voting hours extended -- voter is eligible and NOT in the correct precinct
Not registered by deadline

Reject

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Page 1 of 2

*Opportunity to Cure: Per FS 101.68(4) until 5 PM on the 2nd day after the election, the supervisor shall allow an elector who has returned a VBM ballot that does not include
the elector's signature or whose signature does not match to submit an affidavit with a copy of identification to cure.
**Beyond reasonable doubt: Per FS 101.68(2)(c), a finding by the Canvassing Board that an elector's signature does not match must be by majority vote and beyond a reasonable
doubt.
10 Day Extension for Overseas Voters: A federal write-in absentee ballot may not be canvassed until 7 PM on the day of the election A federal write-in absentee ballot from an
overseas voter in a presidential preference primary or general election may not be canvassed until the conclusion of the 10 day period specified in subsection (5). Each federal
write-in absentee ballot received by 7 PM on the day of the election shall be canvassed pursuant to 101.5614(5) and 101.68, unless the elector's official absentee ballot is
received by 7 PM on election day 101.6952(2)(a). An absent uniformed services voter or an overseas voter who makes timely application for but does not receive an official
absentee ballot may use the federal write-in absentee ballot to vote in any federal, state or local election.

Canvassing Board Provisional Ballot Criteria Chart

From FSE Canvassing Board Workshop

Page 2 of 2

Guidelines for Accepting or Rejecting Signature Cure Affidavit for Missing or Mismatched
Signature on a Provisional Ballot or VBM Ballot Certificate [FS 101.68(4) and FS 101.048]
•

SOE is required to notify a voter as soon as practicable if a signature is missing from the certificate or the signature
on the certificate does not match the signature in the record. This applies to provisional ballots and VBM ballots.

•

A voter has until 5 PM on the 2nd day after Election Day to submit by mail, email, fax or in person a signature cure
affidavit. The voter must submit DS-DE 210 for a provisional ballot or DS-DE 139 for a VBM ballot, AND a copy of:
o A Tier 1 Identification (ID) that is current and valid with voter’s name and photo – Florida driver license, FL
ID card issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles; United States passport; debit or
credit card; military ID; student ID; retirement center, neighborhood association or public assistance ID;
veteran health ID card issued by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs; Florida license to carry a concealed
weapon or firearm; or employee ID card issued by any branch, department, agency or entity of the federal
government, the state, a county or a municipality.
Or (only if voter does not have Tier 1 ID)
o A Tier 2 Identification that shows the voter’s name and current residence address: current utility bill; bank
statement; government check; paycheck; or government document (excluding a voter information card).

•

The Canvassing Board’s finding that a signature on a voter certificate and/or cure affidavit does not match must be
by majority vote and beyond a reasonable doubt.

Canvassing Board Determination on Signature Cure Affidavit

Accept

Reject

Voter provided Tier 1 or Tier 2 ID but no signature cure affidavit

x

Voter provided Tier 1 and Tier 2 ID and an unsigned cure affidavit

x

Voter provided signed cure affidavit but no Tier 1 or Tier 2 ID

x

Voter provided signed cure affidavit and unacceptable ID

x

Voter provided signed cure affidavit and although signatures on affidavit and in the record do
not match, the voter provided current and valid Tier 1 ID

x

Voter provided signed cure affidavit and Tier 2 ID but signatures on affidavit and in the record do
not match
Voter provided signed cure affidavit and Tier 1 or Tier 2 ID and signatures on affidavit and in the
record match

Guidelines for Signature Cure Affidavits, Hillsborough County Canvassing Board
From FSE Canvassing Board Workshop

x
x

Page 1 of 1

PUBLIC INSPECTION OF BALLOTS AND CERTIFICATES
PURSUANT TO 101.572(1)
The official ballots and ballot cards received from election boards and removed from vote-by-mail ballot
mailing envelopes and voter certificates on such mailing envelopes shall be open for public inspection or
examination while in the custody of the supervisor of elections or the county canvassing board at any
reasonable time, under reasonable conditions; however, no persons other than the supervisor of elections or
his or her employees or the county canvassing board shall handle any official ballot or ballot card. If the ballots
are being examined prior to the end of the contest period in s.102.168, the supervisor of elections shall make
a reasonable effort to notify all candidates whose names appear on such ballots or ballot cards by telephone
or otherwise of the time and place of the inspection or examination. All such candidates, or their
representatives, shall be allowed to be present during the inspection or examination.
The Canvassing Board directs staff to accommodate public inspection of ballots and certificates as per the
above statute, and paragraphs 1-10 below.
1. Dates during which public inspection of ballots and certificates may occur will be contained in a legal
notice published in a newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also be available on the
Supervisor of Elections website.
2. When arriving to observe, the member of the public will check in at the front desk of the ESC by 8:00 AM
and will receive a name tag which must be worn at all times. The observer will be escorted to the
inspection area.
3. Voter certificates on mailing envelopes processed the previous day will be available for inspection.
4. Ballots processed the previous day will be available for inspection.
5. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the review/inspection
room.
6. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the review/inspection room.
7. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials.
8. No recordings or photos are allowed.
9. No bags or briefcases are permitted in the review/inspection room.
10. The session will end promptly at 8:30 AM.

REVIEW OR INSPECTION OF CERTAIN MATERIALS BY AUTHORIZED PERSONS
PURSUANT TO 101.572(2)
A candidate, a political party official, or a political committee official, or an authorized designee thereof, shall be
granted reasonable access upon request to review or inspect ballot materials before canvassing or tabulation,
including voter certificates on vote-by-mail envelopes, cure affidavits, corresponding comparison signatures,
duplicate ballots, and corresponding originals. Before the supervisor begins comparing signatures on vote-bymail voter certificates, the supervisor must publish notice of the access to be provided under this section, which
may be access to the documents or images thereof, and the method of requesting such access. During such
review, no person granted access for review may make any copy of a signature.

The Canvassing Board directs staff to accommodate review or inspection of certain materials by authorized
persons as per the above statute, and paragraphs 1-9 below.
1. Dates and times during which review or inspection of certain materials by authorized person may occur
will be contained in a legal notice published in a newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also
be available on the Supervisor of Elections website.
2. Each candidate, political party official, political committee official, or authorized designee thereof
seeking to review or inspect certain materials shall complete an on-line form requesting access and
submit the form to the Supervisor of Elections Office through the Supervisor of Elections website.
Appointments are limited and will be assigned on a first-come, first-served basis.
3. When arriving to observe, the designee will check in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a name
tag which must be worn at all times.
4. A staff member will escort the designee to the review/inspection area. A staff member will present the
designee the materials requested for review or inspection.
5. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the review/inspection
room.
6. No bags or briefcases are permitted in the review/inspection room.
7. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the review/inspection room.
8. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials.
9. The appointment will end promptly at 8:45 AM.

OBSERVATION OF TABULATION
PURSUANT TO 101.5612(2)
Each political party may designate one person with expertise in the computer field who shall be allowed in the
central counting room when all tests are being conducted and when the official votes are being counted. The
designee shall not interfere with the normal operation of the canvassing board.

The Canvassing Board directs staff to accommodate observation of tabulation as per the above statute, and
paragraphs 1-8 below.
1. Dates and times during which tabulation and testing may occur will be contained in a legal notice
published in a newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also be available on the website.
2. The Supervisor of Elections Office reserves the right to not tabulate during the authorized times, based
on agency needs.
3. Each party choosing to designate a representative for observation of tabulation shall submit the name to
the Supervisor of Elections Office. One person per party will be allowed in the tabulation room at a time.
4. When arriving to observe, the designee must check in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a
name tag which must be worn at all times.
5. The observer shall be restricted to a suitable area within the tabulation room from which he or she can
hear and see the tabulation stations.
6. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the tabulation room.
7. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the tabulation room.
8. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials, or otherwise interfere with the activities
underway in the tabulation room. This includes directly communicating with staff performing tabulation.

OBSERVATION OF DUPLICATION
PURSUANT TO 101.5614(4)(A)
Upon request, a physically present candidate, a political party official, a political committee official, or an
authorized designee thereof, must be allowed to observe the duplication of ballots. The observer must be allowed
to observe the duplication of ballots in such a way that the observer is able to see the markings on each ballot and
the duplication taking place.
If any observer makes a reasonable objection to a duplicate of a ballot, the ballot must be presented to the
canvassing board for a determination of the validity of the duplicate.

The Canvassing Board directs staff to accommodate observation of duplication as per the above statute, and
paragraphs 1-11 below.
1. Dates and times during which duplication is authorized to occur will be contained in a legal notice published
in a newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also be available on the website.
2. The Supervisor of Elections office reserves the right to not duplicate during the authorized times, based on
agency needs.
3. Each candidate, political party official, political committee official, or authorized designee thereof seeking to
observe duplication shall submit the name of the designated observer to the Supervisor of Elections office.
One person per candidate, political party, or political committee will be allowed in the duplication room at a
time.
4. When arriving to observe, the designee must check in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a name
tag which must be worn at all times.
5. The observer must sign an affidavit affirming acknowledgment that disclosure of election results discerned
from observing the ballot duplication process while the election is ongoing is a felony. See § 101.5614(4)(a),
Fla. Stat.
6. Observers shall be restricted to a suitable area within the duplication room from which they can hear and
see the duplication stations.
7. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the duplication room.
8. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the duplication room.
9. No bags or briefcases are permitted in the duplication room.
10. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials, or otherwise interfere with the activities
underway in the duplication room. This includes directly communicating with staff performing duplication.
11. If an observer wishes to make a reasonable objection to a duplicate of a ballot, he or she will so indicate by
raising his or her hand, at which time a staff member will provide the observer a form to complete and sign
stating the basis for the objection. Staff will secure the complaint, the original ballot and the duplicate
ballot for presentation to the Canvassing Board.

OBSERVATION OF VBM OPENING
PURSUANT TO CANVASSING BOARD POLICY AND BASED ON 101.5612(2)
Each political party may designate one person who shall be allowed in the Vote By Mail opening room when
VBM ballots are being opened and ballots processed for tabulation.
The Canvassing Board directs staff to accommodate observation of VBM opening as per the above Canvassing
Board policy, and paragraphs 1-9 below.
1. Dates and times during which VBM opening may occur will be contained in a legal notice published in a
newspaper of general circulation. This notice will also be available on the website.
2. The Supervisor of Elections office reserves the right to not open VBM ballots during the authorized
times, based on agency needs.
3. Each party choosing to designate a representative for observation of VBM opening shall submit the
name to the Supervisor of Elections office. One person per party will be allowed in the opening room at
a time.
4. When arriving to observe, the designee must check in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a
name tag which must be worn at all times.
5. The observer shall be restricted to a suitable area within the VBM opening room from which he or she
can hear and see the opening stations.
6. Use of personal computers and devices, including cell phones, is prohibited in the opening room.
7. Eating or drinking is prohibited in the opening room.
8. No bags or briefcases are permitted in the opening room.
9. At no time can the observer touch any ballots or materials, or otherwise interfere with the activities
underway in the VBM opening room. This includes directly communicating with staff performing VBM
opening.

FILING A PROTEST TO A VBM BALLOT
PURSUANT TO 101.68(2)(C)(4)
If any elector or candidate present believes that a vote-by-mail ballot is illegal due to a defect apparent on the
voter’s certificate or the cure affidavit, he or she may, at any time before the ballot is removed from the
envelope, file with the canvassing board a protest against the canvass of that ballot, specifying the precinct,
the voter’s certificate or the cure affidavit, and the reason he or she believes the ballot to be illegal. A
challenge based upon a defect in the voter’s certificate or cure affidavit may not be accepted after the ballot
has been removed from the mailing envelope.

The Canvassing Board directs staff to accommodate filing a protest to a VBM ballot as per the above statute,
and paragraphs 1-4 below.
1. Any elector or candidate may protest against the canvass of a ballot that the elector or candidate
believes is illegal due to a defect apparent on the vote’s certificate or cure affidavit.
2. The protest must be filed before the ballot is removed from the envelope.
3. During the review or inspection period, the person making the objection will indicate to staff the voter
certificate or cure affidavit against which the objection is to be made and will then complete a form to
lodge the protest. The protest must be specific as to the ballot being challenged, the precinct, and the
reason for such protest.
4. Staff will secure the voter certificate or cure affidavit against which the objection has been made, and
the completed and signed protest form for presentation to the Canvassing Board.

1S-2.027 Standards for Determining Voter’s Choice on a Ballot.
(1) Application. The standards in this rule apply to determine whether the voter has clearly indicated a definite choice for
purposes of counting a vote cast on a ballot in a manual recount as provided specifically by Section 102.166, F.S.
(2) Direct recording electronic voting system.
(a) A vote cast on this voting system is valid for a particular candidate, issue choice, or judicial retention choice when the voter
marks the ballot electronically as specified in the ballot instructions.
(b) A vote cast on this voting system is valid for a particular write-in candidate when the voter types on the touch screen the
name of a write-in candidate in accordance with the ballot instructions.
(3) Optical scan voting system.
(a) A vote cast on this voting system is valid for a particular candidate, issue choice, or judicial retention choice when the voter
marks the ballot as specified in the ballot instructions.
(b) A vote cast on this voting system is valid for a particular write-in candidate when the voter writes in the name of a candidate
in the designated write-in space and fills in the oval or arrow next to the write-in candidate’s name.
(4) Manual review and tabulation.
(a) The standards under this subsection apply in all instances where a contest is not marked as specified in the ballot instructions
under subsection (2) or (3), and a manual review of the voter’s markings on a ballot is required to determine whether there is a clear
indication that the voter has made a definite choice in a contest.
(b) The canvassing board must first look at the entire ballot for consistency. Then the provisions of paragraph (c) apply to
determine whether the voter has made a definite choice in a contest, provided the voter has not marked any other contest on the
ballot, or if the voter has marked other contests, he or she has marked them in the same manner, subject to the exceptions in
subparagraphs 7., 10., and 15. The following are examples of valid votes after review for consistency:

Ballot Situation 1: Recount in race of State Representative. The two
ovals in the first two races are filled in properly, but the voter has
circled the candidate’s name in the state representative race. Since
the voter did not mark the state representative race in the same
manner as in the other races, it cannot be determined whether the
voter has clearly indicated a definite choice for Don Nichols.

Ballot Situation 2: Recount in race of State Representative. All
races on this ballot are marked in the same manner. Since the
ballot is consistently marked as in paragraph (c), the vote cast for
Michael Ross in the state representative race is a valid vote.

Ballot Situation 3: Recount in State Representative race. Each race is
marked differently so that no consistency in marking exists. It cannot be
determined which marking, if any, is clearly indicative of the voter’s
choice. Therefore, the vote cast for Bernie West is not valid.

(c) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (4)(b), the following marks constitute a valid vote as indicated for a particular
candidate, issue choice, or judicial retention choice:
1. The voter circles or underlines either the oval or arrow next to a candidate’s name, issue choice, or judicial retention choice.
Valid Vote for Ball

Valid Vote for Ball

Valid Vote for Ball

Valid Vote for Ball

2. The voter circles or underlines the name of a candidate, issue choice, or judicial retention choice.
Valid Vote for Arnaz

Valid Vote for Arnaz

3. The voter circles or underlines the party abbreviation associated with a candidate’s name.
Valid Vote for Benny

Valid Vote for Benny

4. The voter marks an “X,” a check mark, a cross, a plus sign, an asterisk or a star, any portion of which is contained in a single
oval or within the blank space between the head and tail of a single arrow. The marking must not enter into another oval or the space
between the head and tail of another arrow.
Valid Vote for Ball

Valid Vote for Ball

Invalid Vote

Invalid Vote

5. The voter draws a diagonal, horizontal, or vertical line, any portion of which intersects two points on the oval and which does
not intersect another oval at any two points. If it is a horizontal line, the line must not strike through the name of the candidate.
Valid Vote for Ball

Valid Vote for Ball

Invalid Vote

Invalid Vote

6. The voter draws a diagonal or vertical line that intersects an imaginary line extending from the center of the head of a single
arrow to the center of the tail of the same arrow, provided the diagonal or vertical line does not intersect the imaginary line joining
the head and tail of another arrow.
Valid Vote for Ball

Invalid Vote

7. The voter marks all the choices for a race but further clarifies a choice for a particular candidate, issue choice or judicial
retention choice by placing an additional mark or marks showing support solely for that particular candidate, issue or judicial
retention choice.
Valid Vote for Arnaz

Valid Vote for Ball

Valid Vote to Keep Justice in Office

8. The voter strikes through all the choices for candidates, issue, or judicial retention except for one and also leaves the write-in
candidate space blank.

Valid Vote for Bruce

9. The voter writes words such as “Vote for [candidate’s name],” “Count this vote” or “Vote no on amendment or referendum,”
or “I want this one,” provided there are no other markings in the race that would constitute a valid vote for a different candidate,
issue choice, or judicial retention choice pursuant to rule.

Valid Vote for Arnaz

Invalid Vote

Valid “No” vote

10. The voter fills in the majority of an oval, or the majority of the distance between the head and the tail of an arrow
designating a particular candidate, issue choice, or judicial retention choice, regardless of how other races on the ballot are marked.
Valid Vote for Arnaz

Valid Vote for Arnaz

11. If a voter marks fewer candidates than there are positions to be elected for those offices, then the votes for all of those
marked candidates shall count. For example, if the voter is allowed to vote for 5 candidates in a special district election (“Vote for
5”) and the voter marks 2 candidates, the votes for those two marked candidates shall count.
Valid Votes for Arnaz and Bruce

Valid Vote for Benny

12. The voter draws an arrow from the arrow head to a particular candidate, issue choice or judicial retention choice or draws an
arrow head on the tail end of the arrow in lieu of filling in the void between the arrow head and the tail for the particular candidate,
issue choice or judicial retention choice.
Valid Vote for Arnaz

Valid Vote for Bruce

13. The voter darkens or bolds the arrow head and the arrow tail but does not fill in the void between the arrow head and the
tail.

Valid Vote for Ball

14. The voter punches the oval or the void between the arrow head and tail.
Valid Vote for Ball

Valid Vote for Benny

15. The voter marks two or more choices similarly in one of the ways indicated in paragraphs 1.-14. and additionally writes in
comments such as “not this,” “ignore this,” “don’t want,” or “wrong,” or “Vote for [candidate’s name]” such that voter’s definite
choice is clearly indicated.
Valid Vote for Ball

Valid Vote for Arnaz

(5) Write-in Voting.
(a) A voter is determined to have made a definite choice for a write-in vote for the joint office of President/Vice-President if the
voter writes in either the last name of the candidate for President or the last name of the candidate for Vice-President. This standard
similarly applies to constitute a valid write-in vote for the joint office of Governor/Lieutenant Governor if the voter writes in either
the last name of the candidate for Governor or the last name of the candidate for Lieutenant Governor.

Valid Vote for Joint Qualified Write-in President and Vice President Candidates, Lenny Bruce and Sally Marr

(b) A voter is determined to have made a definite choice for a named candidate if the voter indicates a vote for a candidate named on
the ballot and also writes-in the name of that same candidate in the blank space for ‘write-in candidate’.

Valid Vote for Benny

(c) A voter is determined to have made a definite choice for a particular candidate if the voter either writes in the name of a
qualified write-in candidate or the name of a candidate who is named on the ballot in that race, whether or not the oval or arrow
designating the selection of a write-in candidate has been marked.
Valid Vote for Smith, if Smith
is a qualified write-in candidate

Valid Vote for Bruce

(d) If a voter abbreviates, misspells or varies the form of the name of a candidate in the write-in candidate space, it shall not
affect the determination of whether the voter has made a definite choice.
(e) If a voter indicates a vote for a candidate named on the ballot and also writes in a name of a different person in the write-in
candidate space, it shall be considered an overvote and none of the votes are valid for that race.
Invalid Vote

Invalid Vote

(6) Overvotes. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (4) and (5), if the voter marks more choices than there are positions
or choices for that office or issue, it shall be considered an overvote and none of the votes are valid for that race.
Invalid Vote

Invalid Vote

(7) Valid Vote.
(a) A vote shall not count for any particular candidate, issue choice, or judicial retention choice at issue unless determined to be a
valid vote pursuant to this rule.
(b) If a voter does not mark a candidate, judicial retention choice, or issue choice in a contest, the valid votes for other candidates or
issues on the same ballot shall still be counted.
Rulemaking Authority 20.10(3), 97.021, 102.166(4) FS. Law Implemented 101.5614(5), 102.166(4), FS. History–New 6-6-02, Amended 10-6-08.

DUPLICATION POLICY AND GUIDELINES
PURSUANT TO 101.5614(4)(A)
If any vote-by-mail ballot is physically damaged so that it cannot properly be counted by the voting system’s
automatic tabulating equipment, a true duplicate copy shall be made of the damaged ballot in an open and
accessible room in the presence of witnesses and substituted for the damaged ballot. Likewise, a duplicate
ballot shall be made of a vote-by-mail ballot containing an overvoted race if there is a clear indication on the
ballot that the voter has made a definite choice in the overvoted race or ballot measure. A duplicate shall
include all valid votes as determined by the canvassing board based on rules adopted by the division pursuant
to s. 102.166(4). A duplicate may be made of a ballot containing an undervoted race or ballot measure if there
is a clear indication on the ballot that the voter has made a definite choice in the undervoted race or ballot
measure. A duplicate may not include a vote if the voter’s intent in such race or on such measure is not clear.
All duplicate ballots must be clearly labeled “duplicate,” bear a serial number which shall be recorded on the
defective ballot, and be counted in lieu of the defective ballot. The duplication of ballots must happen in the
presence of at least one canvassing board member. After a ballot has been duplicated, the defective ballot
shall be placed in an envelope provided for that purpose, and the duplicate ballot shall be tallied with the
other ballots for that precinct.

The Canvassing Board directs staff to duplicate ballots as per the above statute and the voter intent rule
2.027, and paragraphs 1 – 5 below.
1. Duplicate ballots shall be made of ballots that cannot be read by the automatic tabulating system, including
damaged ballots, faxed ballots, and VBM ballots marked using the Democracy Live accessibility program.
2. As per the voter intent rule, ballots with overvoted races in which the voter has not made a definite choice
in the overvoted race or ballot measure do not require duplication and shall be tabulated as marked.
3. As per the voter intent rule, ballots with undervoted races in which the voter has not made a definite choice
in the undervoted race or ballot measure do not require duplication and shall be tabulated as marked.
4. All markings for which voter intent cannot be readily determined as per the Voter Intent Rule shall be
presented to the Canvassing Board to be adjudicated.
5. All original ballots shall be marked using a highlighter to indicate which ballot positions are to be marked on
the duplicated ballot for tabulation. Each original and corresponding duplicate ballot shall be marked with
the same serial number in order to re-pair the original with the duplicate if necessary.

Recount Procedure Summary
DE Reference Guidelines 0010 (Updated 12/2023)

These guidelines are for reference only. They are not to be construed as legal advice or representation. For any particular
set of facts or circumstances, refer to the applicable state, federal law, and case law, and/or consult a private attorney
before drawing any legal conclusions or relying upon this information.

APPLICABLE LAW

• Sections 102.141(7) and 102.166, Florida Statutes, and Rules 1S-2.027, 1S-2.031, and 1S-2.051 Fla. Admin. Code,
govern recounts.
• This summary only represents a general overview. Please consult law and rule for specifics as they govern.

