On the agenda: Cambridge, MA Dec 9, 2025 12:00 PM - Public Safety Committee - Committee Meeting - Dec 09, 2025 — license plate reader (Dec 9)

PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE

11/10/2025 12:20 PM Nicole Erwin The Full Agenda/Public
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COMMITTEE MEETING
~ AGENDA ~
Tuesday, December 9, 2025

12:00 PM

Sullivan Chamber

The Public Safety Committee will hold a public hearing on December 9, 2025 to further discuss the
implications of deploying automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) and to discuss whether
adjustments should be made related to the deployment of ALPRs since approval in February of this
year, CMA 2025 #257 in City Council October 20, 2025.
A communication was received from Councillor Wilson, transmitting a presentation from the ACLU.
A communication was received from Councillor Wilson, transmitting a presentation from Digital
Fourth.
A communication was received from Councillor Sobrinho-Wheeler, transmitting questions to the
Cambridge Police Department and Flock.
A communication transmitted from Yi-An Huang, City Manager, relative to Awaiting Report Item
Number 25-53, regarding a request that the City Manager consult with relevant departments about
the implications of deploying license plate readers and provide recommendations as to whether
adjustments in plans for deployment should be made in light of changes since approval in February.

City of Cambridge

Last Updated: 12/9/2025 8:54 AM

cambridgema.gov

City of Cambridge
COF 2025 #156
IN CITY COUNCIL
December 9, 2025

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PROTECTING CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND
STANDING BY OUR
COMMUNITY'S
VALUES
Gideon Epstein
Policy Counsel, Technology for Liberty Program
ACLU of Massachusetts

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WE CAN PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY WHILE ACTING IN
ACCORDANCE WITH OUR COMMUNITY’S VALUES.
THIS MEANS REJECTING FLOCK.
• Flock's business model encourages police departments to opt into nationwide data sharing.
• Flock's standard contract includes language that may give it the right to share police department
data, even when a department chooses to restrict data sharing.
• Unrestricted data sharing is a problem because Massachusetts drivers' location information can
and has been shared with immigration enforcement authorities and police departments that are
enforcing restrictive abortion and gender-affirming care laws.
• No process or mechanism to limit data sharing will be completely adequate.

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FLOCK’S BUSINESS MODEL: NATIONAL DATABASE
AND NATIONWIDE DATA SHARING
• Flock advertises "Multi-State Crime Solving" which gives police departments the power to "Track
suspects across counties and state lines with seamless data sharing and national plate visibility."
• National data sharing may lead to inadvertent assistance with civil immigration enforcement,
putting immigrants at risk of detention and/or deportation.
o Cambridge's Welcoming Community Ordinance prohibits city officials from assisting federal immigration
enforcement efforts.

• It also may lead to violations of the Massachusetts Shield Law, putting healthcare providers and care
seekers at risk.
o The Shield Law prohibits Massachusetts law enforcement from providing information or assistance to any
other state’s law enforcement agency in relation to investigations into reproductive healthcare
or gender-affirming healthcare that is lawful in the Commonwealth.

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EXAMPLE: FLOCK NETWORK AUDIT
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FLOCK IS SHARING LICENSE PLATE READER DATA
ON A MASSIVE SCALE
• Network of approximately 90,000 license plate reader cameras across the country
• In one Massachusetts police departments' network audit received in response to a recent public
records request, there were over 2.6 million searches of Flock's nationwide database in just the
first half of 2025.
o Of these 2.6 million searches, nearly 1,500 included an explicit search reason including "immigration"
or "ICE"
o Also included in these searches, which query data from Massachusetts police departments and the
drivers in each jurisdiction, was a search from a police officer in Texas looking for a woman who had
a self-managed abortion.

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JOHNSON COUNTY, TEXAS ABORTION SEARCH OF
FLOCK’S DATABASE
• Earlier this year, police in Johnson County, Texas performed a nationwide search in Flock’s
database to locate a woman who they believed had a self-administered abortion.
• We know about this investigation because the Texas officer entered “had an abortion, search for
female” in the “Reason” field in Flock’s database.
• Initially, Flock tried to dismiss criticism stemming from the negative press, suggesting that the
woman’s “family feared she was hurt” and that police merely sought to make sure that she was
alright.
• But subsequent reporting from 404 Media based on public records obtained by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation show the police who made this search were pursuing the
woman as part of a “death investigation” into the abortion.

