A Police Chief Ran His Ex's Plate.
The short version: A police chief allegedly abused ALPR access to stalk his ex, proving the real threat isn't a hidden tracker but the badge that grants database power.
Our Take
Station One's report cuts to the core of what makes license plate reader networks so dangerous: you don't need a tracker planted on a car when the person surveilling you has a badge and a login. The woman in this story spent hours searching for a physical device that was never there, because the surveillance wasn't hidden under her bumper — it was baked into a network of cameras she drove past every day, and the man reading her movements had the authority to pull them up without anyone asking why.
This is the pattern we keep seeing across the country: ALPR systems marketed as tools for finding stolen cars or serving warrants, quietly repurposed by the people who run them to track exes, rivals, or anyone else they take a personal interest in. Flock and its competitors love to talk about audit logs and 'reasonable suspicion' policies, but audits only catch abuse after the fact, if they catch it at all. A chief with access doesn't need a warrant. He just needs a search bar.
Credit to Station One for putting a face and a timeline to what usually stays abstract in policy debates. If you want to know whether cameras like these are already logging your daily routine, check our map, and if your town hasn't had a public vote on this technology, our take-action page has the tools to push for one.
This is DeFlock The USA’s original commentary. The video above is the work of Station One, published on YouTube — full credit to the creator.