ORDERING OF A RECOUNT

• Who orders the recount?
o The Secretary of State orders any recount for federal, state, or multicounty races involving candidates for
office, candidates for judicial retention, and measures appearing on the ballot.
o For all other races, the board certifying the results orders the recount.
• A recount may not begin until it has been ordered to occur by the proper authority.
• A candidate or political committee has no authority to request a recount.
• A candidate or candidates defeated or eliminated by ½ percent or less or ¼ percent or less (whichever is applicable)
from content, may request in writing that a recount not be made.
• A recount at a minimum consists of a machine recount or use of an independent recount tabulation system (IRTS) 1;
it may also include a manual recount.

RACES NOT SUBJECT TO A RECOUNT (based upon the races not having “candidates” for office)

• Presidential Preference Primary (i.e., names are candidate nominees)
• Political party executive committee (i.e., state, district, and precinct committeemen and committeewomen).

PUBLIC NOTICE

• Public notice must be provided as soon as possible given the circumstances and the limited time schedule.
• Machine and manual recounts are open to the public.
• Public notice must be provided before any pre-sorting of ballots prior to a recount being ordered.
• If an IRTS is to be used, public notice must be provided anytime ballot are run through the system. A single public
notice shall be acceptable if ballots will be processed through the IRTS on a recurring basis before a recount is
ordered.

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As of 2023, no IRTS is currently approved for use in Florida.
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DEADLINE TO REPORT 1ST UNOFFICIAL RETURNS

The results of the 1st unofficial returns are used to determine if a machine recount will be necessary. It is important to
submit as soon as possible but no later than the requisite deadline for time and date.

STATUTORY DEADLINE TO REPORT 1ST SET OF UNOFFICIAL RETURNS (S. 102.141(5), F.S.)
• After a Primary Election: No later than noon on the 3rd day after the Primary Election.
• After a General Election: No later than noon on the 4th day after the General Election.
• After a Special Primary or Special Election: No later than noon on 4th day after the election. (Laws
governing general elections are applicable to special primary and special elections – s. 100.191, F.S.)

MACHINE RECOUNT (S. 102.141(7), F.S.)
• A machine recount must be ordered if the 1st set of unofficial returns indicates that a candidate was defeated or
eliminated by ½ of 1% or less of the total votes cast for an office or if an issue was approved or rejected by ½ of 1%
or less of the total votes cast on the issue.
• Exception to a machine recount:
o

If a candidate or candidates who is defeated or eliminated from contention for the office by ½ of 1% or less
requests in writing that a machine recount not be conducted.

• The canvassing board must follow the procedures in Rule 1S-2.031, Fla. Admin. Code.
• The machine recount constitutes a retabulation of all ballots.
• Before the machine recount occurs using the voting system, a new election definition must be created for the
race(s) to be recounted. Parameters must be set to reject all overvotes and undervotes.
• If an IRTS is capable of rejecting all overvotes and undervotes without needing a new election definition, no
additional testing is required.
• Before the start of the recount, a public test of the tabulating equipment must occur. If an IRTS was publicly tested
before the beginning of the election, no additional public testing is required.
• Optical scan ballots and hybrid voting system paper outputs: The canvassing board must run each ballot with the
affected race(s) through a tabulator. All overvotes (optical scan ballots only) and undervotes (optical scan/hybrid
voting system paper outputs) are outstacked to be used in the manual recount if one becomes necessary.
• Results: The results of the machine recount are included in the 2nd set of unofficial returns.

DEADLINE TO REPORT 2NDT UNOFFICIAL RETURNS

The results of the 2nd unofficial returns are used to determine if a manual recount will be necessary. It is important to
submit as soon as possible but no later than the requisite deadline for time and date.

STATUTORY DEADLINE TO REPORT 2ND SET OF UNOFFICIAL RETURNS (S. 102.141(7)(C), F.S.)
• After a Primary Election: No later than 3 p.m. on the 5th day after the Primary Election.
• After a General Election: No later than 3 p.m. on the 9th day after the General Election.
• After a Special Primary or Special Election: No later than 3 p. m. on the 9th day after the election.
(Laws governing general elections are applicable to special primary and special elections – s. 100.191,
F.S.)
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MANUAL RECOUNT (S. 102.166, F.S.)
• A manual recount must be ordered if the 2nd set of unofficial returns indicates that a candidate was eliminated or
defeated by ¼ of 1% or less of the votes cast for the office or an issue was approved or rejected by ¼ of 1% or less.
• Exceptions to a manual recount:
o If the candidate or candidates defeated or eliminated from contention for the office by ¼ of 1% or less request
in writing that it not be conducted; or
o If the number of overvotes and undervotes is fewer than the number of votes needed to change the outcome
of the election.
• The manual recount is only a recount of overvotes and undervotes as outstacked from the machine recount or IRTS.
• The canvassing board must use the procedures in Rule 1S-2.031, Fla. Admin. Code.
• A vote for a candidate or issue must be counted if there is a clear indication on the ballot that a voter made a
definite choice. See Rules 1S-2.027 and 1S-2.051, Fla. Admin. Code.
• Optical scan ballots and hybrid voting system paper outputs or digital images:
o The canvassing board assigns counting teams to review the overvotes and undervotes (optical scan/hybrid
voting system paper outputs). Authorized representatives are permitted to be present and object to any
decision of the counting team, but they may not otherwise disturb or interfere with the recount.
o Each counting team sorts the ballots into 3 stacks for the recounted race: 1) ballots determined to contain a
valid vote; 2) ballots determined to contain no clear indication of choice; and 3) ballots set aside for canvassing
board determination.
• Results: The results from the manual recount are contained in the certification of the official returns.

DEADLINE TO REPORT COUNTY OFFICIAL RETURNS

The results of the official returns are used to finalize the results for federal, state, cif a manual recount will be necessary.
It is important to submit as soon as possible but no later than the requisite deadline for time and date.

STATUTORY DEADLINE TO REPORT OFFICIAL RETURNS (S. 102.112(2), F.S.)
• After a Primary Election: No later than noon on the 8th day after the Primary Election.
• After a General Election: No later than noon on the 13th day after the General Election.
• After a Special Primary or Special Election: No later than noon on 13th day after the election. (Laws
governing general elections are applicable to special primary and special elections – s. 100.191, F.S.)
If the results are not received by the time specified, such returns are ignored and the results on file at the
specified time shall be certified by the Department of State.

Reminder: Although the results of the Presidential Preference Primary (PPP) are not subject to recount
procedures, the deadlines for submission of the 1st set of unofficial returns and the official returns for the PPP
are the same as for the General Election.

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EXAMPLES OF RECOUNT CALCULATIONS
RACE WITH 2 CANDIDATES (PRIMARY OR GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT)

• Candidate A: 9,755 votes – 49.77%
• Candidate B: 9,845 votes – 50.23%
• Total:
19,600 votes – 100%
• Calculation: 50.23% - 49.77% = .45%; therefore, Candidate A was defeated by .45% of votes cast.
• If this scenario was based upon the 1st set of unofficial returns, a machine recount is required because .45% ≤
.5%. (Note: ≤ .5% is the threshold for a machine recount.)
• If this scenario was based upon the 2nd set of unofficial returns, a manual recount is not required because
.45% ≥ .25%. (Note: ≤ .25% is the threshold for a manual recount.)

NONPARTISAN SCHOOL BOARD RACE WITH 3 CANDIDATES WHERE ONE CANDIDATE
HAS RECEIVED A MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST (PRIMARY BALLOT, ONLY)

• Candidate A: 3,260 votes – 35.58%
• Candidate B: 4,583 votes – 50.02%
• Candidate C: 1,319 votes – 14.40%
• Total:
9,162 votes – 100%
• Per s. 105.051(1)(b), F.S., if two or more candidates, neither of whom is a write-in candidate, qualify for such
office in the primary election, then the name of the candidate who receives the majority of the votes cast shall
not appear on the general election ballot unless there is a write-in candidate. If no candidate receives a
majority of the votes cast, the names of the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes for the office
will be placed on the general election ballot.
• Calculation: In the above race, both Candidate A and Candidate C are eliminated as candidates for the general
election because Candidate B received more than 50% of the votes cast. Candidate A and Candidate C’s
combined vote total equals 49.98%; 35.58% + 14.40% = 49.98%. Candidate B beat both Candidate A and
Candidate C by .02% of the votes cast; 50.02% - 49.98% = .02%.
• If this scenario was based upon the 1st set of unofficial returns, a machine recount is required because .02% ≤
.5%. (Note: ≤ .5% is the threshold for a machine recount.)
• If this scenario was based upon the 2nd set of unofficial returns, a manual recount is required because .02% ≤
.25%. (Note: ≤ .25% is the threshold for a manual recount.)

NONPARTISAN SCHOOL BOARD RACE WITH 3 CANDIDATES WITH NO CANDIDATE RECEIVING A MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST
(PRIMARY ELECTION) OR ANY RACE INVOLVING “VOTE FOR NO MORE THAN 2” CANDIDATES (GENERAL ELECTION)

• Candidate A: 4,010 votes – 26.04%
• Candidate B: 7,315 votes – 47.50%
• Candidate C: 4,075 votes – 26.46%
• Total:
15,400 votes – 100%
• Calculation: In the above race, Candidate A was eliminated as a candidate behind Candidate C by .42% (26.46% 26.04% = .42%).

• If this scenario was based upon the 1st set of unofficial returns, a machine recount is required because .42% ≤
.5%. (Note: ≤ .5% is the threshold for a machine recount.)
• If this scenario was based upon the 2nd set of unofficial returns, a manual recount is not required because
.42% ≥.25%. (Note: ≤ .25% is the threshold for a manual recount.)

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Recount Procedures

DS-DE 405 (eff 06-22)

R1S-2.031, Fla. Admin. Code

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Contents
Section 1. General applicability............................................................................................................................................... 4
Section 2. Definitions ............................................................................................................................................................. 4
Section 3. General provisions ................................................................................................................................................. 5
(a) Presence of canvassing board ....................................................................................................................................... 5
(b) Security of ballots .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
(c) Timeliness ...................................................................................................................................................................... 6
(d) Testing of tabulating equipment ................................................................................................................................... 6
(e) Open to public ............................................................................................................................................................... 6
(f) Location .......................................................................................................................................................................... 6
(g) Recording and minutes .................................................................................................................................................. 6
(h) Recount order ................................................................................................................................................................ 6
(i) Public notices .................................................................................................................................................................. 7
(j) Representatives .............................................................................................................................................................. 8
(k) Review of law and procedures....................................................................................................................................... 8
(l) Public order..................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Section 4. Machine recount – voting system tabulator .......................................................................................................... 9
(a) Initial requirements. ...................................................................................................................................................... 9
(b) Optical scan ballots for recount when only one race is to be recounted ..................................................................... 9
(c) Optical scan ballots for recount when more than one race is to be recounted and the voting system can outstack
the overvotes and undervotes in more than one race at the same time ......................................................................... 10
(d) Machine recount of hybrid voting system’s paper outputs ........................................................................................ 10
Section 5. Machine recount – digitally based independent recount tabulation system ...................................................... 10
(a) Initial requirements ..................................................................................................................................................... 11
(b) Optical scan ballots when only one race is to be recounted ....................................................................................... 11
(c) Optical scan ballots for recount when more than one race is to be recounted and the voting system can outstack
the overvotes and undervotes in more than one race at the same time ......................................................................... 11
(d) Machine recounts of hybrid voting system’s paper outputs ...................................................................................... 12
Section 6. Manual recount- Physical ballots. ........................................................................................................................ 12
(a) Ballot review ................................................................................................................................................................ 12
(b) Outstacking of overvotes and undervotes .................................................................................................................. 12
Section 7. Manual recount – Paper Ballot Images ................................................................................................................ 15
(a) Ballot review ................................................................................................................................................................ 15
(b) Outstacking of overvotes and undervotes .................................................................................................................. 15

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(c) Optical scan ballot manual recount when the ballots were outstacked for only one race during the machine
recount .............................................................................................................................................................................. 15
(d) Optical scan ballot manual recount for when the ballots for more than one race were outstacked during the
machine recount ............................................................................................................................................................... 16
(e) Manual recount of hybrid voting system’s paper outputs .......................................................................................... 18
Section 8. Recount results..................................................................................................................................................... 18
Section 9. Unexpected circumstances .................................................................................................................................. 18

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Section 1. General applicability
(1) General applicability. This manual, incorporated by reference into rule 1S-2.031, F.A.C., contains procedures for machine
and manual recounts in any federal, statewide, multi-county, county, and municipal elections conducted using any county voting
system or independent recount tabulation system, not including Presidential Preference Primary elections or precinct committee
people races in primary elections. The rule also contains requirements for certification and use of an independent recount tabulation
system for conducting recounts.

Section 2. Definitions
As used in this rule, the term:
(a) “Ballot card” means the single physical piece of paper or electronic representation of the front and back of that piece of
paper.
(b) “Ballot page” means either the front or back side of a physical ballot card or the electronic representation thereof.
(c) “Canvassing board” means the county canvassing board or the local board responsible for certifying the election results for
the race undergoing a recount.
(d) “Counting team” is defined in section 102.166, F.S., as at least two electors who manually recount the ballots in a manual
recount. The counting team may be comprised of the county canvassing board, supervisor’s staff, or county electors.
(e) “Hybrid ballot” means the output of a Voter Interface Device (VID) that contains the races titles and the voter’s choices, and
may also contain, but is not limited to, a barcode or other machine-readable optical identifier containing the voter’s choices.
(f) “Hybrid voting system” means a voting system which has a Voter Interface Device (VID) that produces a hybrid ballot. The
hybrid voting system tabulator is designed to read a traditional marksense ballot and a hybrid ballot produced by the VID. When
reading the hybrid ballot the tabulator may read the vote targets or selections from the human readable text, or from the machinereadable identifier on the paper output.
(g) “Independent recount tabulation system” means the certified automatic tabulating equipment which is completely
independent from the voting system, for use in conducting recounts. The system cannot contain any proprietary election-related
hardware or software in common with any voting system certified for use in the State of Florida. Any commercially available
software or hardware shared between the two systems must not be modified. However, information used to decode ballot artwork
and any barcoding schemes on ballots may be shared from the primary vote tabulation system to the independent recount
tabulation system.
(h) “Multi-card ballot” means a ballot that is comprised of two or more ballot cards.
(i) “Outstack” refers to the act of identifying, segregating, sorting, or setting aside ballots either manually, digitally by a highspeed tabulator, or by other means.
(j) “Overvote” means that the elector marks or designates more names than there are persons to be elected to an office or
designates more than one answer to a ballot question and the tabulator records no vote for the office or ballot question.

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(k) “Overvote ballot” means a ballot card with a recount race that has an overvote.
(l) “Paper ballot image” means an electronic record of the content of a marksense ballot cast by a voter and recorded by the
independent recount tabulation system. The paper ballot image shall contain the image of the front and back of a ballot card either
in a single file or multiple associated files. Each paper ballot image file name must have a unique identifier.
(m) “Race” means any contest for office, judicial retention, or issue (e.g., constitutional amendment, initiative, referendum,
ballot question, or other public measure) on the ballot.
(n) “Representative” refers to a person designated pursuant to paragraph (j) of Section 3.
(o) “Undervote” means that the elector does not properly designate any choice for an office or ballot question, and the
tabulator records no vote for the office or question, or that the elector designated fewer than the maximum allowed number of
choices for the office and the tabulator records fewer than the maximum allowed number of choices for the office.
(p) “Undervote ballot” means a ballot card with a recount race that has one or more undervotes.
(q) “Voting system tabulator” is a tabulator that is certified by the state of Florida as part of a voting system.
(r) “Voter interface device” (VID) means any device that communicates voting instructions and ballot information to a voter and
allows the voter to select candidates and issues. The VID produces a paper ballot containing the voter’s selections. That paper ballot
is then processed into a tabulator. A VID may be combined with a voting system tabulator.

Section 3. General provisions
The following provisions apply to both machine and manual recounts:

(a) Presence of canvassing board
1. All three members of the canvassing board shall be present for the determination or decision to resolve a discrepancy during
a recount; otherwise, at least two members of the canvassing board shall be present during all times a recount is being conducted.
2. If a paper-based or digital-based automatic independent recount tabulation system is used during the recount and ballots are
being tabulated on the system prior to the order of a recount, at least one member of the canvassing board shall be present at all
times during the tabulation.
3. Any canvassing board determination or decision must be by majority vote.
4. The Canvassing Board may not interpret questionable voter intent on any ballots unable to be processed by the automated
independent recount system until after a recount has been ordered. Ballots which cannot be interpreted by the system due to
problems with the physical integrity of the ballot such as folds, tears, or other imperfections, may not be interpreted until after a
recount has been ordered.

(b) Security of ballots
1. The supervisor shall ensure the security of the ballots at all times during a recount including recess and adjournment of the
canvassing board.

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2. The supervisor may employ law enforcement to provide security for the ballots and to maintain order during the recount.

(c) Timeliness
All recounts conducted pursuant to this rule must be completed in such a manner as to provide the canvassing board sufficient
time to comply with the provisions of section 102.112, F.S. After the completion of a recount, the results from the machine recount
and manual recount shall be used to certify the second set of unofficial returns and official returns, respectively.

(d) Testing of tabulating equipment
The voting system’s tabulating equipment or independent recount tabulation equipment being used in the recount must be
tested pursuant to the provisions of section 101.5612, F.S., and each time the election parameters are changed during a recount. No
further testing is required if the independent automatic tabulation equipment was tested pursuant to the provisions of section
101.5612, F.S. and the election parameters do not require a change to conduct the recount. The same test deck used for the election
may be used for the recount. The canvassing board may, but is not required to, use the same tabulating equipment on which ballots
were originally tabulated. If the test shows no error, the canvassing board shall proceed with the recount. If the test indicates an
error, the canvassing board shall first correct the error, retest the equipment pursuant to section 101.5612, F.S., and then proceed
with the recount.

(e) Open to public
All procedures relating to recounts shall be open to the public.

(f) Location
Reasonable efforts shall be made to ensure that recounts are conducted in a room large enough to accommodate, as applicable,
the necessary number of counting teams, the canvassing board members and representatives of each candidate, political party or
political committee who sponsored a constitutional initiative in the election being recounted which are entitled to have
representatives. Members of the public, including the media, shall be allowed to observe the recount from an area designated by
the canvassing board. The area may be outside of the actual recount area but must still allow observers to view the activities.

(g) Recording and minutes
The canvassing board’s activities in determining voter intent shall be recorded. In addition, the minutes of a manual recount
shall be made. All recordings and minutes are public record.

(h) Recount order
1. Except as provided in Section 5.(a), a recount shall not begin until after the recount is ordered and notice has been provided
as set forth in this Section.
2. If the Secretary of State orders a machine or manual recount, the Division of Elections shall notify the following individuals,
informing them to contact the supervisor of elections in each county involved in the recount to find out the date, time, and location
of the recount in that county:
a. The supervisor of elections within each county where the recount will occur.
b. The candidates in the race that is the subject of the recount.

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c. The chairperson of the state executive committee of a political party if the party has a candidate who is entitled to one or
more representatives pursuant to paragraph (j) of this Section.
d. The chairperson of the political committee in support of or in opposition to the ballot issue or judicial retention issue that is
the subject of the recount.
3. If the canvassing board orders a machine or manual recount, the supervisor of elections or responsible officer of the
municipality, as applicable, shall notify the following individuals, informing them to contact the supervisor of elections in each
county involved in the recount to find out the date, time, and location of the recount in that county:
a. Each municipality that has a race subject to the recount.
b. The candidates in the race that is the subject of the recount.
c. The chairperson of the county executive committee of a political party if the party has a candidate who is entitled to one or
more representatives pursuant to sub-subparagraph (j)1.b.
d. The chairperson of the political committee in support of or in opposition to the ballot issue or judicial retention issue that is
the subject of the recount.

(i) Public notices
1. The canvassing board shall publish advance public notice of any recount immediately after the recount is ordered.
Alternatively, the notice may be published before a recount is ordered as a conditional notice stating that, if a recount is ordered,
the recount will occur on a certain date, time, and location:
a. The canvassing board shall give public notice, or conditional notice as described in this paragraph, at least 48 hours prior to
the recount.
b. The canvassing board shall give public notice, or conditional notice as described in this paragraph, at least 48 hours prior to
ballots being processed through the recount tabulation equipment prior to a recount being ordered. A single public notice shall be
acceptable if ballots will be processed through the independent recount tabulation equipment on a recurring basis before a recount
is ordered.
c. The canvassing board shall give public notice, or conditional notice as described in this paragraph, at least 48 hours prior to
ballots being pre-sorted prior to a recount being ordered.
2. The notice shall be posted directly on the homepage of the county supervisor of elections’ website, or through a link to the
notice on the supervisor’s homepage.
3. The notice shall also be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county, or displayed in at least four
conspicuous locations in the county including on the door of the public entrance to the building where the office of the supervisor of
elections is housed.
4. If the recount involves only a municipal election, the notice also shall be posted on the municipal clerk’s website or through a

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link to the notice on the clerk’s homepage, at the public entrance to the building where the city clerk’s office is located, and in at
least three other conspicuous locations in the municipality such as at a community center, public library, city park, and city hall.
5. If the Canvassing Board plans to conduct potential recounts using digital images of ballots, then at least a 48-hour notice must
be provided to candidates, political parties, or persons interested in observing the scanning of ballots into the independent recount
system prior to any ballots being scanned into the system.

(j) Representatives
1. The following persons or entities are entitled to have representatives present during a recount:
a. In a recount race, each candidate whose ultimate success or failure in the race could be adversely or favorably impacted by
the recount is entitled to have:
(I) One representative for the county canvassing board.
(II) One additional representative per counting team during a manual recount.
b. In a partisan race that is the subject of a recount, each political party with a candidate whose ultimate success or failure in the
race could be adversely or favorably impacted by the recount is entitled to have:
(I) One representative for the canvassing board.
(II) One additional representative per counting team during a manual recount.
c. In a recount race involving an issue or a judicial retention, any political committee that registered before an election in
specific support of or opposition to the issue or a judicial retention is entitled to have:
(I) One representative for the county canvassing board.
(II) One additional representative per counting team during a manual recount; however, if more than one registered committee
supports or opposes an issue, only one representative per counting team is allowed for each side of a ballot issue, regardless of the
number of committees in support of or in opposition to the ballot issue.
2. The persons or entities entitled to have representatives present during a recount must provide the names of their designated
representatives in writing as soon as is practicable under the circumstances to the supervisor of elections or the municipal clerk,
whichever is applicable, before the recount begins. Failure to provide the names of their representatives shall negate the
opportunity of the persons or entity to have the representative present during the recount, except on the same conditions as a
member of the public.

(k) Review of law and procedures
The canvassing board, the members of the counting teams, and the representatives entitled to be present shall jointly review
the rules and statutes governing recount procedures. Before a manual recount begins, the review shall also include the rules and
statutes as to what constitutes a clear indication that the voter has made a definite choice.

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(l) Public order
Representatives and observers must not interfere with or disturb the recount in any way, except a representative may make
reasonable objections to a counting team’s decision during a manual recount as provided in this rule. The canvassing board may, by
majority vote, have any person or persons removed from the premises during the recount if such person or persons interfere or
disturb the recount process and the situation cannot be corrected.