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JOHNSON COUNTY, TEXAS ABORTION SEARCH OF
FLOCK’S DATABASE
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IMMIGRATION-RELATED SEARCHES:
WELCOMING COMMUNITY ORDINANCE ISSUES
• Cambridge's Welcoming Community Ordinance prohibits city officials from assisting federal
immigration enforcement efforts.
• That's exactly what Flock's national database is used for all the time.
o Flock had a contract with Customs and Border Patrol.

o Hundreds of 2025 searches state "ICE" or "immigration" in the search reason field.

o Flock actively shares data with out-of-state police departments (e.g., Florida Highway Patrol) that are
deputized to support immigration detention and enforcement.
 In the first half of 2025, the Florida Highway Patrol made over 12,000 searches of Flock's nationwide
database, which includes many Massachusetts drivers' location information.

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IMMIGRATION-RELATED SEARCHES:
WELCOMING COMMUNITY ORDINANCE ISSUES
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RESTRICTING EXTERNAL SHARING
• Flock advertises that police departments can
restrict external sharing through administrative
controls.
• In Flock training materials shared in response to
public records requests, Flock's system provides
police departments with options to:
o Make their jurisdiction's data discoverable in
Flock's nationwide database
o Automatically accept external data sharing
requests (including within specific geographic
parameters).

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CONTRACT LANGUAGE PROBLEM
• Flock has template contract language that it proposes to police departments.
• Flock suggests that police departments have freedom to select whether they share license plate
reader data externally, and to choose which external departments have access.
• But, even when police departments choose to restrict external sharing through Flock's system,
contract language may give Flock data sharing rights.
• The template contract language may give Flock "a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royaltyfree right and license (during and after the Service Term hereof) to […] disclose the Agency
Data (both inclusive of any Footage) to enable law enforcement monitoring against law
enforcement hotlists as well as provide Footage search access to law enforcement for
investigative purposes only."

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CONTRACT LANGUAGE PROBLEM
• Sample contract language that gives Flock the right to share LPR data externally, even possibly
when the contracting law enforcement agency selects restrictive settings in Flock's system:

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DATA SECURITY: MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
AND HACKING CONCERNS
• In November 2025, Senator Ron Wyden and Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi sent a letter calling on
the FTC to investigate Flock for its failure to require customers to use industry standard security
measures to protect their accounts.
• The lack of data security measures has led to serious cybersecurity breaches of Flock’s data.
o Flock does not require its law enforcement customers to use multi-factor authentication.

• The members of Congress pointed to at least 35 cases in which Flock passwords had been
stolen, and evidence “from a Russian-language cybercrime forum in which Flock accounts
appear to be offered for sale.”

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Attachment: Cambridge City Council Public Safety Committee - ACLUM Presentation on

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REJECTING FLOCK IS THE ONLY WAY TO PROTECT
CAMBRIDGE RESIDENTS
• No matter what sharing settings CPD chooses in Flock's system, ICE and CBP can use legal
process to force Flock to give them data on Massachusetts residents' location information.
• Search reasons entered by external law enforcement are unreliable and often non-descriptive
(e.g., merely stating "investigation" or "wanted").
• Even if Cambridge limits sharing to certain departments, external law enforcement can easily
share login credentials or specific license plate reader data.
• Flock's nationwide license plate reader database is an exceedingly powerful tool. Law
enforcement officers can easily abuse access and make unauthorized searches.

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QUESTIONS?
• If you have follow-up questions, email me at [email protected]

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SOURCES
• Flock Safety: https://www.flocksafety.com/
• 404 Media: https://www.404media.co/
• Electronic Frontier Foundation: https://www.eff.org/
• Associated Press: https://apnews.com/
• Massachusetts Shield Law: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 147, § 63(b)
• Cambridge Welcoming Community Ordinance: Cambridge, Mass., ch. 2.129
• ACLU of Massachusetts Public Records Requests and Responsive Documents
• Letter from Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi, to
Federal Trade Commission Chair Andrew N. Ferguson (Nov. 3, 2025)

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City of Cambridge
COF 2025 #157
IN CITY COUNCIL
December 9, 2025

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Next Steps For Surveillance
Oversight in Cambridge
City of Cambridge Public Safety Committee Hearing, December 12, 2025

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Introduction
• Alex Marthews, chair of Digital Fourth, Belmont resident, works in Cambridge
• Activist and researcher of government surveillance technologies, advisor on Cambridge’s
surveillance oversight ordinance
• Digital Fourth:
• [email protected]
• www.warrantless.org
Volunteer civil liberties group founded in Cambridge in 2012, focusing on the Fourth
Amendment (searches and seizures), privacy and government surveillance issues.

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Improvements to Management of Cambridge’s Surveillance Ordinance
• Clarify going forward that Public Safety Committee is responsible for substantive review of
costs and benefits of all surveillance technologies, including all new technologies and annual
review of approved technologies
• Require City agencies, when writing STIRs, to actively consider and mitigate in advance of
deployment, differential “potential impact(s) on the civil rights and liberties of any
individuals, communities or groups, including, but not limited to, communities of color or
other marginalized communities in the City” and supply “a description of whether there is a
plan to address the impact(s)”, irrespective of whether the technology is funded out of the
City budget
• Review adoption of surveillance cameras in Central/Inman Square
• Don’t assume that “there is no reasonable expectation of privacy” for technologies that
surveil public spaces
• Appoint a standing Privacy Commission, as in Oakland, to advise PSC on decisions

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Law Enforcement Data-Sharing Agreements

• DHS/Urban Areas Security Initiative
• The Boston Regional Intelligence Center
• Joint Terrorism Task Force

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DHS/Urban Areas Security Initiative
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UASI grant funds subject Cambridge to federal
priorities, and involve electeds only at last minute
• UASI is designed to link DHS grant funds for surveillance equipment (gunshot
detection, ALPR, cameras, drones) to universally popular items like subsidies for
ambulance service and funds to protect against radiological attack
• President Trump now conditioning FY26 funds on local PD compliance with
immigration authorities, sharply reduced FY26 grant for Boston area
• Decisions on what surveillance equipment to apply for originate with BRIC and JPOC
committee of the Metropolitan Boston Homeland Security Region, not with elected
officials
• If we want surveillance equipment, we can pay for it ourselves
• RECOMMENDATIONS: WITHDRAW CAMBRIDGE FROM MBHSR; CITY
COUNCIL SHOULD REJECT FUTURE UASI GRANTS, ESPECIALLY WHEN
CONDITIONED ON VIOLATING OUR OWN WELCOMING ORDINANCE

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The Boston Regional Intelligence Center (“BRIC”)
(The local mini-NSA that tracks and polices domestic dissent)

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BRIC renders null any local commitments by
Cambridge to respect rights better than the
federal government
• BRIC has a long track record of harassing and surveilling dissidents, ethnic and
religious minorities and immigrants in the greater Boston area
• CPD defends partnership with BRIC by citing to its Privacy and Civil Liberties
Policy, but the policy isn’t real, and we know it
• BRIC claims falsely to follow a regulation, 28 CFR Part 23, that limits them to
collecting only information based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime.
• Federal agents sit in BRIC
• Boston’s TRUST Act protections are important, but have significant gaps
• RECOMMENDATION: WITHDRAW CPD FROM PARTICIPATION IN BRIC,
PENDING AN OUTSIDE, INDEPENDENT, RANDOM SPOT AUDIT OF BRIC’S
FILES ON CAMBRIDGE RESIDENTS

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The Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)
It’s not just about countering terrorism anymore

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JTTF and the “Antifa Threat”
• Actively disregards threats of violence from white supremacist groups
• Harasses and investigates journalists and filmmakers critical of the police and
President Trump
• “Crime creation” and entrapment of vulnerable young men, often with disabilities
• President Trump and Attorney-General Bondi have very specifically and
intentionally empowered JTTFs to investigate “antifa”:
•

“Opposition to law and immigration enforcement; extreme views in favor of mass migration and
open borders; adherence to radical gender ideology, anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, or antiChristianity.”