Section 4. Machine recount – voting system tabulator
(a) Initial requirements.
1. Each canvassing board responsible for conducting a recount shall put each optical scan ballot through automatic tabulating
equipment and determine whether the returns correctly reflect the votes cast.
a. If any optical scan ballot has become physically damaged so that it cannot be properly counted in the recount by the
automatic tabulating equipment, a true duplicate of the damaged ballot shall be made pursuant to sections 101.5614(4) and
102.141(7), F.S.
2. The following procedures shall apply to machine recounts:
a. Prior to the order of a recount, a county may pre-sort ballots that could be subject to a recount (e.g., specific card of a multicard ballot, precinct, specific district race, etc.).
b. At least one member of the canvassing board must be present during any pre-sorting of ballots.

(b) Optical scan ballots for recount when only one race is to be recounted
1. As detailed in Section 3(d), the tabulating equipment being used in the recount must be tested pursuant to the provisions of
section 101.5612, F.S., and the election parameters changed so that all ballots for the recounted race can be tabulated and all
ballots containing overvotes and undervotes in the recounted race can be outstacked from the other ballots and counted.
2. In the case of a race to be recounted in which a voter may properly vote for more than one candidate, overvotes and
undervotes must be outstacked. Once outstacking is complete, the ballots outstacked for undervotes must then be tabulated by
overriding the rejection such that valid votes can be included in the tabulation. All outstacked ballots must remain segregated in
case a manual recount becomes necessary, and in a way that counted valid votes on outstacked undervoted ballots are not again
counted in the manual recount vote tally.
3. The canvassing board or its representatives shall then put each ballot through the tabulating equipment and determine the
votes in the recounted race. For purposes of tabulating, the ballot is the card on which the race to be recounted appears. During this
process, the ballot cards with the overvotes and undervotes in the recounted race must be outstacked.
4. The outstacked ballots shall be placed in a sealed container(s) until it is determined whether a manual recount will need to be
conducted. Seal numbers shall be recorded at the time the ballots are placed in the containers.
5. If the percentage threshold for a manual recount in section 102.166, F.S. is met, the canvassing board shall determine the
total combined number of overvote and undervote ballots. If the race is a statewide or multicounty race, each canvassing board
shall notify the Secretary of State of the total combined number of overvote and undervote ballots in the county for the affected

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race.

(c) Optical scan ballots for recount when more than one race is to be recounted and the
voting system can outstack the overvotes and undervotes in more than one race at the same
time
1. For purposes of tabulating, the ballot is the card on which the race or races to be recounted appears.
2. The tabulating equipment being used in the recount must be tested pursuant to the provisions of section 101.5612, F.S., and
the election parameters changed so that all the ballots for the recounted races can be tabulated and all the ballot cards containing
overvotes and undervotes in the recounted races can be outstacked from the other ballot cards and counted. All outstacked ballots
must remain segregated in case a manual recount becomes necessary.
3. If capable, the tabulator shall count all valid votes in the recounted races, and outstack undervoted and overvoted ballots in a
single pass.
4. If the tabulator is not capable of both counting all valid votes and outstacking undervoted and overvoted ballots in a single
pass, then a two-pass process shall be used. The first pass shall outstack ballots with undervotes and overvotes in the recounted
races, while counting all votes in the recounted races on all the other ballots. The second pass shall count all the valid votes on the
ballots that were outstacked in the first pass.
5. In the case of a race to be recounted in which a voter may properly vote for more than one candidate, overvotes and
undervotes must be outstacked. Once outstacking is complete, the ballots outstacked for undervotes must then be tabulated by
overriding the rejection such that valid votes can be included in the tabulation. All outstacked ballots must remain segregated in the
event that a manual recount becomes necessary, and in a way that counted valid votes on outstacked undervoted ballots are not
again counted in the manual recount vote tally.
6. The outstacked ballots shall be placed in a sealed container(s) until it is determined whether a manual recount will need to be
conducted. Seal numbers shall be recorded at the time the ballots are placed in the containers.
7. If the percentage threshold for a manual recount in section 102.166, F.S. is met, the canvassing board shall determine the
total combined number of overvote and undervote ballots. If the race is a statewide or multicounty race, each canvassing board
shall notify the Secretary of State of the total combined number of overvote and undervote ballots in the county for the affected
race.

(d) Machine recount of hybrid voting system’s paper outputs
The procedures for a machine recount of the paper output from a hybrid voting system are identical to those as specified in
paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection above, as applicable.

Section 5. Machine recount – digitally based independent recount tabulation
system
If the independent recount tabulation system is being used to physically sort overvoted and undervoted ballot cards containing
the races to be recounted, then the procedures for a machine recount are the same as recounts conducted using the voting system

10

pursuant to Section 4. If the independent recount tabulation system is being used to digitally sort overvoted and undervoted
ballots, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) Initial requirements
If the ballots have already been processed through an independent recount tabulation system to be used in this recount, the
canvassing board is not required to put each ballot through any automatic tabulating equipment again. If any optical scan ballot has
become physically damaged so that it cannot be properly counted in the recount by the independent recount tabulation equipment,
a true duplicate of the damaged ballot shall be made pursuant to sections 101.5614(4) and 102.141(7), F.S. The duplicate ballot shall
then be tabulated in place of the original unreadable ballot.

(b) Optical scan ballots when only one race is to be recounted
1. The supervisor of elections shall change the parameters if necessary so that all the ballots for the recounted race can be
tabulated and all the ballots containing overvotes and undervotes in the recounted race can be outstacked from the other ballots
and counted.
2. In the case of a race to be recounted in which a voter may properly vote for more than one candidate, overvotes and
undervotes must be outstacked. If the independent recount tabulation system is unable to record valid votes on such a ballot, once
the outstacking is complete, the ballots outstacked for undervotes must then be tabulated by overriding the rejection such that valid
votes can be included in the tabulation. All ballots must remain outstacked in case a manual recount becomes necessary, and in a
way that counted valid votes on outstacked undervoted ballots are not again counted in the manual recount vote tally.
3. The canvassing board or its representatives shall then scan each ballot into the independent recount tabulation system
equipment and determine the votes in the recounted race. Per Section 3(a)2. Of these procedures, this scanning process may take
place prior to the order of the recount. For purposes of tabulating, the ballot is the card on which the race to be recounted appears.
During this process, the ballot card(s) with the overvotes and undervotes in the recounted race must be outstacked, indexed,
notated, or sorted in such a way that each such ballot card can be located and viewed. Once the scanning process is completed, the
canvassing board shall validate that the votes in the recounted race are in agreement with the voting system results.
4. If the percentage threshold for a manual recount in section 102.166, F.S., is met, the canvassing board shall determine the
total combined number of overvote and undervote ballots. If the race is a statewide or multicounty race, each canvassing board
shall notify the Secretary of State of the total combined number of overvote and undervote ballots in the county for the affected
race.

(c) Optical scan ballots for recount when more than one race is to be recounted and the
voting system can outstack the overvotes and undervotes in more than one race at the same
time
1. If necessary, the supervisor of elections shall change the parameters so that all the ballots for the recounted races can be
tabulated and all the ballots containing overvotes and undervotes in the recounted races can be outstacked from the other ballots
and counted.
2. In the case of a race to be recounted in which a voter may properly vote for more than one candidate, overvotes and
undervotes must be outstacked. If the independent recount tabulation system is unable to record valid votes on such a ballot, once

11

outstacking is complete, the ballots outstacked for undervotes must then be tabulated by overriding the rejection such that valid
votes can be included in the tabulation. All outstacked ballots must remain segregated in case a manual recount becomes
necessary, and in a way that counted valid votes on outstacked undervoted ballots are not again counted in the manual recount vote
tally.
3. The canvassing board or its representatives shall then scan each ballot into the tabulating equipment and determine the
votes in the recounted race or races. Per Section 3(a)2. of these procedures, this scanning process may take place prior to the order
of the recount. For purposes of tabulating, the ballot is the card on which the race or races to be recounted appears. During this
process, the ballot card(s) with the overvotes and undervotes in the recounted race or races must be outstacked, indexed, notated,
or sorted in such a way that each such ballot card can be located and viewed. Once the scanning process is completed, the
canvassing board shall validate that the votes in the recounted race are in agreement with the voting system results.
4. If the percentage threshold for a manual recount in section 102.166, F.S. is met, the canvassing board shall determine the
total combined number of overvote and undervote ballots. If the race is a statewide or multicounty race, each canvassing board
shall notify the Secretary of State of the total combined number of overvote and undervote ballots in the county for the affected
race.

(d) Machine recounts of hybrid voting system’s paper outputs
The procedures for a machine recount of the paper output from a hybrid voting system are identical to those as specified in
paragraph (b) and (c) above, as applicable.

Section 6. Manual recount- Physical ballots.
A manual recount consists of a recount of marksense ballots by a person. In addition to the requirements in Section 3., the
following procedures apply to a manual recount:

(a) Ballot review
Only the overvotes and undervotes from the machine recount shall be reviewed. Per section 102.166(5)(b), F.S., each outstacked
ballot which is a duplicate of an original ballot shall be compared with the original ballot to ensure the correctness of the prior
duplication process. This comparison may be conducted prior to or in line with the manual review of each overvoted and
undervoted ballot.

(b) Outstacking of overvotes and undervotes
All overvoted and undervoted ballots outstacked for a recounted race or races during the machine recount shall be transported
to the location of the manual recount by two members of the canvassing board or two employees of the election office designated
by the canvassing board and, if a county chooses, a sworn law enforcement officer.

(c) Optical scan ballot manual recount when the ballots were outstacked for only one race
during the machine recount.
1. The seal numbers on the containers shall be announced as they are broken and shall be compared to the numbers previously
recorded.

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2. Each counting team as designated by section 102.166(5), F.S., shall review the outstacked ballots to determine if there is a
clear indication that the voter has made a definite choice, according to standards set forth in law or adopted by rule as mandated in
sections 102.166(4) and 101.6952(2), F.S.
3. Each counting team shall sort the ballots into the following stacks:
a. Votes for which the team determines the voter made a definite choice for each candidate or issue.
b. Ballots for which the counting team determines there is no clear indication that the voter made a definite choice for an office
or issue.
c. Ballots to be set aside for the canvassing board’s determination because the team is unable to make such determination or
because a representative made a reasonable objection to the team’s determination.
(I) If a ballot is set aside because the team is unable to determine that there is a clear indication that the voter has made a
definite choice or because a representative objected to the counting team’s decision, the ballot must be placed in one or more
containers (e.g., envelopes, folders, tubs, bins, baskets, etc.) designated for indeterminate ballots or ballots for which there is an
objection.
(II). The designated container may each contain one or more ballots at the canvassing board’s discretion; however, if not already
located on the ballot itself, the container or a separate paper for each ballot therein must include the precinct number. In addition, if
the ballot is placed in the container because there was an objection to the counting team’s determination, the container or separate
paper for each such ballot therein must include the basis for the objection and the name and representative capacity of the person
objecting.
4. The canvassing board shall review each ballot set aside by a counting team and shall determine if there is a clear indication
that the voter has made a definite choice, according to standards set forth in law as mandated in sections 102.166(4) and
101.6952(2), F.S., or adopted by rule.
5. The records of the manual recount shall detail the number of votes each candidate or issue choice received and the number
of ballots not allocated to any candidate or issue choice.

(d) Optical scan ballot manual recount for when the ballots for more than one race were
outstacked during the machine recount.
1. The election parameters shall be changed so that only the overvoted and the undervoted ballots for one recounted race will
be outstacked.
2. The seal numbers on the containers of all ballots previously outstacked pursuant to Section 4.(c), shall be announced as they
are broken and shall be compared to the numbers previously recorded.
3. The tabulating equipment being used for the recount shall be tested as stated in Section 3.(d).
4. All ballots previously outstacked pursuant to Section 4.(c) or not outstacked pursuant to Section 4.(d), shall be put back

13

through the tabulating equipment to outstack the ballots for the first manually recounted race.
5. Each counting team shall review the outstacked ballots to determine if there is a clear indication that the voter has made a
definite choice, according to standards set forth in law as mandated in sections 102.166(4) and 101.6952(2), F.S., or adopted by rule.
6. Each counting team shall sort the ballots into the following stacks:
a. Votes for which the team determines the voter made a definite choice for each candidate or ballot issue.
b. Ballots which the counting team determines there is no clear indication that the voter made a definite choice for an office or
ballot issue.
c. Ballots to be set aside for the canvassing board’s determination because the team is unable to make such determination or
because a representative made a reasonable objection to the team’s determination.
(I) If a ballot is set aside because the team is unable to determine that there is a clear indication that the voter has made a
definite choice or because a representative objected to the counting team’s decision, the ballot must be placed in one or more
containers (e.g., envelopes, folders, tubs, bins, baskets, etc.) designated for indeterminate ballots or ballots for which there is an
objection.
(II) The designated container may each contain one or more ballots at the canvassing board’s discretion; however, if not already
located on the ballot itself, the container or a separate paper for each ballot therein must include the precinct number. In addition, if
the ballot is placed in the container because there was an objection to the counting team’s determination, the container or separate
paper for each such ballot therein must include the basis for the objection and the name and representative capacity of the person
objecting.
7. The canvassing board shall review each ballot set aside by a counting team and shall determine if there is a clear indication
that the voter has made a definite choice, according to standards set forth in law as mandated in sections 102.166(4) and
101.6952(2), F.S., or adopted by rule.
8. The records of the manual recount shall detail the number of votes each candidate or issue choice received and the number
of ballots not allocated to any candidate or issue choice.
9. If there is another race to be manually recounted, following the first manual recount:
a. The canvassing board or its representatives shall ensure that each ballot from the first manual recount can be manually
recounted for additional races, as necessary.
b. The outstacked ballots from the first manually recounted race will be combined with the other outstacked ballots.
c. The election parameters shall be changed to outstack the overvoted and the undervoted ballots for the next manually
recounted race.
d. All previously outstacked ballots shall be put back through the tabulating equipment to sort the ballots for the next manually
recounted race.

14

e. The procedures set forth in this Section, subparagraphs (d)4.-9., above, shall be repeated for each subsequent race subject to
a manual recount.

(e) Manual recount of hybrid voting system’s paper outputs.
The procedures for a manual recount of the paper output from a hybrid voting system are identical to those specified in this
Section, paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), above, as applicable. If the hybrid voting system’s paper output is identical to the optical scan
ballot mentioned in this paragraph, the paper output may be treated as an optical scan ballot for the recount. An electronic or
electromechanical reading device may not be used to review a hybrid voting system ballot, unless the printed text is illegible as
mandated in section 102.166(4)(b), F.S.

Section 7. Manual recount – Paper Ballot Images
A manual recount consists of a recount of digital images by a person. In addition to the requirements in Section 4, the following
procedures apply to a manual recount of digital images:

(a) Ballot review
Only the overvotes and undervotes from the machine recount shall be reviewed.
1. For any paper ballot images subject to a manual recount, the supervisor of elections must be able to retrieve the
corresponding physical ballot during the manual recount. The physical ballot must be made available to the canvassing board and
counting team, if requested by the canvassing board.
2. In situations when voter intent is unclear, the counting team or canvassing board shall review as much of the paper ballot
image of the entire ballot as is possible, but no less than, the entire ballot card on which the overvote or undervote occurs.
3. The counting teams and canvassing board shall be provided with a clear view of the paper ballot images during the manual
recount.
4. Per section 102.166(5)(b), F.S., each outstacked ballot which is a duplicate of an original ballot shall be compared with the
original ballot to ensure the correctness of the prior duplication process. This comparison may be conducted prior to or in line with
the manual review of each overvoted and undervoted ballot.

(b) Outstacking of overvotes and undervotes
1. All paper ballot images of overvoted and undervoted ballots outstacked for a recounted race or races during the machine
recount shall be made available to the counting teams and canvassing board.
2. All physical ballots requested by the canvassing board shall be transported to the location of the manual recount by two
members of the canvassing board or two employees of the election office designated by the canvassing board and, if the board
chooses, a sworn law enforcement officer.

(c) Optical scan ballot manual recount when the ballots were outstacked for only one race
during the machine recount

15

1. If a physical ballot is required by the counting team or canvassing board, the seal numbers on the containers shall be
announced as they are broken and shall be compared to the numbers previously recorded.
2. Each counting team as designated by section 102.166(5), F.S., shall review the paper ballot images to determine if there is a
clear indication that the voter has made a definite choice, according to standards set forth in law as mandated in sections 102.166(4)
and 101.6952(2), F.S., or adopted by rule.
3. Each counting team shall digitally segregate the paper ballot images into the following categories:
a. Votes for which the team determines the voter made a definite choice for each candidate or issue.
b. Ballots which the counting team determines there is no clear indication that the voter made a definite choice for an office or
ballot question.
c. Ballots to be segregated for the canvassing board’s determination because the team is unable to make such determination or
a representative made a reasonable objection to the team’s determination.
(I) If a ballot is segregated because the team is unable to determine that there is a clear indication that the voter has made a
definite choice or because a representative objected to the counting team’s decision, the ballot must be designated as
indeterminate or a ballot for which there is an objection, whichever is applicable.
(II) If not already located on the ballot itself, each paper ballot image must include a reference to the precinct number. In
addition, if a ballot is to be sent to the canvassing board because there was an objection to the counting team’s determination, the
referral must include the basis for the objection, the file name or identifier, and the name and representative capacity of the person
objecting.
4. The counting team shall count and record the votes from each candidate or issue.
5. If the independent recount tabulation system is unable to automatically keep a record of the determination for each ballot,
then the counting team shall create a digital log entry or notation corresponding to the categories below which contains each paper
ballot image’s unique identifier and the counting team’s determination.
6. The canvassing board shall review each paper ballot image referred by a counting team and those which received a
reasonable objection and shall determine if there is a clear indication that the voter has made a definite choice, according to
standards set forth in law as mandated in sections 102.166(4) and 101.6952(2), F.S., or adopted by rule.
7. The records of the manual recount shall detail the number of votes each candidate or issue choice received and the number
of ballots not allocated to any candidate or issue choice.

(d) Optical scan ballot manual recount for when the ballots for more than one race were
outstacked during the machine recount
1. Only the overvoted and undervoted ballots for one recounted race will be reviewed at a time.
2. If a physical ballot is required by the counting team or canvassing board, the seal numbers on the containers shall be
announced as they are broken and shall be compared to the numbers previously recorded.

16

3. All paper ballot images previously outstacked pursuant to Section 5.(c) shall be prepared for the first manually recounted
race.
4. Each counting team shall review the paper ballot images to determine if there is a clear indication that the voter has made a
definite choice, according to standards set forth in law as mandated in sections 102.166(4) and 101.6952(2), F.S., or adopted by rule.
5. Each counting team shall digitally segregate the paper ballot images into the following categories:
a. Votes for which the team determines the voter made a definite choice for each candidate or issue.
b. Ballots which the counting team determines there is no clear indication that the voter made a definite choice for an office or
issue.
c. Ballots to be segregated for the canvassing board’s determination because the team is unable to make such determination or
a representative made a reasonable objection to the team’s determination.
(I) If a ballot is segregated because the team is unable to determine that there is a clear indication that the voter has made a
definite choice or because a representative objected to the counting team’s decision, the ballot must be designated as
indeterminate or a ballot for which there is an objection, whichever is applicable.
(II) If not already located on the ballot itself, each ballot image must include a reference to the precinct number. In addition, if
the ballot is to be sent to the canvassing board because there was an objection to the counting team’s determination, each such
ballot must include the basis for the objection, the file name or identifier, and the name and representative capacity of the person
objecting.
6. If the independent recount tabulation system is unable to automatically keep a record of the decision for each ballot, then
the counting team shall create a digital log entry or notation corresponding to the categories corresponding to the stacks above
which contains each paper ballot image’s unique identifier and the counting team’s determination.
7. The counting team shall then count and record the votes from each candidate or issue.
8. The canvassing board shall review each paper ballot image referred by a counting team or which received a reasonable
objection and shall determine if there is a clear indication that the voter has made a definite choice, according to standards set forth
in law as mandated in sections 102.166(4), and 101.6952(2), F.S., or adopted by rule.
9. The records of the manual recount shall detail the number of votes each candidate or issue choice received and the number
of ballots not allocated to any candidate or issue choice.
10. If there is another race to be manually recounted, following the first manual recount:
a. The canvassing board or its representatives shall ensure that each ballot from the first manual recount can be manually
recounted for additional races, as necessary.
b. The outstacked ballots from the first manually recounted race will be combined with the other outstacked ballots.

17

c. The paper ballot images of the outstacked overvoted and undervoted ballots for the next manually recounted race shall be
prepared.
d. The procedures set forth in this Section, subparagraphs (d)4.-9., above, shall be repeated for each subsequent race subject to
a manual recount.

(e) Manual recount of hybrid voting system’s paper outputs
The procedures for a manual recount of the paper output from a hybrid voting system are identical to those specified in
paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), above, as applicable. If the hybrid voting system’s paper output is identical to the optical scan ballot
mentioned in this paragraph, the paper output may be treated as an optical scan ballot for the recount. If the digital image of a
hybrid voting system ballot captured by the independent recount tabulation system is unclear and the physical ballot must be
viewed, an electronic or electromechanical reading device may not be used to review a hybrid voting system ballot, unless the
printed text is illegible as mandated in section 102.166(4)(b), F.S.

Section 8. Recount results
Results and reports for machine and manual recounts must only contain or display information for those races being recounted.
The canvassing board shall review the outstacked ballots for which a determination of a voter’s choice could not be made. Based on
that review, the board shall notify the Division of Elections to determine if the standards for determining a voter’s choice as set forth
in law as mandated in sections 102.166(4) and 101.6952(2), F.S., or adopted by rule, should be revised to better determine the
voter’s choice on those outstacked ballots. The notification shall occur at the same time the canvassing board files the report on the
conduct of the election pursuant to section 102.141(10), F.S.

Section 9. Unexpected circumstances
If issues or circumstances arise involving a recount or its procedures which neither this rule nor any other law or rule covers, the
canvassing board will decide the issue by a majority vote.

18

Post-Election Voting System Audit Procedure Summary
DE Reference Guidelines 0011 (Updated 06/2022)

These guidelines are for reference only. They are not to be construed as legal advice or representation. For any particular set of fact
or circumstances, refer to the applicable state, federal law, and case law, and/or consult a private attorney before drawing any legal
conclusions or relying upon this information.

APPLICABLE LAW

• Section 101.591, Florida Statutes (2013), and Rule 1S-5.026, Fla. Admin. Code, govern the post-election voting system
audit process.
• This summary only represents a general overview. Please consult law and rule for specifics as they govern.

WHEN IS A POST-ELECTION AUDIT CONDUCTED?

• Immediately following the certification of any election, to include municipal or special district elections.
• The audit must be completed and the results made public no later than 11:59 p.m. on the 7th day following
certification of the election by “the county canvassing board or the local board responsible for certifying the election”
[hereinafter “Board”].

WHAT TYPES OF AUDITS ARE ALLOWED?