• RECOMMENDATION: LIKE PORTLAND, SAN FRANCISCO AND OAKLAND,
WITHDRAW CAMBRIDGE FROM COOPERATION WITH THE BOSTON JOINT
TERRORISM TASK FORCE

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City of Cambridge
COF 2025 #155
IN CITY COUNCIL
December 9, 2025

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OFFICE OF COUNCILLOR
Jivan Sobrinho-Wheeler

CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL
December 5, 2025
Dear esteemed members of the Public Safety Committee, Commissioner Elow and
representatives from the Cambridge Police Department, and representatives from Flock:
Please see questions for your relevant organizations below. I look forward to hearing answers to
these at the December 9, 2025 Public Safety Committee meeting.
For Flock:
1. What distinguishes Flock from other license plate reader companies?
2. Who are your private sector customers? Do private sector customers get access to the
national database, or just to the data they collect?
a. Do law enforcement agency customers get access to some private customers’ LPR
data?
b. Will you sell your LPRs to anyone? Is there a type of business or government
agency that you would not sell to?
c. Do you do background checks on Flock’s clients?
3. How many customers does Flock have in MA? And how many total across the country?
4. I would like to ask you a few questions about reports suggesting that Flock enabled a
search into an abortion-related investigation.
a. Are you aware of the 404 Media reports from the spring of 2025 stating that
Johnson County police officers searched Flock’s database for a woman who had
an abortion?
b. Are you aware of Flock’s block post response from June of 2025 stating that this
reporting perpetuates “narratives that have been proven false”?
c. Are you aware that Flock’s June 2025 blog post claimed, as Johnson County law
enforcement did, that the woman’s “family feared she was hurt and asked the
Sheriff’s deputy to search for her to the best of their abilities”?
d. And are you aware that Flock’s June 2025 blog post claimed that the woman “was
never under criminal investigation by Johnson County” and that “[s]he was being
searched for as a missing person, not as a suspect of a crime”?
e. Subsequent reporting found that, in fact, the woman was the subject of a criminal
investigation. Police who made this search were pursuing the woman as part of a
“death investigation” into the abortion. As 404 Media reporters put it: “In
documents created prior to the publication of our article, there is zero mention of
concern about the woman’s safety. The records show that the police retroactively
795 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE | CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139
TEL: 617.349.7236 FAX: 617.349.4287 | TTY/TDD: 617.349.4242 | EMAIL:
[email protected]
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Attachment: Questions for Flock and CPD at 12-9 Public Safety Committee Meeting (COF 2025 #155 : A communication was received from

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OFFICE OF COUNCILLOR
Jivan Sobrinho-Wheeler

CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL
created a separate document about the Flock search a week after our article was
published, in which they justify the search by saying they were concerned for her
safety.”
f. Did Flock issue a correction from its earlier statements in the June blog?
g. Has Flock taken any action against the Johnson County law enforcement agency
that conducted this search? Is that agency still a Flock customer?
h. Are you familiar with the Massachusetts Shield Law?
i. [If not, briefly explain that the Shield Law prohibits Massachusetts law
enforcement from providing information or assistance to any other state’s
law enforcement agency in relation to investigations into reproductive
healthcare or gender-affirming healthcare that is lawful in the
Commonwealth.]
i. How are you going to stop external queries of MA Flock data regarding abortion
or gender-affirming care from happening in the future? Specifically, when a
search is non-descriptive and simply states “investigation” or “wanted”, how can
Flock guarantee that it wont allow searches that may violate Massachusetts'
Shield Law?
5. Flock’s June 2025 blog suggests some possible mechanisms to prevent abuse of external
sharing, including allowing law enforcement agencies to require case numbers to access
their data, as well as imposing an attestation requirement in which officers attest that their
search is not in regards to certain investigations, namely immigration, gender affirming
care, and abortion.
a. With respect to the case numbers requirement, how would the Cambridge PD
know that case numbers from an external department are real? What would
prevent an external agency or one of its officers from entering random numbers
falsely purporting to be a case number?
b. With respect to the attestation requirement, how would CPD or Flock know if
officers are misrepresenting the actual reason for the search? And how could
Flock meaningfully audit false attestations when officers enter false search
reasons?
c. If Flock were to discover a customer misrepresented the reason for a search, what
steps would Flock take to address the issue?
6. Flock assures companies that they can change their settings to limit data sharing to within
the department or with certain departments. But I’ve also read Flock contract language
that gives Flock “a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free right and license
795 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE | CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139
TEL: 617.349.7236 FAX: 617.349.4287 | TTY/TDD: 617.349.4242 | EMAIL:
[email protected]
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Attachment: Questions for Flock and CPD at 12-9 Public Safety Committee Meeting (COF 2025 #155 : A communication was received from

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OFFICE OF COUNCILLOR
Jivan Sobrinho-Wheeler

CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL
[...] to [...] disclose the Agency Data [...] to enable law enforcement monitoring against
law enforcement hotlists as well as provide Footage search access to law enforcement for
investigative purposes only”
a. What is the purpose of the contract clause giving Flock a license to share data
externally even when a dept. chooses to restrict data sharing?
b. Is this language, or similar language, included in the Cambridge PD contract with
Flock? Will that contract be made public, or accessible to councilmembers?
For CPD:
I have a number of outstanding questions regarding CPD’s response memo that was shared ahead
of the October 20th City Council meeting.
1. Will CPD share PII-redacted Flock audits with the council and public for transparency?
2. Does the decision to not implement single sign-on mean that Cambridge officers cannot
search the nationwide Flock database?
a. Does it mean that external departments contracted with Flock can still access LPR
data collected in Cambridge?
3. As described in bullet five of the CPD response memo, why would Flock notify the City
when a third party (i.e., federal agency) seeks to access Cambridge LPR data, given that
Flock would supposedly not possess ownership of Cambridge LPR data? Shouldn’t third
party agencies seeking access to Cambridge LPR data be in contact solely with the
Cambridge PD?
4. What is the significance of the “restrictive administrative settings” if external officers
supposedly cannot access Flock’s database?
5. How would third party agencies seeking information about these restricted areas be
barred from accessing relevant data when they enter or otherwise share generic or nondescriptive reasons for the search/inquiry (e.g., “investigation” or “wanted”)?
6. Please provide more information on the process for determining external agency access,
including when an external agency does not provide a specified reason for the search
(i.e., merely indicating that there is an ongoing investigation regarding the
vehicle/person).
7. I also have a couple of questions regarding how Flock LPRs would be funded.
a. Has the Trump administration decreased Urban Area Security Initiatives Grant
(UASI) funding for the greater Boston area for FY26?
b. [If yes] So can the council rely on UASI grants to fund Flock LPRs?

795 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE | CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139
TEL: 617.349.7236 FAX: 617.349.4287 | TTY/TDD: 617.349.4242 | EMAIL:
[email protected]
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Attachment: Questions for Flock and CPD at 12-9 Public Safety Committee Meeting (COF 2025 #155 : A communication was received from

OFFICE OF COUNCILLOR
Jivan Sobrinho-Wheeler

CAMBRIDGE CITY COUNCIL
Thank you for your time.
Sincerely,

City of Cambridge Councillor Jivan Sobrinho-Wheeler

795 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE | CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139
TEL: 617.349.7236 FAX: 617.349.4287 | TTY/TDD: 617.349.4242 | EMAIL:
[email protected]
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CMA 2025 #257
IN CITY COUNCIL
December 9, 2025
To the Honorable, the City Council:
I am writing in response to Awaiting Report Item Number 25-53, which requested that the City Manager
consult with relevant departments about the implications of deploying automatic license plate readers
(ALPRs) and provide recommendations as to whether adjustments in plans for deployment should be
made in light of changes since approval in February.
Over the last six weeks the Police Department, Law Department, IT Department, and my office have had
many meetings both internally and with Flock Safety to discuss the concerns raised with the deployment
of ALPRs and how we can ensure the safety of all of our residents, at a point in time where collaboration
between local governments and federal law enforcement has been severely strained.
Please see the attached response from CPD, outlining how the implementation framework is intended to
protect our community and the further comprehensive review that we are currently conducting across
several City departments, focusing on data privacy and security, community impact and transparency,
police oversight and governance, and the contractual terms to align with our Welcoming Community
Ordinance and values.

Very truly yours,

Yi-An Huang
City Manager

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TELEPHONE
(617) 349-3300
WEB
www.cambridgepolice.org

TWITTER
twitter.com/CambridgePolice

Christine Elow
Police Commissioner

Yi-An Huang
City Manager

To:

City Manager, Yi-An Huang

From:

Police Commissioner, Christine Elow

Date:

October 20, 2025

Ref.:

AR #25-53

This memorandum has been prepared in response to Awaiting Report 2025 #53 which inquired into the
implications of deploying license plate readers and provide recommendations as to whether adjustments in
plans for deployment should be made considering changes since approval in February.
The Cambridge Police Department has reviewed the City Council’s order regarding the deployment of
Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and the potential implications considering recent federal
immigration enforcement activity.
The Department is deeply committed to public safety, transparency, and maintaining the trust of our
community. We fully recognize and share the City Council’s concerns regarding data privacy, the misuse of
surveillance technology, and the importance of ensuring Cambridge remains a welcoming and safe city for
all residents—regardless of immigration status or other legally protected activities.
Although the technology was originally approved before the most recent updates to the City’s Welcoming
Ordinance, our ALPR policy was developed in alignment with those updated protections as well as with the
Commonwealth’s Shield Law. Our implementation framework was deliberately designed to ensure that
ALPR technology is not used to support or assist in any immigration enforcement efforts or in investigations
related to activities that are legally protected in Massachusetts, including reproductive or gender-affirming
care.
The intended use of ALPR technology is solely for legitimate public safety purposes—such as locating
stolen vehicles, investigating violent crimes, identifying vehicles connected to missing persons, and
improving traffic safety.
A comprehensive review is currently underway with relevant City departments to assess the legal,
operational, and community implications of ALPR deployment. This review will specifically focus on the
following areas:
Data Privacy and Security
• Flock Group Inc. performs an annual SOC 2 Type 2 audit. The purpose of this audit is to ensure
that the Flock Safety Solution System has the proper organizational and system controls in place
and practices such controls to ensure relevant security, availability and confidentiality. This audit
also verifies that employee access to sensitive systems and data is appropriately restricted and
monitored in alignment with security best practices. In review of their most recent audit, which
covers February 16, 2024, to February 15, 2025, there were no exceptions noted. The audit is
conducted by Moss Adams, which is a reputable firm in the accounting industry.

ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO
125 SIXTH STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02142

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Attachment: AR Response 2025 53_ALPRs (CMA 2025 #257 : AR #25-53 Response RE: License Plate Readers)

FACEBOOK
facebook.com/CambridgePolice

•

The Public Safety IT Team has deliberately not implemented single sign-on for the Flock Safety
Solution System; by doing this the system is isolated from our network and facilitates limiting user
access. It is also important to note that there are no data feeds to or from the Flock Safety Solution
System for any of the systems in the public safety network.

•

The City of Cambridge owns all data collected by the ALPR system. Section 4.1 of our contract
(Customer Data) explicitly states that all data is retained solely by the City.

•

Flock’s role is limited to providing technical services. It has no ownership of or open access to
Cambridge data. Any use of anonymized, non-identifiable information (Section 4.3) is limited to
improving system functionality, such as identifying new vehicle models.

•

The Cambridge Police Department does not share data with external agencies, including federal
immigration enforcement, except when legally required through a subpoena or court order. Flock is
required to notify the City if such a request is made.

•

The Department has activated restrictive administrative settings that prohibit access to data related
to immigration enforcement, gender-affirming care, and reproductive health care.

•

Data may be shared only with the Office of the District Attorney for court-mandated discovery in
criminal cases or through proper legal process (e.g., subpoena, warrant, or court order).

•

Requests from external agencies (e.g., for a missing person, Amber or Silver Alert, or stolen
vehicle) are reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with consideration of legal authority and community
impact.

Community Impact and Transparency
• Quarterly audits will regularly assess data accuracy and policy compliance.
• Public transparency reports will summarize audit outcomes, including data access, sharing
instances with the reason, and policy adherence.
• All ALPR data access is fully logged, with metadata tracking user identity, date, time, and purpose.
• The Department will host community information sessions and public forums to explain how the
system works, how data is protected, and how privacy safeguards are enforced.
Policy Oversight and Governance
• The ALPR policy will be updated to reflect community feedback, changes in law, or evolving best
practices.
• Access to ALPR data is strictly limited to authorized personnel with role-based permissions.
• All data is encrypted, stored securely, and automatically deleted after 30 days if not actively used in
an authorized investigation. After 30 days, the data is not retrievable.
Contractual and Operational Review
• Law Dept -The City and Police Department are reviewing contractual terms with Flock to ensure
continued alignment with the City’s Welcoming Ordinance and community values.
The Cambridge Police Department appreciates the City Council’s continued oversight and partnership in
ensuring that public safety tools are deployed responsibly, ethically, and transparently. Our shared goal
remains to enhance safety, protect victims, and uphold the privacy and rights of everyone in our community.
Respectfully,
Christine Elow
Police Commissioner

ADDRESS ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO
125 SIXTH STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02142

Packet Pg. 37

Attachment: AR Response 2025 53_ALPRs (CMA 2025 #257 : AR #25-53 Response RE: License Plate Readers)

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