• Two types are permissible:
o Manual audit
 Consists of a manual tally in one randomly selected race that appears on the ballot in at least 1% but no more
than 2% of the precincts chosen at random by the Board at a publicly noticed Board meeting.
 If 2% or less of the precincts equals less than a whole number, the number of precincts shall be rounded up the
next whole number.
o Automated, independent audit
 Consists of a public automated tally of the votes cast across all races in at least 20% of the precincts chosen at
random by the Board at a publicly noticed Board meeting.
 If 20% of the precincts equals less than a whole number, the number of precincts shall be rounded up the next
whole number.
 Before an automated, independent audit system is used, the Division of Elections must approve the system.

PRE-AUDIT PREPARATION

• Prior to the audit, the Supervisor of Elections, working with the Board should:
o Secure a site for the audit. The room for the audit must be large enough to at least accommodate the Board,
necessary audit teams, and a maximum of 2 observers per audit team.
o For a manual audit, arrange for sufficient audit teams to conduct an audit of a state or county-wide race (if the
race selected is less than a state or county-wide race, even though all of the teams may not have to participate, it
will be easier to be prepared with more teams than needed than to arrange others to participate on short
notice).
o Ensure that all ballots are sorted by precinct (this can be done at any time – the sorting does not need to wait
until the election is certified). The sorted ballots should be kept separate – for example, place all election day
ballots from precinct 1 in a separate stack, all vote-by-mail ballots from precinct 1 in a separate stack, and all
early voting ballots from precinct 1 in a separate stack. (Provisional ballots may be grouped separately or in one
of the above 3 categories, as applicable.) Repeat this process for each precinct. Once the precinct is chosen for
the audit, it will be easier to gather all ballots from that precinct. The audit results will be broken down according
to Election Day, vote-by-mail, and early voting ballots. Overseas vote-by-mail ballots are to be grouped with
other vote-by-mail ballots.

Florida Department of State

DOS DE Reference Guide 0011 (06/2022)

Page 1 of 4

• Public notice
o Ensure public notice (time, date, and place) is provided at least 24 hours in advance of the meeting to conduct
the audit, to include the random selection of the race(s) and precincts.
o The notice may be published before the certification of the official election results, but neither the random
selection nor the audit can occur until after the certification.
o Notice shall be posted in four conspicuous places in the county and on the home page of the Supervisor of
Elections’ website. (A hyperlink to the notice on the website will satisfy the home page requirement.)
• Board Preliminary Duties:
o A majority of the Board must be present at all times during the manual audit process.
o At least one Board member must be present during the processing of ballots into the automated independent
audit system.
o Reviews rules and statutes governing audit procedures.
o Reviews Supervisor of Elections’ security procedures for audits.
o Ensures minutes of the audit are taken, recorded, and maintained.
o Appoints as many audit teams as necessary.
o May adopt rules and policies to ensure public does not interfere with audit. If room is not large enough to
accommodate all public observers present, the Board must provide for the random selection of observers.
o Verifies an accurate ballot count exists between the number of ballots cast in the applicable precincts and races
and the number of ballots to be audited.
 If the difference is ½ of 1% or more, the Board must investigate to determine if the discrepancy can be
resolved.
 If discrepancy cannot be resolved, the Board must provide an explanation on the Voting System Post-Election
Audit Report, Form DS-DE 107.
o Determine the method of random selection of the race and precincts to be audited in a manner that the public is
assured that all races and precincts are included in the selection method. Examples of a selection method:
drawing lots, ten-sided dice, and computerized random selection.
 If multiple municipal or other elections are held on the same day in the county and the Board certifies the
elections, only one audit is required but all elections are to be included in the random selection of race(s) and
precincts.
o Selection of the race occurs before selection of the precinct(s) in a manual audit. (In an automated, independent
audit, all races are included.)
o To the extent possible, the certified results from the selected race(s) and precincts(s) to be audited must not be
disclosed in advance to the audit teams.
• Handling of ballots: No person, except a member of the Board, an employee of the Supervisor of Elections, or an
audit team member may handle any ballot or ballot container.

MANUAL AUDIT PROCEDURES
• Board makes random selection of race(s) and precinct(s).
• Once begun, a manual audit continues until it is completed. A recess may occur, but security procedures established
by the Supervisor of Elections, must account for the security of the ballots and tally results during the recess.

• Optical scan ballots:
o Election Day, early voted, and vote-by-mail ballots shall be audited separately (provisional ballots shall be audited
separately if tabulated separately).
o Audit team examines ballots and if in agreement places them into one of the following 4 stacks: 1) overvoted, 2)
undervoted, 3) Clear voter intent), and 4) unclear voter intent (i.e. ambiguous marks).
o Audit team sorts the ballots in the “should have been tabulated stack” according to the voter’s choice in the
audited race (e.g., all votes for Candidate A are placed in one stack, all votes for Candidate B in another stack).
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o Audit team tallies the votes from each stack and records the tally on Manual Audit Team Worksheet for
Marksense Ballots, DS-DE 105B.
o For races with “Vote for no more than ___”, the audit team:
 Sorts undervoted ballots with no selection made and records the count.
 Sorts the remaining undervoted ballots into two stacks: A stack containing Candidate A and a stack containing
the remaining candidates. The audit team records the votes for Candidate A on Manual Audit Team Worksheet
for Marksense Ballots, DS-DE 105B.
 Re-sorts the ballots again into two stacks: A stack containing Candidate B and a stack containing the remaining
candidates. The audit team records the votes for Candidate B on the Manual Audit Team Worksheet for
Marksense Ballots, DS-DE 105B.
 Repeats the above two steps for each subsequent candidate until all candidates’ votes are recorded on the DSDE 105B.
 Tallies the votes for each stack and records the tally on Manual Audit Team Worksheet for Marksense Ballots,
DS-DE 105B.
• Results Compilation:
o The Supervisor of Elections prints a report from the voting system for the precincts selected which provides the
group detail of the number of ballots for Election Day, early voting, vote-by-mail and provisional (unless the
provisional ballots are included in one of the other ballot numbers). This report is not to be shown to the audit
team members.
o The Board compares the numbers listed on the report from voting system with those from the manual audit
 If the manual tally and official totals match, the result is listed on the Precinct Summary for Manual Audit, DSDE 106.
 If there is a discrepancy of less than ½ of 1%, the Board shall record the result, expressed as a percentage of
agreement (i.e., 99.98%), on the Voting System Post-Election Audit Report, DS-DE 107.
 If there is a discrepancy of more than ½ of 1%, the Board shall determine if it can be reconciled by further
review of the official results with the audit teams’ stacks.
 If discrepancy is still more than ½ of 1%, a different audit team conducts a manual re-tally. If the totals do not
match, the Board will record such on the Precinct Summary for Manual Audit, DS-DE 106.
o By December 15 of a general election year, the Board must provide a report of the audit results to the
Department of State.

AUTOMATED INDEPENDENT AUDIT (AIA) PROCEDURES
• AIA software test: Before scanning ballots in any election, the Supervisor of Elections must test the tabulation

accuracy of the AIA software by performing a logic and accuracy test on all scanners used for scanning ballots.
• AIA system test: Before beginning an AIA, the Board shall test the AIA system to ascertain that the system will
correctly count the votes cast.
• Board makes random selection of precinct(s): All races in the precinct(s) chosen will be tallied.
• Official paper ballots: The AIA system shall produce and print the tally for all races from the selected precincts of
ballots cast by ballot type (i.e. at the lowest level of aggregation).
• Results Compilation:
o After the AIA system has finalized its tally, the Board or AIA system shall compile and compare the results to the
official vote totals for all races in the selected precincts.
 The results of the AIA shall be produced as a summary report listing the number of ballot and vote
discrepancies computed at the lowest level of aggregation reported in the election.
 If there is a discrepancy of less than ½ of 1%, the Board shall record the result, expressed as a percentage of
agreement (i.e., 99.98%), on the Voting System Post-Election Audit Report, DS-DE 107.
 If the discrepancy is ½ of 1% or more, the Board:
• Must investigate by reviewing the ballot images or extracts therefrom to ascertain if the vote was marked
in a race that likely was not read by the voting system tabulator or AIA system.

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• Must prepare a Discrepancy Report for Automated Independent Audit, DS-DE 106A, or the AIA system
may print a report with the same required information.
• Must explain the discrepancy on the Voting System Post-Election Audit Report, DS-DE 107.
o By December 15 of a general election year, the Board must provide a report of the audit results to the
Department of State.

AUDIT REPORT
• Due to Division of Elections by December 15 of a general election year.

• Content: The audit report (Voting System Post-Election Audit Report, DS-DE 107) shall include a description of:
o Overall accuracy of the audit expressed as a percentage of agreement (i.e., 99.98%).
o Problems/discrepancies encountered, if any.
o The likely cause of any problems/discrepancies encountered, if any.
o Recommended corrective or remedial actions for any problems/discrepancies encountered for future elections.
• For manual audit, the report must be accompanied by the Precinct Summary for Manual Audit, DS-DE 106 for each
precinct audited.
• For an automated independent audit, the report must be accompanied by the summary report as specified in Rule 1S5.026, Fla. Admin. Code, or a Discrepancy Report for Automated Independent Audit, DS-DE 106A.

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Table of Contents
Section 1: Staffing, training, and facilities security............................................................................2
Section 2: Pre-election ....................................................................................................................3
Voting system maintenance and storage .............................................................................................. 3
Voting system devices, elections storage media, maintenance, and storage ....................................... 4
Electronic access to voting system ........................................................................................................ 6
Pre-election steps for voting systems ................................................................................................... 8
Ballot preparation procedures .............................................................................................................. 9
Ballot and election materials security–pre-election............................................................................ 10
Ballot distribution ................................................................................................................................ 11
Public logic and accuracy test .............................................................................................................. 12
Filing of election information .............................................................................................................. 14
Section 3: Election ........................................................................................................................ 15
Transport of ballots and/or election materials.................................................................................... 15
Early voting requirements ................................................................................................................... 17
Election Day requirements .................................................................................................................. 23
Vote-by-mail ballot handling ............................................................................................................... 31
Section 4: Post-election................................................................................................................. 36
Receiving and preparing voted ballots (after 7 p.m. on Election Day) ................................................ 36
Post-election audit .............................................................................................................................. 37
Ballot and election materials security – post election......................................................................... 39
Appendices .................................................................................................................................. 40
Chain of Custody: Election Day Media and Voting Equipment ............................................................ 40
Chain of Custody: Early Voting Ballots................................................................................................. 41
Chain of Custody: Election Day Ballots ................................................................................................ 42
Chain of Custody: Vote By Mail Ballots ............................................................................................... 43
Election Schedule ................................................................................................................................ 44

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Section 1: Staffing, training, and facilities security
1.
2.

Supervisor of Elections’ organization and physical facility security.
Training plan pertaining to physical facility.

The Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections (SOE)
office is organized into multiple departments:
Operations and Support Services; Poll Worker Services
and Training; Voter Services; Administration and
Finance;
Information
Technology;
and
Communications. Senior leadership consists of the SOE
plus the Chief of Staff, General Counsel, Chief
Communications Officer, departmental directors, and
deputy directors. The senior leadership team is
responsible for establishing and overseeing policies,
procedures and processes as well as ensuring
regulatory compliance in each of their areas.
The HCSOE has two permanent locations. The
downtown location is in the County Center and houses
Executive, Administration, Communications (including
Candidate Services), and a unit of Voter Services. The
Elections Service Center (ESC) is in the geographic
center of the county and houses Operations and
Support Services, Poll Worker Services and Training,
Information Technology, and a unit of Voter Services.
Two warehouses at the ESC contain all voting
equipment and materials for Election Day and Early
Voting. Vote By Mail equipment (e.g., Blue Crest ReliaVote) is located at the main ESC warehouse. HCSOE
facilities comply with fire, safety and Americans with
Disabilities Act requirements as well as the safety
requirements of Hillsborough County government.
HCSOE abides by the standards set by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. Security of offices
and warehouses is of primary concern and all have keyswipe access. The HCSOE has a contract with a security
company to monitor usage and respond to alarms at
entry points to agency facilities. CCTV Video Security
cameras are located throughout the HCSOE facilities,
covering entry and exit points, as well as all areas where
ballots are stored or processed.
At the request of the SOE, a Security and Crime
Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)
review was conducted by the Hillsborough County
Sheriff’s Office, and an initial report was issued in June
2013. The report identified organizational, mechanical
and natural controls to enhance safety and security of
property and personnel. All recommendations were
implemented. A subsequent CPTED review was
conducted in 2018, and all recommendations were
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implemented. A Department of Homeland Security
Physical Security Assessment was conducted in 2018
and pertinent standards were met. Subsequent
physical security assessments have been conducted
and standards met.
A Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) is reviewed and
updated at least annually. The COOP contains plans and
instructions for relocation of operations to a backup
site in the event HCSOE locations become inoperable.
Prior to every election cycle, the following occurs: an
audit of authorized personnel who have access to the
facilities; reexamination of physical access policies
throughout the facilities; review of policies and
procedures for intrusion incident response; review of
positioning and functioning of surveillance cameras;
and review of surveillance system management alert
policies.
Training on these policies and procedures occurs prior
to each election cycle.
Canvassing Board members receive a copy of the
Security Procedures, with an overview presented by the
Supervisor of Elections and key staff, to assure their
familiarity with security procedures, to answer
questions and to address concerns. As applicable to
their positions and duties, staff review policies,
procedures, forms and documentation prior to each
election cycle. All new staff undergo orientation
sessions that provide an overview of the entire
organization and each department’s roles and
functions, as well as intensive training within their
assigned department. Seasoned staff members work as
mentors to new staff to assure understanding of and
compliance with security and other procedures.
Temporary workers receive up to a week of paid
training. The training consists of review of policies and
procedures, and hands on exercises to become familiar
with equipment and paperwork. After each election
cycle, policies and procedures are reviewed and
amended as determined appropriate to address issues
or improve processes. Based on such changes, training
is amended each cycle as needed.

Section 2: Pre-election
Voting system maintenance and storage
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Maintenance and testing performed on all voting system components.
Storage and nonoperational maintenance of all voting system components.
How all components of the voting system will be secured.
Chain of custody process for components of the voting system sent offsite.
Certified antivirus software installed on election management system’s computing equipment.

Annual preventive maintenance is performed on all
voting system components on-site by the vendor.
All DS200 ballot scanners, DS850 high speed scanners,
and ExpressVote Units are stored in secured
environments (continuous CCTV surveillance, restricted
access), charged, repaired and cleaned to the
manufacturer’s recommendations. All repairs and
maintenance are performed by the vendor.
All voting systems batteries, voltage, charging, and
storage requirements are reviewed annually to ensure
compliance with the manufacturer’s specifications.
No components of the voting system are sent offsite to
vendors for repairs or maintenance. All maintenance
and repairs are done on-site under the supervision of
SOE staff. A log is maintained to document all repairs
performed on any voting system component.
All areas in which components of the voting system are
stored are under CCTV surveillance and are accessible
via restricted key card access limited to authorized
personnel.
Memory sticks used during an election remain locked in
the Tabulation Room or Vault at the Elections Service

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Center until the memory sticks are loaded and secured
in the DS200 ballot scanners or ExpressVote Units. Only
authorized election personnel may enter these rooms.
Blank memory sticks are stored in a locked cabinet in
the Tabulation Room or Vault at the Elections Service
Center.
The data servers are tested prior to each election and
before each Logic and Accuracy Test. All computer files
are backed up to an external hard drive. The Election
Database System is checked in a pre-Logic and Accuracy
Testing before each election. The Election Database
System is locked in the Tabulation Room with access
only by the Chief of Staff and authorized staff.
The antivirus software

Voting system devices, elections storage media, maintenance, and storage
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

Sealing and securing all voting devices on Election Day and each day of the early voting period.
Create and maintain an inventory of all elections storage media.
Chain of custody process for elections storage media.
Ensuring any elections storage media prepared for an election is free of malicious software.
Maintaining a secure location for elections storage media.
Distributing voting system equipment to the precincts.
Ensure elections storage media is sealed utilizing uniquely identified tamper-resistant or tamper-evident
seals.
Chain of custody process for identifying, documenting, handling, and tracking voting devices.
Recovery plan in the event of a security breach of accountability and chain of custody procedures.
Training plan pertaining to all relevant election officials, staff, and temporary workers.

A custody assignment sheet is prepared by the
warehouse manager for each precinct and/or Early
Voting site. Each precinct/polling location is assigned a
DS200 tabulator and an ExpressVote, both of which
contain a memory stick programmed for the specific
election being conducted. Precincts/polling locations
and Early Voting sites may be assigned more than one
DS200 and/or ExpressVote unit based on the number of
ballot styles or anticipated voter turnout.
When not in use, DS200 and ExpressVote units are
stored at the warehouses of the ESC. This facility has
controlled access with high-security magnetic lock/card
swipe access, CCTV Video Security, and a monitored
alarm system. Access to the facility is limited to the SOE
and authorized personnel.
In preparation for an election, a memory stick is
assigned to each DS200 and a memory stick to each
ExpressVote unit. IT staff program and label all election
media for each DS200 and ExpressVote. Warehouse
staff install and test all equipment.
The memory sticks for both the DS200 and ExpressVote
are secured into the units. The DS200 (lid) units are
locked and sealed. The seal numbers are recorded on
the Opening Verification Form. These seal numbers are
verified by the Clerk and Assistant Clerk at the polling
site. The tabulator casing is secured.
Warehouse staff print and IT staff retain Configuration
and Zero Reports from each DS200 tabulator showing
the units have no votes and are ready for the election
with date/time and election data verified. When the
preparation of the DS200 tabulator is complete, and
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the unit is ready for the election, the unit is secured
with tamper evident seals and the seal numbers are
recorded on the Opening Verification Form. The ESC
warehouse manager verifies the seal number.
DS200 tabulators and ExpressVote units are prepared
by precinct/polling location and in delivery route order
to await distribution.
Delivery personnel are given a delivery sheet to record
delivery of each polling location’s or Early Voting site’s
supplies and equipment. Upon delivery, delivery
personnel enter the date and time of delivery on the
sheet and initial the form. The delivery sheet is
returned to the ESC warehouse manager.
If, at any point during pre-election preparation,
security, testing or distribution procedures, there is
evidence of damage or tampering with a DS200
tabulator or ExpressVote unit, the unit in question is
taken out of service and the SOE office notified
immediately.
Inadvertent damage to seals during transport of
equipment is noted on the appropriate form and
reported to the SOE office by phone upon discovery. A
seal damaged during transport is replaced with a new
seal and verified by transportation crew members. The
new seal number is noted on the custody assignment
sheet.
If the incident is determined to be deliberate, the
Canvassing Board, law enforcement, and the Division of
Elections are notified immediately. Any breach of
security is included in the Conduct of Election report.

All electronic media undergo full reformatting prior to
use.
After the Logic and Accuracy Test has been completed,
the DS200 transport case is locked and sealed with a
tamper-evident numbered seal. The DS200 serial
number and the seal number are recorded on the
Opening Verification Form. The electronic poll books
are tested for proper operation and assignment to
precincts/polling locations. The ExpressVote Units are
tested for proper operation after the ballot definition
has been loaded.
The SOE rents moving trucks to deliver equipment and
supplies to individual precincts, or contracts with a
commercial moving service. SOE staff members
coordinate delivery of precinct/polling location
equipment and supplies. SOE staff and delivery crews
load and deliver precinct/polling location equipment
and supplies. Delivery personnel record the date and
time of delivery to each precinct/polling location on the
delivery sheet and return this document to the ESC
warehouse manager after the delivery route is
completed. Route assignments are based on delivery
truck capacity to ensure the most efficient distribution
schedule.
SOE staff members coordinate delivery of Early Voting
site equipment and supplies. SOE staff and delivery

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crews load and deliver Early Voting equipment and
supplies to all Early Voting sites. Delivery personnel
record the date and time of delivery to each Early
Voting site on the delivery sheet and return this
document to the ESC warehouse manager after the
delivery route is completed. Route assignments are
based on delivery truck capacity to ensure the most
efficient distribution schedule.
If, during the distribution of the precinct/polling
location equipment and supplies, a seal becomes
inadvertently damaged as previously referenced or
broken the ESC delivery team notifies the ESC
warehouse manager immediately and, with the
assistance of one other person on the delivery crew,
replaces the seal and notes the change in seal number
on the delivery sheet. If the seal on the ballot box is
replaced, the seal number is updated in the inventory
system database.
The Director of IT maintains an inventory of all elections
storage media. Each media device is wiped clean after
use in an election and returned to a secured storage
container until the next election. Prior to use in a
current election, an anti-virus scan is performed to
assure the absence of any malicious or otherwise
unauthorized software.

Electronic access to voting system
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Methods of electronic access; authorizing access and function; detecting, controlling, and reporting access.
Process to ensure SOE’s authority to grant authority to change encryption keys and passwords not
delegated.
Process to ensure passwords, encryption keys, or other identifiers have been changed as appropriate.
Control keys/passwords maintained in secure, controlled environment; individuals with access delineated.
Maintain 'user control' access so individual’s access limited to certain menus, software modules,
components.
Verify that all elections storage media used on the voting system is free of malicious software.
Training plan for electronic access to the voting system for election officials, staff, and temporary workers.

The Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections uses a
stand-alone election reporting system that functions in
one location – Elections Service Center (ESC) at 2514 N.
Falkenburg Rd., Tampa, FL 33619.

The HCSOE Ballot Tabulation Network is controlled by a
series of personal computers, operating in a secure
local area network. The tabulation center at the ESC
contains some common system elements.

The reporting system is located in the tabulation room.
Physical access to the tabulation room is restricted via
high-security magnetic swipe card access. The entire
area is under continuous CCTV video surveillance.

These are defined as follows:

The principle of least privilege is used to limit users’
access rights only to the menus, modules and
components strictly required to do their jobs.
Access to the election reporting system software
requires logon username and passwords. The SOE is
responsible for establishing and maintaining system
access rights and passwords. This authority is not
delegated.
Electronic access to the voting system is granted by the
SOE to the three persons: Director of IT, Chief of Staff,
and an on-site vendor support liaison. Prior to each
election cycle the usernames and passwords of
authorized persons are changed. A copy of this
information is provided to the SOE who then secures
this in a lock box to which only he has access.
Prior to each election cycle, training is provided to
officials, staff and temporary workers to comply with
the procedures for electronic access to voting systems.
Senior staff in the Information Technology Department
provide the training, which consists of review of
policies, procedures, forms and documentation.
All electronic media undergo full reformatting prior to
use, including anti-virus scanning.

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File Server: The file server is the central depository for
storage of files. All network communications are
controlled by the server, which is also responsible for
user level password security.
Administrator Stations: These PCs administer the
ElectionWare and ERM systems, collecting and
consolidating all tabulation totals. It is also the source
of election reports.
Reader Station: These computers interface directly
between the USB memory stick readers and the ERM
database server. They run the ElectionWare Suite
programs which collect the totals from the Memory
Sticks from the precinct/polling location scanners and
central count scanners and process them into the
Central Tabulation System.
Data Server (Results Acquisition): This server, located at
the Elections Service Center, receives the electronic
results from DS200s, which are located at the
precincts/polling locations. This process uses a check
sum validation to ensure that only precincts that are
used in the election are accepted. There is also error
checking deployed to ensure that good data is received.
Firewall: A
firewall is in place between the data
server and Central Tabulation Network to ensure only
the results data from the server is passed into the
Central Tabulation Network.

Website: The Hillsborough County Supervisor of
Elections maintains a website where election night
results are available and updated periodically.
If the Administrator Station fails, it is replaced with one
of the PCs being used as a Reader Station or a
compatible backup PC. The failed PC is removed from
the tabulation network, and the Reader Station is
restarted as the Administrator Station. At this point,
normal ballot processing can resume.
There are two central file servers. After the Logic and
Accuracy Test, a backup of the database and related
data is copied from one file server to the other. In the

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event of a file server failure, the other server would be
brought online and connected to the network. The
workstations would have to attach to the new server
and staff would continue to process incoming data.
In the event a data server fails, a mirrored backup
station is turned on and made the production station.
In the event a Firewall fails, a mirrored backup of the
unit is turned on and made the production Firewall.
In the event the website goes down, election night
results will be shared via paper report in the public
media room.

Pre-election steps for voting systems
a.
b.

Voting system components tested and functioning accurately after annual maintenance and programming.
Test materials utilized and the voting system tests performed prior to the public logic and accuracy testing.

After the annual maintenance of voting system
components and programming for the election is
completed, and once the ballot is determined to be
accurate, all of the voting system components that will
be used in the election are tested using a pre-marked
test deck which includes hand marked and ExpressVote
ballots.
The test deck is designed to record a predetermined
number of valid votes for each candidate and on each
measure and to include for each office one or more
ballots which have activated voting positions in excess
of the number allowed by law in order to test the ability
of the tabulating devices to reject such votes.
A complete backup is performed on the Central
Tabulation System (ES&S ElectionWare), which will be
used in the tabulation process as follows:


After the ballot definition has been verified and the
tabulation system has been programmed, a backup
is performed.



A complete internal Pre-Election Logic and
Accuracy Test is performed by reading at least one
memory stick from each ballot style into the ERM
(Election Reporting Manager). This test involves
processing a memory stick from at least one DS200
ballot scanner for each ballot style that was test

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voted using a test deck of ballots. Memory stick
processing is performed on the ERM workstation
that will be used in the election.


When completed, the test results are audited by a
proofing team. Proofing materials contain various
documentation and formulas needed for checking
the test data. All items on the test result reports
are proofed for accuracy. These checks may
include but are not limited to numeric accuracy of
results, proper wording and spelling, statistical
calculations (registration totals, percentages,
under/over votes), and district/precinct crossreferences to check the validity of the voting
options.

If errors are detected during this process, appropriate
corrections are made, and the entire test is reexecuted. Once the proofing team has established that
the test results are completely accurate, they sign off
on the proofed copies of the tests, as well as their
auditing checklists. These documents are then stored
with the remainder of the election testing materials and
are available for inspection during the Logic and
Accuracy Tests.
All electronic media is stored in the locked tabulation
room and when in use in the DS200 and ExpressVote,
the media is in a locked compartment.

Ballot preparation procedures
a.
b.
c.
d.

Verify that all ballots contain the proper races, candidates, and issues for each ballot variation.
Verify accuracy of assignment of unique marks or other coding used to identify ballot variations or precincts.
Verify that all ballots and ballot variations are accurately prepared and printed.
Verify proper tabulation of the unique marks or other coding used to identify ballot variations or precincts.

For each election, a list of offices to be filled by election
is prepared. This list is verified at the beginning of
candidate qualifying. As candidates establish campaign
accounts locally and with the State of Florida Division of
Elections, their names are listed under the office for
which they have filed. At 12:00 noon on the last day of
official qualification and write-in qualification, SOE staff
prepares a certified list of office titles, candidates and
issues to be placed on the ballot. The loyalty oaths are
used to confirm the spelling of the local candidates’
names as they should appear on the ballot and verified.
The State of Florida Division of Elections provides the
certified list of names for candidates who are required
to file with the State of Florida Division of Elections.
The ES&S ElectionWare Suite is the system used to
facilitate ballot preparation.
When the issues and names of candidates are entered
into the Central Tabulation System, the Central
Tabulation System determines and assigns ballot styles
based on the profile information that is maintained in
the system. A ballot style list of precincts and districts
in each style is printed. This list is proofed against the
precinct district list to verify that all eligible precincts
are assigned the correct ballot style.

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When all ballot information has been entered into the
system, sample ballots are printed on standard paper
stock and reviewed for accuracy against the original
source material. If errors are discovered, information is
re-entered and new ballots are printed. This process
continues until all information has been verified as
correct.
After the ballot design is complete and hard copies of
each ballot style on ballot paper stock are obtained, the
ballots undergo a final verification process where each
ballot is checked for legibility, clarity of layout, spelling
errors, inaccuracies in candidate/office assignments,
errors in office/ballot style assignments, etc. If errors
are discovered, the ballot is corrected and reentered
into the verification process. Each ballot is put through
the tabulating equipment to check that they can be
read. Once the ballots are found to be error free, the
printer is authorized to produce the ballots.
All sample ballots used during ballot preparation
procedures are prominently marked as ballot proofing
material. Once ballot preparation is completed, ballot
proofing materials are stored securely in a sealed
container in the vault at the ESC.

Ballot and election materials security–pre-election
a.
b.

Ballot accountability and storage measures, and security measures for ballots and election materials.
Individuals authorized access to ballots and election materials; individuals authorized to permit access.

All ballots are received in the Elections Services Center
Warehouse where they are stored under continuous
CCTV surveillance in restricted access areas until
distribution to Election Day polling places, Early Voting
locations, or to voters as Vote By Mail ballots.
Election Day Ballots: Election Day ballots are delivered
from the ballot printing company to the ESC Warehouse
approximately four weeks prior to an election.
Quantities of ballots received are verified against
quantities ordered. The ballots are inspected and
stored in a secure area for distribution to precincts. The
custody of the ballots remains with the ESC Warehouse
manager until distributed.
Blank Ballot Stock: Blank ballot stock is intended for use
in the Ballot on Demand system at Early Voting
locations and at SOE offices for over-the-counter Vote
By Mail ballots. Early Voting is conducted in the offices
of the Supervisor of Elections and at other designated
Early Voting sites. Early Voting sites use Ballot on

Page | 10

Demand to provide precinct-specific ballots to voters.
Blank ballot stock is secured in the ESC Warehouse in
the EV Cage
Vote By Mail Ballots: Approximately two weeks before
the statutory deadline to deliver VBM ballots to voters,
ballots are received at the ESC from the printer. These
ballots are secured in the VBM Cage where they are
prepared for delivery using the Blue Crest Relia Vote
system.
Test Deck Ballots: The test deck ballots are delivered to
the ESC Warehouse and received by the Director of
Operations. They are stamped in red “TEST DECK” and
separated into precinct packets for use in testing. All
test deck ballots are retrieved and accounted for when
testing is completed and secured in the vault
throughout the election.

Ballot distribution
a.
b.
c.

Number and variations of ballots per precinct determined for Election Day and during the early voting
period.
Method for securing and controlling access to ballots.
Process for distributing the physical ballots to precincts.

The Hillsborough County SOE uses historical voter
turnout information and anticipated turnout figures to
estimate the number of ballots required for an election.
Each precinct is assigned its own ballot style. If there is
a split within the precinct, a ballot style is assigned to it.
For primary elections, a ballot style is designated for
each major party conducting nominating elections and
a ballot style is designated for no party affiliation voters.
Ballots for Election Day voting are delivered to the ESC
from the vendor, where they are examined to ensure
the ballot packaging is intact and stored in a secured
restricted area. The ballots are inventoried against the
order that was placed and transferred to the respective
ballot box. The ballots are stored in the precinct/polling
location specific ballot box secured with a numbered
seal in a locked warehouse that is protected by a
security system and video surveillance system. Access
is limited to the SOE and designated staff.

Page | 11

Ballots are delivered under the direction of staff from
the Operations and Support Services Department to
polling places for Election Day voting in locked ballot
boxes secured with numbered seals. Using the Opening
Verification Form, the Clerk verifies quantity and ballot
style information prior to the opening of the polls on
election morning and calls the SOE to report
discrepancies.
Early Voting sites use ballot on demand to provide
precinct specific ballots to voters. Blank ballot paper for
Early Voting sites is secured at the ESC. Access is limited
to the SOE and designated staff. The Clerk of each Early
Voting site is notified of the time and date that the
election supplies, including blank ballot paper, will be
delivered. The blank ballot paper is then secured at the
respective Early Voting site and custody is assumed by
the Early Voting site Clerk and staff.

Public logic and accuracy test
a.
b.
c.

Explain each test performed, including information about the test materials used for EV, ED and VBM devices.
Information about the ballot test decks and pre-audited results used in testing.
Seal, secure, retain election definition, test ballots, results, other materials; maintain record of proceedings.

Prior to the Public Logic and Accuracy Test, every DS200
unit that will be deployed for use in the election is
tested with results documented on an L&A Checklist.




This comprehensive checklist includes:

Step 5: Reset DS200
 DS200 is reset, Zero Report is printed w/ zero (0)
votes for each race, and public count is:
 Configuration Report, Zero Report, Results Report,
and 2nd Zero Report, on one tape, is removed
 New full roll of DS200 paper is installed
 DS200 is powered off and screen and lid are closed
and locked

Step 1: Verify Correct Information on Configuration
Report
 Current Time and Date
 Unit Serial Number
 Time Zone
 Modem Status
 Modem Type
 Modem ID
 Available Backup Storage
 Scanner FW
 Power Management
 DS200 Firmware
 Election Name
 Election Date
Step 2: Process Test Decks
 Location number in header of this form, on DS200
lid and screen, on ballot box, and Zero Report all
match
 On Zero Report, all races have zero (0) votes
 Ballots were processed in all 4 orientations
 Overvoted and blank ballots rejected on initial
scan, then rescanned and accepted
 Multi-sheet sensor tested and functioning
properly, ballots were rejected
 All test deck ballots were processed and public
count matches Test Deck A-Card Total in header
 Test deck ballots were removed, hand-counted
total is:
, and returned to envelope
Step 3: Close Poll
 DS200 public count matches Test Deck A-Card
Total in header – Public count total is:
 Results tape match expected/pre-determined
results
Step 4: Modem Results (Verify Tab Room Readiness)
 DS200 results sent successfully YES or NO (if NO
enter error code/message below)
Page | 12

Error Code/Message (if applicable)
DS200 results uploaded successfully on Central
Server

For each election, a quantity of precinct tabulators
equal to five percent (5%) of the number of units to be
fielded on Election Day or ten (10) units, whichever is
greater, tabulators used for Early Voting, and automatic
tabulating equipment used for processing VBM ballots,
are publicly tested.
County candidates are provided with written
notification of the Public Logic and Accuracy Test at the
time of qualifying. Statewide candidates are notified by
the Secretary of State to contact the county Supervisor
of Elections for Logic and Accuracy scheduling. Written
notice is also sent by certified mail at least thirty (30)
days prior to the start of Early Voting to each County
party chair of each political party and all candidates,
other than statewide, whose names appear on the
county’s ballot and who did not receive notice at the
time of qualifying. Public notice of time and place of
Logic and Accuracy Testing is posted on the HCSOE
website at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to its
occurrence.
The testing begins with the election parameters loaded
into the selected automatic tabulating equipment and
a zero report produced by each tabulator tested to
demonstrate that the tabulating equipment has no
votes recorded for any offices or measures in the
election. A test deck of pre-audited ballots is produced
to record a predetermined number of valid votes for
each candidate and on each measure. The test deck
includes one or more ballots for each office with
activated voting positions in excess of the number

allowed by law and at least one blank ballot to test the
ability of the automatic tabulating equipment to reject
such votes. The test deck also included hand-marked
ballots and ExpressVote ballots. The test deck is
processed through the selected units. Similarly, a test is
conducted on the VBM tabulation equipment. Results
are collected from each unit tested and a cumulative
report is produced for all units to confirm total results.
Test totals are then compared to the expected outcome
and verified by the Canvassing Board.
Once the Canvassing Board verifies that the Logic and
Accuracy Test has been satisfactorily completed, the
Canvassing Board signs all printed reports and the
results of the tests are recorded in the Canvassing
Board minutes. All signed materials, test decks, and
reports are stored in a secured area at the ESC following
the Logic and Accuracy Test.
Immediately after the completion of the first public
Logic and Accuracy Test, the Central Tabulation System

Page | 13

equipment is secured. A copy of the election specific
passwords is sealed in an envelope and signed across
the flap by the Canvassing Board. The Supervisor of
Elections, Chief of Staff and Director of Information
Technology are the only persons with access to the
password. A backup of the election database, test
ballots, reports used in the Public Logic and Accuracy
Test and the envelope containing the passwords are
stored in a secured area and retained in the custody of
the Canvassing Board. A copy of the election database
is forwarded to the Division of Elections.
For the central count DS850 scanners, a Logic and
Accuracy Test is conducted prior to the first day of
canvassing VBM ballots, and after the completion of the
official count.

Filing of election information
a.
b.

File with DOE a copy of the L&A tested election database to be used in an election.
Provide DS-DE 132 completed by individual who created database and definition IF not employee of the SOE.

Once the Canvassing Board verifies that the Logic and
Accuracy Test has been satisfactorily completed, the
Canvassing Board signs all printed reports and the
results of the tests are recorded in the Canvassing
Board minutes, in accordance with Chapter 101 Florida
Statutes, and Rule 1S-2.015, Florida Administrative
Code, the Supervisor of Elections sends by certified mail
to the Department of State, Division of Elections (DOE):
•
•

Copy of voting system software
Copy of administrative database used to define the
election

Page | 14

•
•
•

Copy of all election-specific files generated and
used by the system
Documentation stating the release level of the
precinct tabulation equipment and firmware
Form DS-DE 132 (required if outside party creates
election definition)

The system parameters disk is mailed to the DOE the
day after the completion of the Logic and Accuracy Test.

Section 3: Election
Transport of ballots and/or election materials
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Recording date, time, and names of individuals who transported ballots, ExpressVote ballots, and/or
election materials to a delivery site.
Recording the date, time, and names of individuals who received the transported ballots, ExpressVote
ballots, and/or election materials.
Create and maintain secure location for storing and transporting voting devices once election definitions
are loaded, including procedures used at locations outside the direct control of the SOE.
Creating and maintaining an inventory of voting devices, at each storage location, for each election.
Training plan for transport of ballots and/or election materials.

Election Day ballot custody is secured and documented
continuously from initial receipt of ballots from the
printer to records retention storage.
1.

2.

3.

4.

Upon receipt from the printer, Election Day ballots
are placed in the ESC Warehouse under camera
surveillance and restricted swipe card access in the
custody of the Director of Operations.
 Received from printer (Documentation:
Delivery Receipt)
 Quantities confirmed and quality checked
(Documentation: Order Confirmation)
 Sealed into ballot boxes (Documentation:
Custody Assignment Sheet and Opening
Verification Form)
Ballots are delivered to voting locations. Sealed
boxes in which the ballots are locked are
geotagged, in the custody of election staff couriers.
 Delivered to voting locations (Documentation:
Delivery Sheet, Seal Verification and
Geolocation Report)
Ballots are at the Polling Location in the Custody of
the Clerk
 Ballot quantities and styles confirmed
(Documentation: Opening Verification Form)
 Distribution to voter (Documentation:
Epollbook Check-in)
 Ballots placed in sealed and barcoded
containers and accounted for when voting
ends (Documentation: Closing Verification
Form - Voted, Provisional, Spoiled, Unscanned)
Ballots are delivered to drop sites in geotagged
black ballot bags in the custody of the Clerk.
 Delivered to Drop Site (Documentation: Drop
Site Log, Seal Verification, and Geolocation
Report)

Page | 15

5.

6.

Ballots are transported from the Drop Site to the
ESC Warehouse in sealed and geotagged bags in
the custody of elections staff couriers
 Transported to ESC (Documentation: Delivery
Sheet, Seal Verification, and Geolocation
Report)
Ballots are in the ESC Warehouse under camera
surveillance, restricted swipe card access in the
Custody of the Director of Operations
 Received at ESC (Documentation: Receipt Log,
Seal Verification)
 Scanned for inventory, image record, and
reconciliation (Documentation: Clear Audit
Scanning Log and Reconciliation Report)
 Ballots In record storage for 22 months
(Documentation: Records Inventory Log)

Election Day supplies are picked up by Clerks the
weekend prior to Election Day at the ESC. The supplies
include a Clerk’s Briefcase, electronic poll books and
accessories, name badges, and the clerk’s folder
containing forms. Backup precinct registers, unscanned
ballot bag, voted provisional ballot bag, spoiled ballot
envelope, election results bag, completed forms
envelope, and seals are also delivered during Clerk’s
pickup in the Black Ballot Bag. The Clerk’s Briefcase and
Black Ballot Bag are stored and maintained in a
separate secure area at the ESC for transfer to the Clerk
during Clerk’s pickup prior to the election. The Clerk
maintains custody of the Clerk’s Briefcase and Black
Ballot Bag until arrival at the precinct/polling location.
Early Voting ballot custody is secured and documented
continuously from initial receipt to records retention
storage.

1.

2.

3.

4.

Upon receipt from the printer, Early Voting blank
ballot stock is placed in the ESC Warehouse under
camera surveillance and restricted swipe card
access in the custody of the Director of Operations.
 Ballot stock received from the printer
(Documentation: Delivery Receipt)
 Quantities confirmed and quality checked
(Documentation: Order Confirmation)
 Ballot
stock
assigned
for
delivery
(Documentation: Custody Assignment Sheet
and Opening Verification Form)
Ballot stock delivered to voting locations. The
vehicles in which the blank ballot stock is delivered
are geotagged.
 Delivered to voting locations (Documentation:
Delivery Sheet and Geolocation Report)
Ballot stock is at the Early Voting Site in the
Custody of the Early Voting Clerk.
 Verification
of
quantities
received
(Documentation: Supplies Receipt Log)
 Ballot printed and distributed to voter
(Documentation: Epollbook Check-in)
 At the end of voting each day, ballots are
placed in sealed and barcoded containers
(Documentation: Closing Verification Form Voted, Provisional, Spoiled, Unscanned)
Ballots are delivered to the ESC in geotagged
vehicle daily.
 Ballots are retrieved by the courier
(Documentation:
Courier
Log,
Seal
Verification, and Geolocation Report)

Page | 16

Transported to ESC (Documentation: Courier
Log, Seal Verification, and Geolocation Report)
Ballots are in the ESC Warehouse under camera
surveillance, restricted swipe card access in the
Custody of the Director of Operations
 Ballots received at ESC (Documentation: EV
Receipt Log, Seal Verification)
 Scanned for inventory, image record, and
reconciliation (Documentation: Clear Audit
Scanning Log and Reconciliation Report)
 Ballots In record storage for 22 months
(Documentation: Records Inventory Log)


5.

At each point of transfer of custody of ballots and
election materials, accompanying documentation is
signed by the person relinquishing and the person
receiving custody.
Secure locations for storing voting devices are
maintained within the elections office using multiple
methods, such as CCTV surveillance and restricted
swipe card access. Locations not under the direct
control of the SOE are secured via locked room and/or
polling places to which only SOE staff and polling clerks
have keys. Transport security is achieved using chain of
custody protocols, numbered and tamper evident
seals, locks and geotags.

Early voting requirements
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.

Ballot accountability, storage measures, security measures for ballots and election materials during EV.
Verify the expected number of EV ballots were received at an early voting site prior to the opening of polls.
Verifying that a voter, choosing to vote at an early voting site, receives the correct ballot.
Verifying ID, seal, and protective counter numbers of voting devices used at early voting sites.
Sealing or verifying the seals on the ballot box(es) used at early voting sites.
Verifying the operability and readiness of voting devices used at early voting sites.
Verifying that all counters except protective counters are set at zero on each voting device used EV sites.
Printing record from each device at EV sites, to ensure no votes on the voting device (i.e., zero tapes).
How unscanned and spoiled ballots are handled at early voting sites.
Accounting for and monitoring VBM ballots deposited at a SBIS at an EV site, and SOE office.
Verification if electronic or voter authorization slips/stubs, used to track voter during the EV voting process.
Handling voting system malfunctions at an EV site.
Securing voting machines at the close of the polls at an EV site, process for the close of each EV day.
Accounting of all ballots and hybrid voting system paper outputs after the polls close at an EV site.
Sealing or verifying seals on the voter authorization slips container(s) if used during EV.
Recording and verifying votes cast (i.e., ballot accounting forms, etc).
Tabulation of votes for EV
i.
Daily process for counting and reconciliation of voted ballots and ExpressVote outputs during EV.
ii.
Daily processing, tabulation, and accumulation of voted ballots, ExpressVote outputs, election data during EV.
iii.
Processing and recording write-in and provisional ballots during EV period.
iv.
Handling unreadable ballots during EV period.
v.
Backup and recovery of tabulated results and voting system programs during EV period.
vi.
Handling the results from each of the EV tabulators.
vii.
Endorsing EV results by the Election Board.
viii.
Transport EV results to the SOE central or regional site.
ix.
Handle provisional ballot results.
x.
Public viewing of the poll closing process at EV sites.
xi.
Reconciling discrepancies between unused, tabulated, provisional, unscanned ballots; other discrepancies found
during EV accumulation process.

The voting method employed for Early Voting sites uses
a Marksense ballot completed by the voter and then
inserted into the DS200 tabulator by the voter.
DS200s used for Early Voting retain election totals for
all precincts. Election totals from DS200s used for Early
Voting are directly uploaded into the election
management system as per statute no later than 7:00
PM on the day before Election Day.
Early voting rooms are locked when not in use. Facility
keys control access to the facility where the polling
room is located and/or the polling room itself. There
are two sets of facility keys for each Early Voting Team.
The poll worker teams will receive the keys, in a manila
envelope, hand-delivered by the delivery driver on the
scheduled equipment delivery day. The Clerk and
Assistant Clerk from each team will each be responsible
for a set of keys. Each night, the Clerk and Assistant
Clerk will take home a set of facility keys and a set of
Page | 17

voting equipment keys. Poll workers are instructed that
these items must never be left behind overnight.
***
Blank ballot stock is delivered to the early voting
locations as needed during the course of voting. A
chain of custody form accompanies all blank ballot
stock, signed by the warehouse manager, courier, and
early voting poll worker who receives the blank ballot
stock.
All voted ballots are returned to the Elections Service
Center after the end of voting each day during the early
voting period.
Ballots are in the ESC Warehouse under camera
surveillance and in areas with restricted swipe card
access in the custody of the Director of Operations and
Warehouse Manager.

The chain of custody is as follows:













Ballot stock received from the printer –
documented by delivery receipt.
Quantities confirmed and quality checked –
documented against the order confirmation.
Ballots assigned for delivery – documented on the
Custody Assignment Sheet.
Ballots delivered to voting locations – geotagged
and documented by the delivery sheet.
Quantity received verified — documented on the
Opening Verification Form.
Ballot distributed to voter – documented by
epollbook check in.
Ballots (voted, provisional, spoiled, unscanned)
accounted for when voting ends – documented on
the Closing Verification Form, sealed and barcoded.
Ballots retrieved by courier staff and transported
to the ESC—geotagged and documented on the
Courier Log and Seal Verification.
Ballots returned to the ESC—documented by EV
Receipt Log and Seal Verification
Ballots scanned for inventory, record image and
reconciliation—documented by Clear Audit
Scanning Log and Reconciliation Report

There are hundreds of different ballot styles for each
election, based on the different districts in the county.
A “split precinct” is one that requires more than one
ballot style.
The ballot style is comprised of five digits. The first
three numbers correspond to the voter’s precinct
number. The fourth digit is reserved for splits, if one
exists for the associated precinct. And in partisan
elections, the last number represents the voter’s party
affiliation.
***
The Clerk and Assistant Clerk verify the seal numbers on
the Lid Seal, and Ballot Box Seal, and the DS200 serial
number, on the Opening Verification Form. The Clerk
and Assistant Clerk sign, certifying the information is
true and correct.
If, during this procedure, the Election Board discovers
evidence of damage to or tampering with any seal on
the DS200 tabulator, the tabulator in question is not
put into service and the SOE office is notified
immediately.
On the first day of Early Voting, the Clerk and Assistant
Clerk follow the opening instructions to turn on and

Page | 18

print the Configuration and Election Zero Report for the
DS200 tabulator.
This is a process performed the first day of early voting
confirming that all races on the Zero Report have zero
vote totals. The Zero Report is a critical document that
ensures that no ballots have been cast into the DS200
before the polls open. Poll workers use the First Day
Opening Verification Form, located in the Clerk’s
Folder, along with a set of voting equipment keys and
the flashlight, to:




Break the seal securing the Auxiliary bin, use the
key to open it, and check to make sure no ballots
or debris are inside.
Before breaking the seal on the DS200 lid, verify
the seal matches the seal number recorded on the
DS200 and Election Zero Report Verification
section of the First Day Opening Verification Form.
Then, using the key, unlock the lock, and lift the
latches to open the lid. Verify the serial number on
the DS200 matches the serial number preprinted
on the First Day Opening Verification Form.

The poll worker will then enter the election code. The
Configuration Report will immediately begin to print.
The Configuration Report lists storage memory
availability, firmware and scanner information that has
already been verified by the Elections Office.
The Election Zero Report will print. The poll worker will
tear off both reports, leaving the Configuration Report
attached to the Election Zero Report. He or she will
verify the Election Zero Report against the DS200 Zero
Report Sample Ballot found in the Clerk’s Folder to
verify that all races appear on the report and each race
has zero vote totals. The Clerk and Assistant Clerk must
sign the Election Zero Report where indicated.
Both reports (Configuration and Election Zero Reports)
are placed inside the DS200 Reports Bag.
The poll worker will finish completing the DS200 and
Election Zero Report Verification section of the First
Day Opening Verification Form by placing a checkmark,
where indicated, to confirm the date, time, and site
displayed on the DS200 screen are correct, that all races
on the Election Zero Report have zero vote totals, and
that the Election Zero Report has been signed by the
Clerk and Assistant Clerk. The poll worker will then sign,
date and record the time where indicated on the
opening form.
***

On each subsequent day of early voting, the poll worker
will unlock the DS200 lid and display screen and place
both in the upright position. Because the DS200 is
plugged in, the unit will automatically power on
opening to the Enter Election Code Screen.
Each day of Early Voting, the Configuration Report will
print. The poll worker will tear the report off and place
it inside the DS200 Reports Bag. Similar to the First Day
Opening Verification Form, the poll worker completes
the Daily Opening Verification Form after the first day,
and each day thereafter.
***
If the voter has spoiled their ballot or the DS200 Unit
has rejected the voter’s ballot for various reasons, the
voter may request a replacement ballot. In any election,
a voter may receive two (2) replacement ballots, for a
total of three (3) ballots. A voter may only cast one (1)
ballot in any given election. The clerk or assistant clerk
will reverse the check in on the electronic pollbook to
re-issue a ballot and will write spoiled across the ballot
and place the spoiled ballot inside the Spoiled Ballot
Envelope.
When voting has ended for the day, the clerk or
assistant clerk will retrieve the Spoiled Ballot Envelope,
remove and count the spoiled ballots, verify the total
counted matches the number indicated in the
ePollbook, and record this total in section 1 of the
Closing Verification Form. He or she will then return the
spoiled ballots to the Spoiled Ballot Envelope and place
the envelope in the side compartment of the Black
Ballot Bag.
***
Voters have the option to return their Vote By Mail
ballot at any one of the designated Early Voting sites. A
sealed and locked Secure Ballot Intake Station (SBIS),
with a Blue Ballot Transfer Container located inside of
it, will be positioned at each Early Voting site. At least
one poll worker is designated to stay by the SBIS at all
times. The Clerk at the Early Voting site has keys to
unlock the SBIS box. Once the voter deposits their
voted ballot into the SBIS Box, the voter’s ballot has
been cast for the election and the ballot cannot be
retrieved. At the end of voting each day, a poll worker
will retrieve the SBIS Box, secure it inside the polling
room, and call Poll Worker Services to inform the
office that the site is closed and that daily closing
procedures are underway.
The clerk retrieves the Blue Ballot Transfer Container
from within the SBIS, checks to assure that no VBM
ballots cast that day are left inside the SBIS, and
then closes and seals the container.
Page | 19

The SOE courier will come each evening of Early Voting
to retrieve the SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container and
replace it with an empty Blue Ballot Transfer Container
that will be used the next day.
***
The Multi-Purpose Form is a double-sided document
that contains five forms on one single sheet of paper
that is used to identify an issue or a need a voter may
have. The Multi-Purpose Form creates a paper trail of a
voter’s movement in the voting location. It is one of
several SOE documents used in procedures constituting
a system of checks and balances. It is the one document
allowing us to process a voter’s address change, name
change, declaration to secure or provide assistance,
etc. Poll workers are trained to use extreme care in
reviewing the form when it is completed by the voter at
the Voter Check-In Table and/or the Voter Assistance
Table.
***
The DS200 unit has an uninterruptible power supply
with an internal battery that is continuously charged,
enabling the tabulator to continue counting ballots for
a limited time during a power failure. In the unlikely
instance there happens to be a power failure, the Clerk
must be notified so they can immediately call Poll
Worker Services to inform them of the situation. The
DS200 unit may accept ballots a little slower than usual;
however, as long as it accepts the ballots, the unit is
working and votes are being recorded. If the internal
battery is depleted, the poll worker is instructed to
break the seal and unlock the Auxiliary Bin, and instruct
voters to insert their voted ballot inside this bin,
continuing to have voters insert their ballots inside the
Auxiliary Bin until power is restored. Once power is
restored, the Clerk will relock and seal the Auxiliary Bin
and follow normal procedures. The Clerk will submit an
incident report documenting the power failure and
then update the incident report to include the time the
power was restored.
***
During Early Voting, at the end of each day, when voting
has been completed, the Clerk and another poll worker
record on the DS200 Unit Log the number of “Ballots
Cast” from the DS200 display screen. They then
subtract this number from the previous day’s total to
get the current day’s total. That number is recorded on
the Closing Verification Form. The Clerk and/or
Assistant Clerk count and record on the Daily Closing

Verification Form the number of Early Voting Check-ins,
the number of spoiled ballots, the number of
unscanned ballots, and the number of voted provisional
ballots. The number of Early Voting Check-ins are
compared to and reconciled with the ballot count on
the DS200 Unit Log or the number recorded on the
closing verification form. All ballots are placed in the
Black Ballot Bag(s) and secured with a numbered seal
for return to the SOE Office. When the SOE
representatives pick up the Black Ballot Bag, they sign
the Daily Closing Verification Form and take possession
of the Black Ballot Bags from the Early Voting site.
The Black Ballot Bags are then transported to the SOE
office where seal numbers are verified for custody
transfer and the contents of the bags are sorted and
stored in the secured Early Voting Cage under video
surveillance.
***
Daily closing procedures are as follows:
Announce Closing: Outside the entrance to the polling
place, the clerk will announce that the polls are now
closed according to the time on the cell phone. “The
Polls are now closed. Voters currently in line can still
cast a ballot; however, no additional voters may enter
this line.” Once the Clerk makes this announcement, a
poll worker will stand behind the last person in line to
establish the completion of voting. If a voter attempts
to enter the line, the voter is informed that the polls
have closed and he or she cannot enter the line. If the
voter is confrontational, the Clerk is notified and Poll
Worker Services is contacted for additional support.
The Clerk is notified if there is a line at the time of
closing with the approximate number of voters. The
Clerk will then inform Poll Worker Services.
Process Remaining Voters: At the end of the voting day,
poll workers allow any voters that were in line at the
time of closing to cast their ballot. Voters continue to
cast ballots as they would prior to the closing of the poll.
Set Up Public Observation Area: After the final voter has
cast their ballot and departed, any public observers who
want to observe the closing of the poll may enter the
polling room. Chairs are placed along the wall for
observers. Poll workers are instructed that all members
of the public, including media, candidates, and Poll
Watchers are allowed to observe the opening and
closing procedures. Observers may not touch any
equipment or materials, use cell phones, or otherwise
interfere with the opening and closing procedures.
Page | 20

Photography is not permitted during the opening and
closing processes.
Remove Unscanned Ballots: Removal of ballots from
the DS200 is completed by the clerk and an Election
Board member of a different party affiliation, as per the
following four steps.
1. Remove the seal on the Auxiliary Bin. Thoroughly
check for any ballots deposited inside.
2. Retrieve the Unscanned Ballot Bag from the side
compartment of the Black Ballot Bag. Enclose
unscanned ballot(s) inside the blue Unscanned Ballot
Bag.
3. Write the total number of unscanned ballots in
section 1 of the Closing Verification Form.
4. Return the Unscanned Ballot Bag to the side
compartment of the Black Ballot Bag.
Retrieve Closing Verification Form and DS200 Unit
Log(s): Remove the Opening and Closing Verification
Form and DS200 Unit Log(s) from the Clerks Folder. The
Daily Closing Verification Form (on the reverse side of
the Opening Verification Form) is dedicated to
recording the total ballots cast at the polling place and
verifying essential voting supplies are returned each
day of Early Voting. The DS200 Unit Log(s) are essential
to helping know how many ballots were cast on any
given day – it is used to calculate the number of ballots
on each DS200.
Record Check-in Totals: Once the last voter has been
processed, cast their ballot, and has left the polling
place, retrieve from the epollbooks the total number of
regular (issued) check-ins processed. Record the grand
total of ‘Issued’ ballots in the Regular Check-Ins field of
the Closing Verification Form.
Update DS200Unit Log(s): In order to capture the daily
total, first thing in the morning of each day, the clerk
will record the beginning total (zero for the first day,
subsequent days will be the end total from the day
prior) in the Begin Total field for the respective date. At
the end of voting for the day, the poll worker will record
in section 1 on the Closing Verification Form in the Daily
Scanned Ballot Total the number shown in the Public
Count area at the top of the DS200 screen in the End
Total column of the Unit Log. This is done for each
DS200 until the last day of Early Voting.
Shutdown DS200 Unit(s): Steps are performed each day
to shut down the DS200 unit. Shutdown procedures
allow poll workers to reopen the poll the subsequent

days of Early Voting. Immediately after the last voter
has voted and departed the polling room and after
recording the daily scanned ballot totals, the DS200
unit(s) are shut down. Once the screen turns
completely black, the poll worker will close and lock the
DS200 monitor, and will close, latch, and lock the lid.
Provisional and Spoiled Ballot: Remove the provisional
ballots enclosed inside the Provisional Ballot Bag and
count the number of envelopes. The number counted
should match the number indicated in the ePollbook.
Record this number in section 1 of the Closing
Verification Form. Then, return the provisional ballots
to the Provisional Ballot Bag and place the Provisional
Ballot Bag in the side compartment of the Black Ballot
Bag. If the number counted does not match the number
indicated in the ePollbook, an incident report
documenting the reason for the discrepancy is
submitted by the Clerk. The same steps are used to
count and record the number of spoiled ballots –
Retrieve the Spoiled Ballot Envelope. Remove and
count the spoiled ballots. Verify the total counted
matches the number indicated in the ePollbook and
record this total in section 1 of the Closing Verification
Form. Return the spoiled ballots to the Spoiled Ballot
Envelope and place the envelope in the side
compartment of the Black Ballot Bag.
Account For and Pack All Voted Ballots: When removing
the ballots from the ballot box, the poll workers ensure
that the box is checked thoroughly so that no ballots
are left inside.
Unlock the Ballot Box door and remove the ballots.
Once removed, ensure that the ballots are stacked in
the same orientation and placed neatly into the Black
Ballot Bag.
Shut the ballot box door and relock.
1.

2.

3.

Ensure all cancelled VBM ballots and completed
Multi-Purpose Forms are placed inside the
Completed Forms Envelope and the envelope is
placed in the side compartment of the Black Ballot
Bag.
Make sure the DS200 Reports Bag (with DS200
reports enclosed) and Accident Forms Envelope
(with completed Accident Forms enclosed) are
placed in the side compartment of the Black Ballot
Bag.
Remove the numbered seals from the side pocket
of the Black Ballot Bag. Secure the Black Ballot Bag
by closing all zippers and placing numbered seals
on each zipper that accesses the ballots enclosed

Page | 21

4.
5.
6.

7.

inside. Record the seal numbers placed on the
Black Ballot Bag in section 2 of the Daily Closing
Verification Form.
Retrieve the SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container
and record the seal number in section 2 of the
Closing Verification Form.
Finish completing section 2 of the Daily Closing
Verification Form confirming the items listed are
placed in the Black Ballot Bag.
In section 3 of the Daily Closing Verification Form,
the Clerk and Assistant Clerk must sign, date, and
record the time. Signatures confirm all information
in sections 1, 2, and 3 are true and correct.
Have the Daily Closing Verification Form, Black
Ballot Bag(s) and VBM Ballot Box ready and near
the entrance/exit door for courier pickup.
***

The DS200 Ballot Box is capable of holding
approximately 2,500 sheets of paper. A Full Ballot Box
Procedure is implemented when the ballot box has
received more sheets of paper than it is designed to
contain. Poll Worker Services will advise the Clerk how
to proceed based on expected voter turnout and the
time of day. If Poll Worker Services advises that the
voted ballots should be removed from the ballot box
before the polls close, the clerk will perform the steps
below to securely transfer ballots from the DS200 unit
to a Black Ballot Bag to store the voted ballots.
The Clerk and DS200 Inspector will:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

Inform the voters that there will be a slight delay in
voting as the ballot box is full and the ballots must
be removed and secured.
Open the main compartment of the Black Ballot
Bag and remove any items inside, if applicable.
Break the seal and open the ballot box door.
Remove the ballots and place them neatly inside
the Black Ballot Bag.
Zip the compartments of the Black Ballot Bag
closed, and seal with a numbered seal.
Place the Black Ballot Bag in a secure location
within the polling room.
Complete an incident report in the ePollbook
recording the seal numbers placed on the Black
Ballot Bag, and documenting the removal of ballots
from the ballot box.
Close and reseal the ballot box door. Resume
voting.
***

Provisional Ballot Voter’s Certificate and Affirmation
Envelope is a large white envelope that the voter and
the Clerk or Assistant Clerk must complete before the
voter can receive their provisional ballot. All provisional
ballot voters must return to the Voter Assistance Table
once the voter has marked their ballot. The voted
provisional ballot and the green striped privacy folder
are sealed inside the completed Provisional Ballot
Voter’s Certificate and Affirmation Envelope and placed
inside the green Provisional Ballot Bag. Poll workers are
trained to not allow a voter to insert their voted
provisional ballot into the DS200 unit.
The Voted Provisional Ballot Bag is a large green
zippered bag that all voted and sealed Provisional Ballot
Affirmation and Certificate envelopes must be placed in
after the voter returns their voted provisional ballot.
Once the voter returns to the Voter Assistance Table
with his or her provisional ballot, the poll worker will
place the privacy folder, with provisional ballot inside,
into the voter’s completed Provisional Ballot Voter’s
Certificate and Affirmation envelope and seal the
envelope. Th poll worker will then verify that the
tracking number found on the upper right-hand corner
of the certificate envelope, matches the one on the
Notice of Rights to Provisional Ballot Voters and give
the notice to the voter.
***
Marksense ballots sorted by the DS200 tabulator
and/or DS850 scanner, which could not be read, are
presented to the Canvassing Board for inspection and
determination of voter intent. When necessary, these
ballots are forwarded to the Duplication Team to be
recorded and duplicated, according to instructions
from the Canvassing Board. After duplication, the
ballots are processed and counted. Ballots that are
received ripped, torn, wrinkled or otherwise damaged
and cannot be fed through the tabulators are, at the
direction of the Canvassing Board, forwarded to
duplication.
***
Back up of voting system programs includes: all
software is retained on media and can be reinstalled;
the electronic voting systems are backed up prior to the
election and after results are collected; the DS200
ballot scanners produce a printed results tape; the
voted ballots could be reprocessed; the voting system
program may also be retained by the state via the
required system parameter filing.

Page | 22

***
When the tabulators are returned on the final day of
Early Voting, they are placed in the secured restricted
access tabulation room, under continuous CCTV
surveillance. Under the direction of the Chief of Staff,
the election is closed, the results tape is printed, and
the results are uploaded into the Election Management
system as required by statute. The uploaded results are
compared against the DS200 tapes and voter turnout.
***
Each day of Early Voting, a courier dispatched from the
Elections Office retrieves the Black Ballot Bag(s) and
SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container. The courier will also
deliver any requested supplies. Once the courier
arrives, the Clerk will give them the Daily Closing
Verification Form so that they can verify that the seal
numbers recorded on the form match the seals
securing the bag(s) and SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer
Container. Once they confirm that the information
matches, the courier will complete section 4 of the
Closing Verification Form, then place the completed
Closing Verification Form in the side, unsealed pocket
of the Black Ballot Bag. The courier will load the Black
Ballot Bag and SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container
inside their vehicle and immediately depart for the
Elections Office.
***
Voters voting a provisional ballot complete a
Provisional Ballot Voter’s Certificate and Affirmation,
which is printed on the provisional ballot envelope. The
certificate has the voter’s information, reason for
provisional ballot, and an area for researching and
canvassing the voter’s eligibility. Upon review of the
certificate and affirmation, the Canvassing Board
determines the voter’s eligibility. Accepted provisional
ballots are recorded and added to the election results.
At the conclusion of canvassing and processing of the
provisional ballots, voters may check the status of their
provisional ballot on the SOE website.
***
For daily reconciliation, the previous day’s voted ballots
are counted. This count is compared to data derived
from the ballot counter on the DS200s, and the number
of voter check-ins. Any discrepancy is immediately
addressed by reviewing daily incident forms, examining
epollbook check-in data, and contacting the location
Clerk for information to resolve any discrepancy.

Election Day requirements
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.

Accountability, storage, specific security measures taken for ballots and election materials on ED.
Verify number of ballots received at ED precincts; received correct ballots for that precinct.
Verifying that a voter, choosing to vote on ED, receives the correct ballot.
Verifying identification, seal, and protective counter numbers of voting devices used at ED precincts.
Process for sealing or verifying the seals on the ballot box(es) used at ED precincts.
Process for verifying the operability and readiness of voting devices used at ED precincts.
Verifying all counters except protective counters are set at zero on each voting device used at ED precincts.
Printing record from each voting device at ED precincts to ensure no votes on voting device. (i.e., zero tapes).
How unscanned and spoiled ballots are handled at Election Day precincts.
Process for accounting for and monitoring VBM ballots deposited at a SBIS at SOE office.
Verification if electronic or voter authorization slips/stubs, used to track voter during ED.
Handling voting system malfunctions at ED precincts.
Securing voting machines at the close of the polls to prevent further voting at ED precincts.
Accounting of all ballots and hybrid voting system paper outputs after the polls close at ED precincts.
Sealing or verifying seals voter authorization slips container(s) if used at ED precincts.
Tabulation of votes for ED
I.
Counting and reconciliation of voted ballots and ExpressVote outputs at ED precincts.
II.
Processing and recording write-in and provisional ballots at ED precincts.
III.
Handling unreadable ballots at ED precincts.
IV.
Backup and recovery of tabulated results and voting system programs on ED.
V.
Printing of precinct results and results from individual tabulating device; recording and verifying votes cast.
VI.
Endorsing the ED precinct results by the Election Board.
VII.
Post a copy of ED precinct results.
VIII.
Transport ED precinct results to a central or regional site.
IX.
Consolidation of precinct and provisional ballot results.
X.
Public viewing of the accumulation process.
XI.
Reconciling discrepancies between unused, tabulated, provisional, unscanned ballots; other discrepancies
found during the accumulation process.

Election Boards for each polling location are appointed
by the SOE, pursuant to §102.012, Florida Statutes. An
Election Board is comprised of poll workers who serve
as Clerks and Inspectors. At least one poll worker is
assigned as deputy at each polling location. All Election
Board members receive training prior to scheduled
elections, pursuant to §102.014, Florida Statutes.
The Opening Verification Form (OVF) is a document
that allows the office to verify and affirm the secure
exchange of documents, ballots, and equipment from
departure from the Elections Office to delivery to the
respective polling locations.
Poll Workers verify and affirm that the correct
equipment was delivered, and that each item listed was
delivered in the manner and quantity outlined on the
form and that no tampering has taken place.
OVF Section 1 – ePollbook and MiFi Verification
Page | 23

Completed Monday by the Clerk and Assistant Clerk.
They verify the labels on the ePollbooks and MiFi match
information on this form by placing a checkmark in the
appropriate fields.
OVF Section 2 – DS200 Unit Verification
Completed on Monday, once the AutoKart cover is
removed, the Clerk and Assistant Clerk verify the seals
on the DS200 lid and ballot box door match the
information on this form by placing a checkmark in the
appropriate fields. The DS200 Unit is delivered locked
and sealed. No seals are removed nor is the unit opened
until Tuesday morning, Election Day. If a seal is broken,
or a poll worker suspects the seal may have been
tampered with, or the label information on the devices
or voting equipment do not match the information on
this form, a call is placed immediately to the SOE office.

OVF Section 3 – Ballot Verification
On Tuesday morning, the Clerk along with an Election
Board member of another party affiliation, break the
seal and remove the ballots stored inside the ballot box.
The Clerk and one other Election Board member of a
different party affiliation count the number of ballots
packed in the ballot box. The ballot count is compared
to the recorded totals on the Opening Verification Form
to ascertain correctness. If there are any discrepancies
the Clerk immediately calls the SOE. The ballots are
then compared to the precinct’s sample ballot to
ensure the proper ballot(s) was issued.
OVF Section 4 – DS200 Tabulator and Election Zero
Report Verification
On Tuesday morning, the Clerk and Assistant Clerk
verify the seal numbers on the Lid Seal, Ballot Box Seal,
and the DS200 serial number on the Opening
Verification Form. If, during this procedure, the
Election Board discovers evidence of damage to or
tampering with any seal on the DS200 tabulator, the
tabulator in question is not put into service and the SOE
office is notified immediately.
The Clerk and Assistant Clerk perform the following
steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

Break the seal securing the Auxiliary bin. Use the
key to open the bin. Check inside the bin to make
sure no ballots or debris are inside.
Break the seal securing the DS200 lid. Use the key,
unlock the lock, lift the latches and open the lid.
Verify the serial number on the DS200 matches the
serial number preprinted in section 4 of the
Opening Verification Form.
Use the key, unlock the display screen and raise it
up. Since the AutoKart is plugged in and receiving
power, once the screen is placed in the upright
position, the DS200 will automatically power on.
On the opening screen, enter the election code,
then press Accept. The Configuration Report will
immediately begin to print. The Configuration
Report lists storage memory availability, firmware
and scanner information that has already been
verified by the Elections Office.
Press the Open Poll button on the screen The
Election Zero Report will print. Tear off both
reports, leaving the Configuration Report attached
to the Election Zero Report. Verify that all races
appear and each race has zero vote totals. The
Election Zero Report, produced at poll opening,
shows the tabulator precinct number/polling

Page | 24

location designation and the ballot count at zero,
confirming that no votes for any of the races or
issues are recorded. The Clerk and Assistant Clerk
review and verify that the date, time, precinct(s)
and site location are correct. They also verify the
values are zero for the ballot count and each race
or issue. The Election Zero Report is also compared
to the sample ballot to ensure the races or issues
are the same.
7. The Clerk and Assistant Clerk sign the Election Zero
Report and place it in the DS200 Reports Bag.
8. Once the Zero Report is verified and signed, press
the Go to Voting Mode button. The ‘Welcome.
Please insert your ballot’ screen appears and the
DS200 is ready for voting.
9. Place the Configuration and Election Zero Reports
inside the DS200 Reports Bag.
10. Place a checkmark, where indicated, to confirm the
serial number matches, all races have zero vote
totals, the correct date, time, and location is
displayed on the DS200 screen, and the zero report
is signed by the Clerk and Assistant Clerk.
OVF Section 5 – Certification
The Clerk, Assistant Clerk and another Election Board
member sign, date and indicate the time to affirm all
steps have been completed and verified.
****
In preparation for distribution to a voter at the Ballot
Distribution Table, ballots are placed into the ballot
sorter inside the Ballot Tray. Ballots at the Ballot
Distribution Table remain stored in the ballot tray at all
times until a voter comes to retrieve their ballot. The
ballot style label on the tray corresponds to the ballot
style on the ballot. Ballot pads not in use at the Ballot
Distribution Table are stored inside the gray supply tub,
secured at the Voter Assistance Table.
After a voter has checked in and been verified as
eligible to vote in the election at the precinct, the poll
worker writes the ballot style number on a Ballot Style
Ticket and initials where indicated. The Ballot Style
Ticket is handed to the voter and they are directed to
the Ballot Distribution Table.
The ballots are positioned in a way that they are not
accessible to anyone but Poll Workers. Ballots remain
in the ballot tray until a voter presents themselves to
receive a ballot with their Ballot Style Ticket. The poll
worker exchanges the ballot for the Ballot Style Ticket,

asking the voter to confirm that the ballot style
numbers on the ticket and the ballot match.
***
If a voter makes a mistake on his or her ballot, a
replacement ballot may be issued to the voter at the
Voter Assistance Table. Voters are allowed two
replacement ballots. In the event an election has more
than one page, the voter is allowed two replacement
ballots per page. The Clerk or Assistant Clerk at the
Voter Assistance Table completes the required
information on the Spoiled Ballot Log and ensures the
voter signs the Log. The Clerk or Assistant Clerk places
the spoiled ballot into the spoiled ballot envelope. The
number of spoiled ballots are counted and recorded on
the Closing Verification Form as part of the ballot
reconciliation process. All spoiled ballots are placed in
the Spoiled Ballot Envelope and then in the Black Ballot
Bag, which is secured with a numbered seal for return
to the SOE office.
Voters may not receive a replacement ballot if they
have already cast their ballot into the DS200. If a voter
insists on receiving a replacement ballot after they have
already cast a ballot, the voter is issued a provisional
ballot. The reason the provisional ballot is being issued
is documented on the Provisional Ballot Voter’s
Certificate and Affirmation envelope.
***
The DS200 Ballot Box is capable of holding
approximately 2,500 sheets of paper. A Full Ballot Box
Procedure is implemented when the ballot box may
receive more sheets of paper than it is designed to
contain. When the current election is a single-page
ballot, the public count located on the blue bar of the
display screen, just above the protected count, will
increase by one for each ballot cast. When the counter
reaches approximately 2,400, the Full Ballot Box
Procedure may be implemented, depending on how
much time is left in the voting day. When the current
election is a two-page ballot, the public count will still
only increase by one when the voter casts the first page
of the ballot. When the counter reaches approximately
1,200, the Clerk and Regional Tech are alerted so that
Full Ballot Box Procedures may be implemented. In the
event of a three-page ballot, the public count will again
increase, by one when the voter casts their ballot. In
this instance, Full Ballot Box Procedures may be
implemented when the public count reaches
approximately 800.

Page | 25

If the Full Ballot Box Procedures are implemented, the
Regional Tech will supervise the secure transfer of
ballots from the DS200 unit to a Black Ballot Bag to
store the voted ballots. The Clerk and DS200 Inspector
will:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

Inform the voters that there will be a slight delay in
voting as the ballot box is full and the ballots must
be removed and secured to continue voting on the
DS200.
Open the main compartment of the Black Ballot
Bag and remove any items inside, if applicable.
Break the seal and open the ballot box door.
Remove the ballots and place them neatly inside
the Black Ballot Bag.
Zip the compartments of the Black Ballot Bag
closed, and seal with a numbered seal.
Place the Black Ballot Bag in a secure location
within the polling room.
Complete an incident report in the ePollbook
recording the seal numbers placed on the Black
Ballot Bag, and document the removal of ballots
from the ballot box.
Close and reseal the ballot box door.
Resume voting.
***

Clerks have access to their assigned field operation
support through a designated phone number, as well as
access to the IT Help Desk. If a DS200 tabulator
malfunctions, the Clerk contacts the IT Help Desk. If
possible, the malfunction is resolved via the IT Help
Desk. The IT Help Desk may deploy support for onsite
assistance in troubleshooting the issue. If the resolution
results in the replacement of voting equipment,
Warehouse or IT staff provide the replacement
equipment. In these instances, a DS200 Exchange Form
is completed and signed by the Warehouse or IT staff
and the Clerk.
The DS200 unit has an uninterruptible power supply
with an internal battery that is continuously charged,
enabling the tabulator to continue counting ballots for
a limited time during a power failure. In the event of a
power failure, the Clerk will immediately call the
Regional Tech to inform them of the situation. The
DS200 unit may accept ballots a little slower than usual;
however, as long as it accepts the ballots, the unit is
working and votes are being recorded.
If the internal battery is depleted, the Clerk will break
the seal and unlock the Auxiliary Bin. Voters are
instructed to insert their voted ballot inside the
Auxiliary Bin until power is restored. Once power is

restored, the Clerk will relock and seal the Auxiliary Bin
and resume normal procedures. The Clerk will submit
an incident report documenting the power failure and
then update the incident report to include the time the
power was restored.
***
On Election Day when the polls close and precinct
tabulation has been completed, the Clerk and/or the
Assistant Clerk record on the Closing Verification Form
(CVF) the number of “Ballots Cast” from the Election
Results Tape. The Clerk and/or the Assistant Clerk count
the number of unscanned ballots, the number of
spoiled ballots, and the number of voted provisional
ballots, and record these totals on the Closing
Verification Form. All voted ballots are placed in the
Black Ballot Bag and secured with a numbered seal for
return to the SOE office. All unused ballots are counted
and placed in the DS200 unit ballot box. The ballot box
door is sealed and the seal number is documented on
the Closing Verification Form. The Black Ballot Bag is
brought to the Drop Sites and then returned to the SOE
office. The DS200 and election supplies (on the
AutoKart) are picked up by or under the direction of
Warehouse staff for return to the SOE.
The following procedures are implemented at the
closing of the polls on election day:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Outside the entrance to the polling place at 7:00
PM, the Clerk will announce “The Polls are now
closed. Voters currently in line can still cast a ballot;
however, no additional voters may enter this line.”
Once the Clerk makes this announcement, the
deputy will stand behind the last person in line to
establish the completion of voting. If a voter
attempts to enter the line, the voter is informed
that the polls have closed and they cannot enter
the line. If the voter is confrontational, the Clerk is
notified and he or she can contact the Regional
Tech or the Elections Office for additional support.
The deputy will also inform the Clerk if there is a
line at the time of closing with the approximate
number of voters. The Clerk will inform the Election
Phone Bank.
Any voters in line at 7 PM are allowed to cast a
ballot. Voters continue to cast ballots as they
would prior to 7 PM.
After the final voter has cast their ballot and
departed, any public observers who want to
observe the closing of the poll may now enter the
polling room. Any available chairs are placed along
the wall for observers.

Page | 26

***
Immediately after the last voter has voted and
departed the polling room, the following steps are
performed to close the poll on the DS200.
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

Unlock and open the access door to reveal the
power and close polls buttons. Press the Close Polls
button.
Press the Close Poll button on the screen to
confirm the polls should be closed. The DS200 will
automatically print 2 copies of the Election Results
Report.
The next screen to appear indicates that transfer of
the election results has begun. The DS200 will
connect to the secure server at the Elections Office
to transfer the results. Sending Results – Please
Wait screen with several statuses will appear as the
transfer process proceeds.
Once the transfer is complete, the screen will
display Successfully Sent Results. If the results are
not successfully transferred after three attempts,
the poll worker will power down the unit, wait until
the screen has gone black twice, remove the
memory stick and secure it inside the Elections
Result Container. A designated poll worker will
then bring the memory stick to the Elections
Service Center for manual upload.
When the DS200 has finished sending the results, a
screen will appear indicating the unit can be turned
off. The poll worker is instructed to wait to power
down the unit until they receive a text message
from the SOE office indicating that the site’s results
were received. Once text confirmation of
successful results transmission is received, the poll
worker may proceed with powering down the
DS200 by pressing the Finished– Turn Off button.
Election Results Reports are removed, and the
Clerk and Assistant Clerk each sign both copies.
One copy is placed inside the Election Results
Container, located inside the Election Results Bag.
The second copy is posted on the exterior door of
the polling room.
Once the DS200 screen is completely black and the
power light is off, the poll worker will remove the
DS200 memory stick and secure it inside the
Election Results Container with the Elections
Results Report.
The seal inside the Elections Results Bag is removed
and the Election Results Container is sealed. The
seal number is written on the Closing

Verification Form, and the container is placed
inside the Election Results Bag.
10. The DS200 monitor/screen is closed and locked;
the DS200 lid is closed, the latched secured and the
lid locked.
11. The AutoKart power strip is turned off and
unplugged from the electrical outlet and secured
onto the AutoKart.
***
The ExpressVote closing instructions are to be
completed by at least one Inspector unless there is a
request for assistance from another team member.
***
Once the last voter has been processed, cast their
ballot, and left the polling place, the following
processes are used to account for and pack ballots.
Remove the provisional ballots enclosed inside the
Provisional Ballot Bag and count the number of
envelopes. The number counted should match the
number indicated in the ePollbook. The poll worker will
record this number in section 1 of the Closing
Verification Form, return the provisional ballots to the
Provisional Ballot Bag, and place the Provisional Ballot
Bag in the side compartment of the Black Ballot Bag. If
the number counted does not match the number
indicated in the ePollbook, an incident report
documenting the reason for the discrepancy is
submitted.
The poll worker will retrieve the Spoiled Ballot
Envelope, remove and count the spoiled ballots, verify
the total counted matches the number indicated in the
ePollbook and record this total in section 1 of the
Closing Verification Form. The poll worker will return
the spoiled ballots to the Spoiled Ballot Envelope and
place the envelope in the side compartment of the
Black Ballot Bag. If the number counted does not match
the number indicated in the ePollbook, an incident
report documenting the reason for the discrepancy is
submitted.
Removal of unscanned ballots from the DS200 Auxiliary
Bin is completed by the Clerk and an Election Board
member of a different party affiliation as follows:
Remove the seal on the Auxiliary Bin, open the bin and
thoroughly check for any ballots deposited inside;
retrieve the Unscanned Ballot Bag from the side
compartment of the Black Ballot Bag and enclose the
unscanned ballots inside the blue Unscanned Ballot
Bag; write the total number of unscanned ballots in
Page | 27

section 1 of the Closing Verification Form; return the
Unscanned Ballot Bag to the side compartment of the
Black Ballot Bag.
Regular voted ballots are retrieved as follows: the poll
worker will unlock the Ballot Box door and remove the
ballots inside, ensure that the ballots are stacked in the
same orientation and place the ballots neatly into the
Black Ballot Bag. The poll worker will remove the
numbered seals from the side pocket of the Black Ballot
Bag, secure the Black Ballot Bag by closing all zippers
and place numbered seals on each of the 3 zippers that
accesses the ballots enclosed inside.
Unused ballots are collected from the Ballot
Distribution Table and gray supply tub at the Voter
Assistance Table. All loose, unused ballots (ballots that
are no longer in the shrink-wrapped packaging and
were never issued to voters) are placed into the Unused
Ballot Bag(s) in the Black Ballot Bag. Any ballots that
were not used during Election Day remain in their
packaging.
Unused ExpressVote Ballots are returned into the
ExpressVote Ballot bag. All unused, shrink-wrapped
ballot packages, the Unused Ballot Bag, and the
ExpressVote Ballot bag are placed into the empty ballot
box bin. The ballot box door is closed and relocked. A
numbered seal from the side pocket of the Black Ballot
Bag is retrieved and placed on ballot box door lock.
***
The Closing Verification Form (CVF) is used to record
the total ballots cast at the polling place and verify that
voting supplies are returned Election night.
CVF Section 1 – Ballot Count
The Clerk records the totals for Regular Ballots Cast
(totals from public count on DS200 or from Election
Results Tape); Regular Check-Ins (total from ePollbook
under Issued); Provisional Ballots (provisional
envelopes placed in green Provisional Ballot Bag);
Unscanned Ballots (ballots removed from Auxiliary Bin
and placed in blue Unscanned Ballot Bag); Spoiled
Ballots (ballots placed in gray Spoiled Ballot Envelope);
and Unused Ballots (ballots that have not been issued).
CVF Section 2 – Items Returned
The Clerk confirms each item listed has been placed
inside the Black Ballot Bag, records each seal number
placed on the compartments of the Black Ballot Bag,
and confirms each item listed has been placed in the
Clerk’s Briefcase.

CVF Section 3 – Seals on Unused Ballots and DS200
Memory Stick Containers
The Clerk records the seal numbers on the Ballot Box
into which unused (unissued) ballots and ExpressVote
cards are placed. The Clerk also records the seal
numbers for the memory stick containers.
CVF Section 4 – Certification
The Clerk and another election board member sign,
date, and record the time the form was completed.
***
On election night, the poll workers (usually the clerks)
deliver their ballots, custody forms, electronic poll
books, zero tape, results tape, configuration report,
memory stick and supplies to one of the regional drop
sites. Staff at the drop sites handle the check-ins.
When the Closing Verification Form is completed, the
Black Ballot Bag(s), Clerk’s Briefcase, and AutoKart are
packed, and all closing and packing procedures to
restore the polling place to its original state have been
performed, the clerk uses the Drop Site Information
Sheet to return the Election Results Container, Black
Ballot Bag(s), and Clerk’s Briefcase to the designated
Drop Site.
The Clerk’s Briefcase and Black Ballot Bag(s) are loaded
into the Clerk’s vehicle, preferably the trunk. The
Election Results Container is loaded into the vehicle,
preferably the passenger seat.
To minimize the wait time and/or any confusion at the
Drop Site, the clerk will follow the directional signs to
the supplies delivery point, and remain in the line in
which they arrived to ensure this operation is done
smoothly and accurately.
The clerk will remain in the vehicle. Once they arrive to
the delivery point, the Drop Site representative will
retrieve the Election Results Container, Black Ballot
Bag(s) and Clerk’s Briefcase from the vehicle.
Once the Drop Site representative has verified receipt
of these items the clerk is officially released from
Election Day duties.
The Drop Site staff:


Receive the DS200 Reports Bag (containing the
zero report, results tape, configuration report, and
DS200 memory stick) and records the time of
receipt.

Page | 28





Receive the precinct/polling location Black Ballot
Bag (containing voted, unscanned, spoiled and
provisional ballots, and backup precinct registers)
and Clerk’s Briefcase (containing electronic poll
books) and records the time of receipt.
Verify the Memory Stick Container (enclosed inside
the DS200 Reports Bag) and Black Ballot Bag seal
numbers.

During election night check-in, staff at the ESC remove
the precinct/polling location provisional ballot bag and
send it to staff to verify the number of provisional
ballots against the Closing Verification Form. The
electronic poll books are removed from the Clerk’s
Briefcase and back up precinct registers removed from
the Black Ballot Bag and are delivered to staff for postprocessing and voter history update.
***
The voting method employed for polling locations uses
a Marksense ballot completed by the voter and then
inserted into the DS200 tabulator by the voter. The
DS200 is programmed to retain the election totals for
the respective precinct and furnish a tabulation of the
precinct results at the closing of the polls. The SOE may
receive precinct results via secure modem from
precinct/polling location DS200 tabulators, after the
polls have closed, and accumulate these results for
reporting and public viewing.
If the results are not transmitted by modem for any
reason, the Clerk, Assistant Clerk, or other designated
poll worker will deliver the DS200 memory stick to the
ESC for direct uploading of election results.
The DS200 memory stick and ballots from Election Day
are returned to the ESC on election night from the drop
off locations and placed in secure storage.
***
A Write-in Board, which consists of two SOE staff
members, reviews write-in reports that include images
of all VBM, Early Vote, Election Day and provisional
write-in votes. The Write-in Board identifies votes cast
for qualified write-in candidates and presents its
findings to the Canvassing Board for verification. Totals
for qualified write-in candidates are included with
Election Vote Totals.
***
Provisional ballots are issued at the Voter Assistance
Table. The voter is given the Provisional Ballot Voter’s

Certificate and Affirmation envelope and instructed to
complete section 1. The Clerk or Assistant Clerk
completes the information in sections 2 and 3. The
Clerk or Assistant Clerk then provides the voter a ballot
inside a provisional ballot privacy folder. The privacy
folders designated for provisional ballots have a green
stripe along the spine of the folder. The voter takes the
ballot, marks the ballot, and places the ballot into the
privacy folder. The voter returns to the Voter Assistance
Table to place the privacy folder with ballot inside into
the Provisional Ballot Voter’s Certificate and Affirmation
envelope. This envelope is sealed and inserted into the
Voted Provisional Ballot Bag. After the polls have closed,
and the last voter has cast his/her ballot, the voted
Provisional Ballot Voter’s Certificate and Affirmation
envelopes are removed from the Voted Provisional
Ballot Bag. The envelopes are counted and the total is
recorded on the Closing Verification Form as part of the
ballot reconciliation process. After counting and
recording the number of voted Provisional Ballot
Voter’s Certificate and Affirmation envelopes, the
envelopes are returned to the Voted Provisional Ballot
Bag and then placed in the Black Ballot Bag, which is
secured with a numbered seal for return to the SOE
office.
***
Marksense ballots sorted by the DS200 tabulator
and/or DS850 scanner, which could not be read, are
presented to the Canvassing Board for inspection and
determination of voter intent. When necessary, these
ballots are forwarded to the Duplication Team to be
recorded and duplicated, according to instructions
from the Canvassing Board. After duplication, the
ballots are processed and counted.
Ballots that are received ripped, torn, wrinkled or
otherwise damaged and cannot be fed through the
DS850 scanners are, at the direction of the Canvassing
Board, forwarded to duplication.
***
Back up of voting system programs includes: all
software is retained on media and can be reinstalled;
the electronic voting systems are backed up prior to the
election and after results are collected; the DS200
ballot scanners produce a printed results tape; the
voted ballots could be reprocessed; the voting system
program may also be retained by the state via the
required system parameter filing.
***
Page | 29

At the precinct/polling location, after the polls close,
the Clerk and Assistant Clerk secure the tabulator from
further voting. Once voting has ended, the DS200
tabulator prints a results tape and is ready to transmit
results to the ESC. The results tape is signed by the
Clerk and Assistant Clerk and delivered to the
designated regional drop site on election night. A copy
of the results tape is printed and posted for public
viewing at the precinct/polling location by the Election
Board after the polls have closed.
***
If a court or the Governor extends voting hours, voters
vote using a provisional ballot. The normal provisional
ballot procedure is followed except that the extended
hours provisional ballots are segregated from the
normal provisional ballots. All extended hours
provisional ballots are placed in the Black Ballot Bag and
secured with a numbered seal for return to the SOE
Office.
Voters voting a provisional ballot complete a
Provisional Ballot Voter’s Certificate and Affirmation,
which is printed on the provisional ballot envelope. The
certificate has the voter’s information, reason for
provisional ballot, and an area for researching and
canvassing the voter’s eligibility. Upon review of the
certificate and affirmation, the Canvassing Board
determines the voter’s eligibility. Accepted provisional
ballots are recorded and added to the election results.
At the conclusion of canvassing and processing of the
provisional ballots, voters may check the status of their
provisional ballot on the SOE website.
***
Collection and reporting of election results is done in
the tabulation room at the ESC located in Tampa, FL.
Viewing of the process is facilitated by windows
between the tabulation room and the public/media
room.
Election results are displayed on monitors in the
public/media room during the Election Night tabulation
process. Printed preliminary results may be provided
periodically throughout the tabulation process and
made available to various press agencies in hard copy
or by fax or email. Results are also available on the SOE
website.
***
Any discrepancy between the number of voters who
checked in via electronic poll books and signed the

precinct register and the tabulation count is described
by the Clerk on the Closing Verification Form or on a
Voting Incident Form. Comparison of precinct tape
results and results received via modem is conducted by
the Canvassing Board to confirm the match of all
results. Following the election, precinct total numbers
and precinct electronic poll book and register numbers
are reconciled again during the process of updating
voter history.
***
The process for accounting for and monitoring of VBM
ballots deposited at a Secure Ballot Intake Station (SBIS)
at the Supervisor’s office include the following:
Each SBIS and Blue Ballot Transfer Container is labeled
to indicate which location it will be used at and locked
and sealed when in use.
The SBIS is delivered by SOE staff to the office where it
will be used and placed so that it is under continual
surveillance by SOE staff.

Page | 30

During the day, as monitored by SOE staff, if a
replacement is needed due to high volume, a new SBIS
is delivered (labeled, sealed and locked) and the original
SBIS is returned to the secured, surveilled, restricted
access VBM cage at the ESC Warehouse. The SBIS or
Blue Ballot Transfer Container is never opened except
when it is returned to the VBM cage and in the custody
of the Director of Voter Services.
When opened in the VBM cage, a daily SBIS Count Form
is maintained to record the number of VBM ballots
received in the SBIS. The ballots are then processed as
per standard VBM ballot handling.
On Election Day, each SBIS at the Supervisor of
Elections offices is removed from service at 7:00 PM
when voting has ended, and returned to the VBM cage
for standard VBM ballot handling.
.

Vote-by-mail ballot handling
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Security measures for transporting, collecting, and storing blank and voted VBM ballots and related materials
prior to and after an election
Determining and verifying VBM ballot variations (i.e., UOCAVA, SWAB, FWAB, or Dom Civ).
Verify that voters are issued the correct VBM ballot.
Precluding voters from voting at the polls and casting a VBM ballot.
Receiving and recording receipt of VBM ballots (Dom Civ, SWAB, FWAB) and determining which ones should be
counted if more than one per voter is received.
Security measures to ensure safekeeping of VBM ballots by the SOE.
Opening valid VBM ballots in preparation for tabulation.
Recording and storing the voted ballots or ExpressVote outputs which were duplicated.
Allowing the public to examine VBM ballots prior to opening and processing.

VBM ballots are received directly from the contract
printer and stored in a secured restricted area in the
custody of the Director of Operations and Support
Services and designated staff. VBM ballots are printed
and delivered daily as needed.
VBM ballots are processed at the ESC on DS850 highspeed readers designed for this purpose, or on DS200
tabulators that are programmed to accept multiple
precinct styles.
VBM ballot styles are determined by processes
described in the section titled Ballot Preparation. A
barcode containing the precinct, split (if applicable),
party (if applicable) and page number is assigned to
each unique precinct ballot variation and printed in the
margin of the ballot sheet.
The quantity of ballots ordered for VBM voting is
determined by the number of requests on file for each
ballot style. Ballots may also be printed upon demand,
either by in-house Ballot on Demand (BOD) printing or
through an off-site vendor.
After receipt from the supplier, ballots are inspected,
logged in, and stored in a secured area in the ESC
warehouse.
In preparation for mailing, the VBM ballot coordinator
requests and receives, through the voter registration
system, a VBM ballot mailing list in batches – uniformed
services and civilians residing overseas; absent
domestic military voters residing within the United
States; voters who registered by mail and who have not
met statutory ID requirements; and domestic civilian

Page | 31

voters. From these batches, the VBM ballot packages
are assembled by the Blue Crest Relia-Vote system.
A team of at least two designated SOE employees
coordinates the operation of the Relia-Vote system,
which ensures that each voter that has requested a
VBM ballot receives their ballot. The Relia-Vote system
tracks every ballot from the time the ballot enters the
system until the ballot is sorted for mailing by the US
Postal Service. Additionally, the Relia-Vote system
coordinates delivery tracking of ballots within the US
Postal Service.
The voter’s record reflects the date his/her request for
a VBM ballot was received by the SOE, mailed by the
VBM ballot department, and returned as voted to the
SOE.
When the electronic poll books are prepared, if a voter
has requested a VBM ballot, the notation “Absentee
Ballot Mailed/Issued” is indicated. If a voted VBM ballot
is received by the SOE, the notation “Absentee Ballot
Received/Voted” or “VOTED” is indicated on the voter's
record. These notations allow the Election Board to
verify a voter’s eligibility to vote during Early Voting and
on Election Day.
The following procedures also preclude voters from
voting at the polls or Early Voting and casting VBM
ballots:
•

A voter who requested and received a VBM ballot
but then goes to the precinct/polling location on
Election Day or Early Voting with the VBM ballot is
allowed to vote a regular ballot if the VBM ballot is
surrendered. The Poll Worker writes “Cancelled”

•

•

on the outer envelope of the VBM ballot. The
cancelled VBM ballot is placed in the Completed
Forms Envelope and returned to the SOE office.

The voted ballots in their unopened certificate
envelopes are stored by group batch, in a secured area
at the ESC.

A voter who requested and received a VBM ballot
but then goes to the precinct/polling location on
Election Day or Early Voting without the VBM ballot
is allowed to vote a provisional ballot if it cannot be
determined whether the voted VBM ballot was
received by the SOE. If it can be determined by
contacting the SOE office or via the electronic poll
book data base that the voter has not already voted
a VBM ballot, the voter may vote a regular ballot at
the precinct/polling location or Early Voting site.
The VBM ballot is blocked.

VBM ballots set aside for review by the Canvassing
Board are presented to the board in their unopened
certificate envelopes. All VBM ballots rejected as illegal
by the Canvassing Board are retained unopened and in
accordance with records retention schedules. The
reason for rejection is noted and a tally of rejected
ballots is made.

A voter who has requested and returned a VBM
ballot to the SOE, but who goes to an Early Voting
site or precinct/polling location on Election Day
maintaining he/she has not returned the ballot and
is still eligible to vote, will be given a provisional
ballot.

The voter’s record on the electronic poll book reflects
the date his/her request for a VBM ballot was received
by the SOE, mailed by the SOE to the voter, and
returned as voted to the SOE.

***
Ballots accepted by the Canvassing Board are opened
and processed in accordance with the following
functions:
•
•
•
•

***

•

When VBM ballots in their unopened certificate
envelopes are received by the SOE, they are date/timestamped and logged into the voter registration system.
The elector’s signature on the certificate envelope is
checked against the signature of record. All staff who
perform signature verification are certified via the
Department of State signature verification training
course.

•

If the certificate has not been signed by the voter, or
the signature does not match the signature on file, the
ballot is set aside. Attempt is made to notify the voter
that the signature is missing or mismatched. Until 5 PM
on the second day after an election, the voter is allowed
to complete and submit an affidavit in order to cure the
unsigned or mismatched ballot.
If the VBM appears to be invalid (for reasons other than
signature defects), the VBM ballot is coded for review
by the Canvassing Board.

Page | 32

•

•

Voted VBM ballot envelopes are slit open and
placed in trays.
Trays are delivered to SOE staff supervised by
senior SOE management.
Staff removes the secrecy envelopes/sleeves from
the mailing envelopes.
Staff checks the mailing envelopes to see that
nothing has been left inside, and then sets the
envelopes aside. Mailing envelopes are kept in
group batch order.
Staff removes the VBM ballots from the secrecy
envelopes/sleeves.
Staff stacks the secrecy envelopes/sleeves and
checks to be sure that no VBM ballots have been
left in them.
When all of the envelopes have been opened, the
ballots are placed in a container and delivered
directly to the tabulation room.
After the VBM ballots have been tabulated, they
are placed in a labeled container and stored in a
secured area.
***

State Write-in Ballots (SWAB) are canvassed on Election
Day. If a regular VBM ballot is received from the voter
after the State Write-in Ballot is received, the regular
VBM ballot is counted for the election and the SWAB is
canceled and retained unopened in a secure area with
other canceled ballots.
When received by the SOE, Federal Write-in Absentee
Ballots (FWAB) are placed under the control of the VBM
ballot coordinator. The FWAB is date/time-stamped

and logged into the voter registration system with a
note flagging it as a FWAB. FWABs are held unopened
until election night. If a FWAB is accepted and a regular
VBM ballot is received prior to Election Day, the FWAB
is canceled and the regular ballot is processed for the
election.
Ballots received up to 10 days after the date of a federal
or special election from overseas voters are placed
under the control of the VBM ballot coordinator and
are canvassed, opened, and counted in a presidential
preference primary election and general election if
postmarked by election day.
The Canvassing Board convenes on or after the tenth
day following an election in which there are federal
candidates or a special election. The regular VBM
ballots or FWABs received after Election Day, until the
tenth day following the federal election, are opened.
The votes cast are manually recorded on a tally sheet
and the total number of valid votes is added to the
election totals on the final canvass report.
***
As to custody of voted ballots returned by voters to
offices of the SOE in a SBIS Ballot Box:
•

•

Prior to Election Day, voted ballots in their
certificate envelopes, sealed by the voters and
returned to SOE offices are placed in a SBIS box. At
the end of each day, the SBIS Blue Ballot
Transfer Container or ballot box with the ballots
is delivered to the VBM coordinator at the ESC by
members of the SOE staff.
On Election Day or night, voted ballots in their
certificate envelopes, sealed by the voters and
returned to SOE offices are placed in a SBIS ballot
box. At 7:00 PM, on Election Day, the SBIS Blue
Ballot Transfer Container or ballot box with the
ballots are delivered to the VBM coordinator at
the ESC by members of the SOE staff.

As to custody of voted ballots returned by voters to
remote Early Voting locations:
•

Voted ballots in their certificate envelopes, sealed
by the voters and returned to Early Voting locations
are placed in a SBIS ballot box. An SOE staff
member maintains custody and control of the
secure ballot box at all times. At the end of each
day, the SBIS Blue Ballot Transfer Container with

Page | 33

the ballots is delivered to the VBM coordinator at
the ESC by members of the SOE staff.
***
Pursuant to §101.5612, Florida Statutes, the Logic and
Accuracy Test for the optical scan readers is performed
prior to the processing and scanning of VBM ballots.
The optical scan tabulators are operated by a
designated team under the direction of the Director of
Information Technology. With the approval of the
Canvassing Board, the opening and scanning process
begins. The VBM coordinator presents the VBM Ballot
Canvass Report to the Canvassing Board. VBM ballots
that need a determination by the board are handled
individually and processed separately. In the event a
paper ballot is damaged to the point that it cannot be
automatically read, the damaged ballot is duplicated as
requested by the Canvassing Board.
VBM ballots are logged in batches by groups of
precincts. A ballot custody sheet for each group is
completed with the date, time, and number of VBM
ballots presented for tabulation. A batch log is
maintained as a double check that all VBM ballots have
been accounted for. VBM ballots that have been
processed are boxed and sealed. Any VBM ballots
required for audits are retrieved under the direction of
the Canvassing Board and transferred to a sealed
container prepared for the audit team. In the
alternative, as permitted by rule, the Canvassing Board
may direct that an automated independent audit be
performed using the Clear Audit system.
***
Under the direction of the Canvassing Board, the
functions of the Duplicating Board are performed by at
least two members of the SOE staff. Each damaged or
faxed ballot is consecutively numbered and stamped
“ORIGINAL”, and each replacement ballot is marked
with the number of the ballot it duplicates and is
indicated as “DUPLICATE”. One staff member marks the
duplicate ballot according to the voter’s intent as per
the direction of the Canvassing Board, and the other
staff member reviews and affirms the accuracy of the
markings. The duplicated ballots are tabulated. All
ballots that require duplication are stored, with a
duplication log, in a secure duplication storage area
separate from other voted ballots.
***

Observation of duplication per F.S. 101.5614(4)(a) is
accommodated as per the following:

2.

1.

3.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

Dates and times during which duplication is
authorized to occur will be contained in a legal
notice published on the Supervisor of Elections’
website.
The Supervisor of Elections office reserves the right
to not duplicate during the authorized times, based
on agency needs.
Each candidate, political party official, political
committee official, or authorized designee thereof
seeking to observe duplication shall submit the
name of the designated observer to the Supervisor
of Elections office. One person per candidate,
political party, or political committee will be
allowed in the duplication room at a time.
When arriving to observe, the designee must check
in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a
name tag which must be worn at all times.
Observers shall be restricted to a suitable area
within the duplication room from which they can
hear and see the duplication stations.
Use of personal computers and devices, including
cell phones, is prohibited in the duplication room.
Eating or drinking is prohibited in the duplication
room.
At no time can the observer touch any ballots or
materials, or otherwise interfere with the activities
underway in the duplication room. This includes
directly communicating with staff performing
duplication.
If an observer wishes to make a reasonable
objection to a duplicate of a ballot, he or she will so
indicate by raising his or her hand, at which time a
staff member will provide the observer a form to
complete and sign stating the basis for the
objection. Staff will secure the complaint, the
original ballot and the duplicate ballot for
presentation to the Canvassing Board.
***

Observation of opening and processing VBM ballots per
F.S.101.5612(2) is accommodated as per the following:
1.

Dates and times during which VBM opening may
occur will be contained in a legal notice published
on the Supervisor of Elections’ website.

Page | 34

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

The Supervisor of Elections office reserves the right
to not open VBM ballots during the authorized
times, based on agency needs.
Each party choosing to designate a representative
for observation of VBM opening shall submit the
name to the Supervisor of Elections office. One
person per party will be allowed in the opening
room at a time.
When arriving to observe, the designee must check
in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a
name tag which must be worn at all times.
The observer shall be restricted to a suitable area
within the VBM opening room from which he or
she can hear and see the opening stations.
Use of personal computers and devices, including
cell phones, is prohibited in the opening room.
Eating or drinking is prohibited in the tabulation
room.
At no time can the observer touch any ballots or
materials, or otherwise interfere with the activities
underway in the VBM opening room. This includes
directly communicating with staff performing VBM
opening.

***
Review or inspection of certain materials by authorized
persons per F.S. 101.572(2) is accommodated as per the
following:
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

Dates and times during which review or inspection
of certain materials by authorized person may
occur will be contained in a legal notice published
on the Supervisor of Elections’ website.
Each candidate, political party official, political
committee official, or authorized designee thereof
seeking to review or inspect certain materials shall
complete a form requesting access and submit the
form to the Supervisor of Elections office.
Appointments are limited and will be assigned on a
first-come, first-served basis.
The requester will schedule the date he or she
seeks reasonable access.
When arriving to observe, the designee will check
in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a
name tag which must be worn at all times.
A staff member will escort the designee to the
review/inspection area. A staff member will
present the designee the materials requested for
review or inspection.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Use of personal computers and devices, including
cell phones, is prohibited in the review/inspection
room.
Eating or drinking is prohibited in the
review/inspection room.
At no time can the observer touch any ballots or
materials.
The appointment will end promptly at the
scheduled time.

Observation of tabulation as per F.S. 101.5612(2) is
accommodated as follows:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

Dates and times during which tabulation and
testing may occur will be contained in a legal notice
published on the Supervisor of Elections’ website.
The Supervisor of Elections office reserves the right
to not tabulate during the authorized times, based
on agency needs.
Each party choosing to designate a representative
for observation of tabulation shall submit the
name to the Supervisor of Elections office. One
person per party will be allowed in the tabulation
room at a time.
When arriving to observe, the designee must check
in at the front desk of the ESC and will receive a
name tag which must be worn at all times.
The observer shall be restricted to a suitable area
within the tabulation room from which he or she
can hear and see the tabulation stations.
Use of personal computers and devices, including
cell phones, is prohibited in the tabulation room.

Page | 35

7.
8.

Eating or drinking is prohibited in the tabulation
room.
At no time can the observer touch any ballots or
materials, or otherwise interfere with the activities
underway in the tabulation room. This includes
directly communicating with staff performing
tabulation.

Public inspection of ballots and certificates per
F.S. 101.572(1) is accommodated as follows:
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Dates during which public inspection of ballots and
certificates may occur will be contained in a legal
notice published on the Supervisor of Elections’
website.
When arriving to observe, the member of the
public will check in at the front desk of the ESC and
will receive a name tag which must be worn at all
times.
Voter certificates on mailing envelopes processed
the previous day will be available for inspection.
Ballots processed the previous day will be available
for inspection.
Use of personal computers and devices, including
cell phones, is prohibited in the review/inspection
room.
Eating or drinking is prohibited in the
review/inspection room.
At no time can the observer touch any ballots or
materials.
No recordings or photos are allowed.
The session will end promptly as scheduled.

Section 4: Post-election
Receiving and preparing voted ballots (after 7 p.m. on Election Day)
a.
b.
c.
d.

Receiving and preparing ExpressVote outputs and voted ballots, including provisional ballots, election data, and
memory devices.
Verify ballot containers are properly secured and accounted for and seal numbers are correct.
Verify/reconcile ballot container(s) for each precinct contain hybrid voting system paper outputs, unused
ballots, and voted ballots, including provisional ballots, unscanned ballots, spoiled ballots, and write-in ballots
as shown to exist on the ballot accounting forms completed by each election board for that purpose.
Inspect ballots or ExpressVote outputs to identify those that must be duplicated or upon which voter intent is
unclear, thus, requiring a determination by the Canvassing Board, including the process used for keeping a
record of which marksense ballots or paper outputs are submitted to the Canvassing Board and the disposition
of those marksense ballots or paper outputs.

After the polls close, the DS200 results memory stick
and Election Results Reports are removed from the
DS200 ballot scanner. The memory stick and Election
Results Report are placed inside a container that is
secured with a numbered seal. The zero tape,
configuration report, and sealed memory stick
container (with memory stick and results report
enclosed) are placed in the DS200 Reports Bag in the
presence of the Election Board. The Clerk returns the
Reports Bag (zero tape, results tape, configuration
report, and results memory stick) to their assigned Drop
Site.
The voted ballots are retrieved from the DS200 ballot
box. The voted ballots are placed in a Black Ballot Bag
and sealed with a numbered security seal. The Clerk
returns the ballots in the Black Ballot Bag, along with
the unscanned ballots, backup precinct registers,
provisional ballots, spoiled ballots, and electronic poll
books to their assigned Drop Site.
The Closing Verification Form documents the time that
the DS200 Reports Bag left the precinct. At the Drop

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Site, the Reports Bag Check-in Log documents the time
the memory stick, zero tapes, configuration report,
results tape, Black Ballot Bag and Clerk’s Briefcase are
delivered to the Drop Site by the Clerk.
On Election Night at the ESC Warehouse, staff under
the direction of the Director of Operations and Support
Services, receive materials from the regional drop sites,
and scan the seals and/or barcodes on the critical items
(black ballot bag in which is sealed regular voted
ballots, clerk’s briefcase, precinct registers, provisional
ballot envelop, unscanned ballot envelop, and spoiled
ballot envelop). An accounting is made for each
precinct and location to assure all materials are in the
possession of the SOE. On Election Night, staff begin
processing provisional ballots, and continue this
process if necessary the morning after the election.
Unscanned ballots are delivered to the IT Director for
tabulation. Any ballots that require duplication and
determination of voter intent are processed as per
Canvassing Board guidelines.

Post-election audit
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Random selection of races and precincts for a manual audit or automated independent audit, or both.
Random selection of races and precincts if a separate municipal or local election is held on ED and the
Canvassing Board certifies the elections, if applicable.
Determine the ballot count of the random selection, segregated by ballot type.
Allow the public to inspect the VBM ballots before moving forward with conducting the post-election audit.
Ensure the public does not interfere with or otherwise disturb the post-election audit.
Ensuring security of ballots and ExpressVote outputs, chain of custody controls, protocols for authorized
access, and secure storage of ballots and ExpressVote outputs that will be used in the audit.

Under the direction of the Canvassing Board, a manual
or automated independent audit (AIA) is conducted
after each election.
***
In the case of a manual audit, an excel file may be
created which contains one spreadsheet that assigns a
number to each race on the ballot, and another
spreadsheet that lists each precinct. A race is selected
through the randomization function of Excel. Based on
the race selected, the precincts to be audited are
selected through the randomization function of Excel.
The randomization function is performed at the
Canvassing Board meeting. Alternatively, the
Canvassing Board may use identical numbered balls or
tags to randomly select a race and precinct(s) to be
audited.
The Director of Information Technology provides a
report from the Election Management System
containing the number of ballots subject to the audit,
by precinct and by method of voting (Election Day, Vote
By Mail, Early Vote and Provisional). Ballots are stored
in areas surveilled by CCTV and with swipe card access
in the warehouse according to method of voting (e.g.
Early Vote, Vote by Mail, Election Day). All ballots
subject to the manual audit are gathered by staff under
the direction of the Chief of Staff and delivered to the
tabulation room which is surveilled by CCTV and has
limited swipe card access. The ballots are kept
separated by precinct and method of voting in the
tabulation room until such time as the public audit is to
commence.
For the manual audit, the ballots are delivered to the
room in which the Canvassing Board will meet, and
teams of two manually count the ballots. Members of
the public may be present, and the Canvassing Board
maintains order. The teams complete the counts and fill
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out the appropriate paperwork. Once all teams are
finished, the documentation is presented to the
Canvassing Board for review and acceptance. Upon
completion of the manual audit, the ballots are
returned for storage to the warehouse.
Post-election manual audits are conducted in the
Elections Service Center training room which is large
enough to accommodate the Canvassing Board, SOE
staff, and public observers.
A member of the Canvassing Board is present during
any times in which ballots are transported out of the
locked storage areas and when ballots are removed
from their sealed storage containers.
From the time the audit is started until the time the
audit is completed the ballots are under the supervision
of the Canvassing Board.
***
For an Automated Independent Audit, the HCSOE may
utilize the state certified Clear Audit system to conduct
post-election audits Staff will scan ballots into the audit
system periodically throughout the election in advance
of conducting post-election audits. All scanning into the
audit system will take place during publicly noticed and
accessible sessions.
To facilitate observation, each session during which
scanning will take place will be posted in the Canvassing
Board meeting notice and calendar. This information
includes canvassing board meetings and ballot
processing sessions, as well as timeframes for scanning

ballots into the audit system, audit review, and potential
meetings to conduct any recounts should they be
needed.
In advance of an AIA, each scanner to be used is tested
to assure proper operation, and a Logic and Accuracy
Test is conducted. The Canvassing board randomly
selects the race(s) and precincts(s) to be audited, or the
Canvassing Board may direct a 100% audit of all races
and precincts. The AIA system shall produce and print
the tally for all races from the selected precincts of
ballots cast by ballot type. After the AIA system tally is
finalized and compiled, the Board shall compare the
results to the official vote totals for all races in the
selected precincts. The results of the AIA are produced
as a summary report listing the number of ballot and
vote discrepancies computed at the lowest level of
aggregation reported in the election.
If there is a discrepancy of less than ½ of 1%, the Board
shall record the result on the Voting System PostElection Audit Report. If the discrepancy is ½ of 1% or
more, the Board investigates by reviewing the ballot

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images or extracts therefrom to ascertain if the vote
was marked in a race that likely was not read by the
voting system tabulator or AIA system. The Board
prepares a Discrepancy Report for Automated
Independent Audit, or the AIA system may print a
report with the same required information. The Board
also explains the discrepancy on the Voting System
Post-Election Audit Report.

The location of the audit is posted along with the notice
of the audit. Supervisor of Elections employees deliver
ballots for the randomly drawn precincts from the
secure storage area to the audit area. Canvassing Board
members, Supervisor of Elections employees, and/or
audit team members may handle or touch ballots.
Florida law prohibits all others from handling ballots.
Should the audit recess for any reason, ballots are
secured.

Ballot and election materials security – post election
a.
b.

Ballot accountability, storage, and security measures of ballots and election materials until they are destroyed.
Individuals who have authorized access, and who have authority to permit access to stored election materials.

All voted precinct ballots that were cast on Election Day
or at an Early Voting location are secured in a locked,
access-controlled area with video surveillance until
after the contest of election period. These ballots are
then stored in the records retention room of the accesscontrolled warehouse for twenty-two months.
All voted VBM and provisional ballots that have been
processed on the DS850 central count scanners are
stored in ballot storage boxes. These ballot storage
boxes are stored in a VBM cage with access control and
video surveillance until after the contest of election
period. These ballots are then stored in the records

Page | 39

retention room of the access-controlled warehouse for
twenty-two months.
All provisional and VBM ballots rejected by the
Canvassing Board are stored in the records retention
room of the access-controlled warehouse for twentytwo months.
Election materials are retained as per records retention
requirements in the ESC Warehouse and/or records
retention room. The Director of Operations and
Support Services retains custody of the materials and
controls access of staff to the secured areas.

Appendices
Chain of Custody: Election Day Media and Voting Equipment

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Chain of Custody: Early Voting Ballots

Page | 41

Chain of Custody: Election Day Ballots

Page | 42

Chain of Custody: Vote By Mail Ballots

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Election Schedule
Attached is a template for a standard election cycle schedule. This schedule is updated, adjusted and re-issued
annually.

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